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22. Coming to the Indian decisions, a distinction is drawn between an action for defamation in a Civil Court and a criminal prosecution for defamation. In regard to the latter it has been held that the absolute privilege accorded in England to a party or a witness or an advocate in connection with judicial proceedings cannot apply; it is only qualified privilege and it must come within one of the exceptions of Section 499 of the Indian Penal Code - vide Tiruvengada Mudali v. Tripurasundari Ammal (1926) 51 M.L.J. 112 : I.L.R. 49 Mad. 728 (F.B.), Satish Chandra Chakravarti v. Ram Doyal De (1920) I.L.R. 48 Cal. 388 (S.B.) and Bai Shanta v. Umrao Amir (1925) I.L.R. 50 Bom. 162 (F.B.). The reason given is that the law having been codified by statute, the latter must prevail. But for civil wrongs there has been no such codification and the rule of law that is applicable is justice, equity and good conscience. It is no doubt anomalous that in connection with the same matter one principle of law should apply for the purpose of a criminal case and another for the purpose of a civil action. But the anomaly is there, and until the Legislature intervenes, it must be recognised. However, the rule which is now to be applied for the case on hand is the rule of justice, equity and good conscience, which has been generally understood to be the principles of common law in England so far as they are applicable to Indian Society having regard to the circumstances of the case. But where the principles of common law in England are in a state of uncertainty, there is nothing to preclude us applying that view of the law which is essentially just and equitable cf. Parvathi v. Mannar (1884) I.L.R. 8 Mad. 175 and which is in consonance with the principle on which the doctrine of privilege is based. In our opinion the older view of treating communications like the one in question under the head of qualified privilege ought to be the rule of justice, equity and good conscience. Even in England authority is not wanting for the view that the doctrine of absolute privilege should not be extended vide Lopes, L.J., in Royal Aquarium and Summer and Winter Garden Society, Ltd. v. Parkinson (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 at 451. And where the Indian Legislature has chosen to depart for the purpose of criminal law from the doctrine of absolute privilege as applied by the common law of England, it seems to us that the extension made in More v. Weaver (1928) 2 K.B. 520 should not be adopted here. Therefore the defendants cannot escape liability for their wrongful act unless it is proved that in so doing they were not actuated by malice. We have already found that the words spoken concerning the 2nd plaintiff were false and made from an improper motive. As observed by Lord Esher in Royal Aquarium, etc. v. Parkinson (1892) 1 Q.B. 431 at 443: