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1. Two important questions of law arising' for our consideration in this petition are as under.

(i) "Whether Rule 233 of the Gujarat Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, is ultra vires Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988?"

(ii) "Whether the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act (of 1939 or 1988 as the case may be) has got powers under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for enforcement and execution of its award i.e. whether such Claims Tribunal can be called or equated with Court and can execute an award like a decree?

9.3. The above decision has been referred to and relied upon by this High Court in the case of Kishanchand v. KM. Satwani. reported in 1975 A.C.J. 433. In para 2 of the said judgment, it has been held as under:

In a series of decisions of this Court, the Claims Tribunal when it deals with such compensation matters, has been held to be a 'Court' because the claims Tribunal is constituted in supersession of the ordinary Courts of the land for this purpose with all the powers of the Court and it has to pronounce a definitive judgment in accordance with law, after proper evidence is led for fastening the liability, on the basis of fault. After considering the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act as a single Judge, I had decided this question on settled principles in Special Civil Application No. 1599 of 1969 decided on May 23, 1970 and that view was approved in the decision of the Division Bench where Patel, J. spoke for the Division Bench for both of us in F.A. No. 280 of 1968 decided on November 15/16, 1971. Even the relevant Bombay Motor Vehicles Rules, 1959 hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules' make a clear provision in Rule 306 for a judgment of the Claims Tribunal by enacting that the Claims Tribunal in passing order, shall record concisely in a judgment the finding on each of the issues framed and its reasons for such finding. Therefore, it is obvious that in such Motor Accidents Claims proceedings which result in an award of compensation under Section 110-D the Claims Tribunal has to pass a formal judgment in accordance with which a formal award or decree has to be drawn up as required by the provisions of the Code. The Claims Tribunal, being a Court, would be governed by the provisions of the Code in that respect. That is why Rule 310 even enacts that in so far as these rules make no provision or make insufficient provisions the Claims Tribunal shall follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the trial of suits. It is against such an award of the Claims Tribunal under Section 110B that an appeal is provided to this Court under Section 110D. Rule 312(3) provides that the provisions of Order 41 and Order 21 in the Code shall mutatis mutandis apply to appeals preferred to the High Courts under Section HOD. Therefore, there is not only a judgment and formally drawn up award against which an appeal had to be filed but the original decree or the decree in appeal could be executed by invoking the provisions under Order 21 of the Code. Therefore on both the grounds that the Claims Tribunal is a Court and because of these specific provisions it is obvious that the Claims Tribunal's judgment has to be formally embodied in the award like a Civil Court's decree and therefore the award has got to be drawn up and to that extent the Tribunal was right in its view.

10. Mr. Padiya, the learned Advocate for the petitioner as a last resort finally submitted that in view of the fact that Section 173 of the 'Act, 1988' clearly bars jurisdiction of the Civil Court and in that view of the matter, the Tribunal was not justified in assuming any exercising powers of the Civil Court by resorting to and applying provisions under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Now this is a total misconception of law. Oh going through the scheme and object of the 'Act, 1988' and Rules made thereunder viz. 'Rules. 1989' it is difficult to conceive as to how Section 175 of the 'Act. 1988' which pertains to the bar of the Civil Court can forbid the Tribunal in resorting to and adopting and applying the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is one thing and the application of the Code of Civil Procedure is entirely a different thing. Both stand on different footings. It has to be appreciated that the bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has been created only and simply because the 'Act, 1988' has created a special and exclusive jurisdiction to deal with the cases of motor accident claims arising out of the vehicular accidents. Obviously, no such claim proceedings for which the Special Motor Accident Claims Tribunals are constituted can lie before the Civil Court. Under the circumstances, Section 175 of the 'Act, 1988' which speaks about bar of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court has nothing to do with the application of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the proceedings before the Claims Tribunal. As a matter of fact, Mr. Padiya forgets that Rule 229 of the Rules, 1989' in terms permits the application of the Code of Civil Procedure. 1908, to the Tribunal proceedings. So far as the enforcement of an award of the Tribunal is concerned, Rule 333 of the 'Rules, 1989' is so patently clear regarding application of Code of Civil Procedure that it needs no further comments on our part.

11. In view of the above discussion, both the contentions raised by Mr. Padiya having no substance have to be rejected. We accordingly hold that (i) Rule 233 of 'Rules, 1989' is intra vires Section 174 of 'Act, 1988', and (ii) that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal constituted under the provisions of 'Act, 1988' is a 'Court' for all intents and purposes including enforcement of its award and therefore can exercise powers under Section 47 and Order 21 Civil Procedure Code, 1908, and that what is barred by Section 175 of 'Act, 1988' is the jurisdiction of Civil Court and not the procedure to be applied under Civil Procedure Code.