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As the trio raised common questions of law, they are disposed of by a common judgment.

The 1st petitioner in the Writ Petition is an Association representing the officers of the State Civil Service of U.P. and petitioner Nos. 2 to 17 are its members. some of them and Bihar State Officers are the appellants in the two appeals respectively. On January 19, 1984, the association represented to the Govt. of India requesing to remove wide disparity prevailing in different States of promotional avenues from the State Civil Services to All India Administrative Service. The officers from Andhra Pradesh and Kerala, on completion of 8 to 9 years of service are becoming qualified for promotion to All India Administrative Service, while the officers from States like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar would get chance only after putting 24 to 27 years of service. The Estimate Committee of Seventh Lok Sabha too in its 77th Report highlighted the injustice. A committee of A senior Secretaries constituted by the Union Govt. recommended, after due consideration, to evolve equitable principles of comparable seniority from different States for promotion to Indian Administrative Service. Pursuant thereto the Central Govt. proposed to amend the Indian Administrative Service (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1954, for short 'the Seniority Rules'. In the meantime the Rules were repealed and replaced by I.A.S. (Regulation of Seniority) Rules, 1987 which came with effect from Nov. 6, 1987 for short 'New Seniority Rules'. The first respondent issued (Circular letter dated September 9, 1986 to the State Govts. indicating amendments for fixation of seniority of officers promoted from State Civil Services' to I.A.S. to give weightage over and above 4 years in the assignment of year of allotment as per the existing relevant rules, namely, four years for the first 12 years State service with additional weightage of one year for every two to three years' completed service subject to a maximum of five years. After receiving suggestions or comments from State Governments, the Central India exercising the power under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 3 of All India Service Act, 1951 for short, 'the Act' amended the New Seniority Rules, 1987 which amendment was published in the Gazette of India on February 3, 1989 for short the 'First Amendment Rules'. The proviso thereto was made limiting its operation prospectively from February 3, 1989. Putting the proviso and its prospective operation in issue, the appellants from U.P. in Civil Appeal No. 4788 of 1992[S.L.P. (C) No. 13823 of 1991] filed Original Application No. 18 of 1989 in the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad at Lucknow Circuit Bench, contending that they were promoted in 1980 onwards but by limiting its application to November 6, 1987, they were discriminated. Bihar Officers questioned the Rule in O.A. No. 136 of 1989 before the C.A.T. at Patna. Therein the appellants though found to be entitled to the total weightage of 9 years since their juniors were given 1983 as the year of allotment by operation of proviso to Rule 3(3)(ii) of the First Amendment Rules were given 1983 as the year of allotment. Thereby they were denied 3 years weightage.

It is equally settled law that in an affirmative action the court strike down a rule which offends the right to equality enshrined in Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution like the one arose in D.S. Nakara v. Union of India, [1983] 2 SCR 165 and B. Prabhakar Rao v. state of A.P., [1985]2 suppl, SCR 379, this court extended parity in an affirmative action by reading the rule down without doing violence to the language or injustice to others. The application of the First Amendment Rule has the inevitable and insiduous effect of doing injustice to the direct recruit/promotee officers or officers promoted earlier to Feb. 3 1989 and the proviso avoided such injustice to the date of promotion to I.A.S the rule to all the senior irrespective of the date of promotion to I.A.S. cadre would land in or lead to inequitous or unjust results which itself is unfair, arbitrary and unjust results which itself is unfair, arbitrary and unjust, offending Art. 14 of the Constitution. To avoid such unconstitutional consequences the proviso to rule 3(3) (ii) of the First Amendment Rules was made. The doctrine or kicking down or picking up, put forth in Union of India v. P.K. Roy, [1968] 2 SCR 1986 at 201-202, equally cannot be extended to the facts of the case. But for the proviso the operation of rule 3(3) (ii) would be inconsistent with sec. 3(1A) of the Act. Equally though the doctrine of reading down is a settled principle of law, its application to the facts of the case would lead to injustice to the officers promoted earlier to the appellants. A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to give full benefit of weightage of rule 3(3) (ii) and (b) of the First Amendment Rules would amount to direct the executive to disobey the proviso which is now held to be intra vires of the Constitution. In the light of the above discussion no directions could be given to the central Govt. to amend to Rules. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that though Govt. of India has power to amend the New Seniority Rules by First Amendment Rules prospectively giving weightage of total 9 years services to promotee officers of state Civil services in assigning a year of allotment, no direction or mandamus could be issued commanding the Central Govt. To disobey the proviso or to apply the rules retrospectively to all the officers even to word out monetary benefits as contended by sri Vaidyanathan. His further contention that the First Amendment Rules would be applied with effect form the date of the New seniority Rules or date of intimation of the proposed First Amendment Rules to the state Government for limited retrospectivity also cannot be acceded to for the same reasons.

Its bare reading clearly indicates that the Rules made under the Act shall not be given retrospective effect so as to prejudicially affect the "interest of any person to whom such rules may be applicable". The attempt of Sri Vidyanathan that this rule may be so read as applicable only to the promotee officers vis-a-vis the senior promotee officers cannot be accepted. The Lucknow Bench of the C.A.T glossed over it by adopting strange construction that since the offending proviso to rule 3(3) (ii) of the First Amendment Rules would apply to promotee officers inter se , sub-section (1) (a) of section 3 of the Act would not apply to the direct recruits, to say the least, is disparate construction. There is a distinction between right and interest. No one has vested right to promotion or seniority, but an officer has an interest to seniority , But an officer has an interest to seniority acquired by working out the rule. Of course, it could be taken away only by operation of valid law. Sub-section (1A) of sec. 3 of the Act enjoins the authorities not to give retrospective effect to such a rule or regulation so as to avoid "Prejudicial affect to the interest" of any person to whom such rule may be applicable. The operation of law may have the effect of postponing the future consideration of the claims or legitimate expectation of interest for promotion. Take a case as an illustration. Articles 14 16(1), 16(4) ,335 and 46 read with proviso to Art. 309 of the Constitution empowers the President or the Governor to make satutory rules of reservation, where there is no adequate representation to persons belonging to scheduled castes and scheduled Tribes in a service or posts in connection with the affairs of the Central Govt. or the state Government. By operation of rule of reservation appointments or promotions given to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe officer, though prejudicially affect the interest of officers of general category on parity of merit, in the larger public interest by the operation of the rule of reservation discrimination in favour of scheduled castes and scheduled Tribes ins constitutionally permissible as class. Therefore, the proviso to rule 3(3) (ii) of the Amendment Rules is consistent with section 3(1A) of the Act, and that therefore, it is not ultra vires of the power of the central Govt. nor it offends Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the constitution.

By operation of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 3 the rules laid on the floor of each House of the Parliament. There were no suggestions or alterations made by either House of Parliament. Under the circumstance we have no hesitation to hold that the failure to consult all the State Governments or Union Territories on the proviso to rule 3(3)(ii) or

(iii) of the First Amendment Rules does not render the proviso ultra vires, invalid or void. Accordingly, we do not find any merit to issue the writ as prayed for in the writ petition. The Writ Petition and Civil Appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 12469/90 are dismissed. The appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 13823/91 is allowed and the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench at Lucknow is set side. But in the circumstance parties are directed to bear their own costs throughout.