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The learned District Munsif Held, following the opinion expressed by Mayne in his "Hindu Law and Usage" and certain observations occurring in the judgment of Viswanatha Sastri J. in --'Radha Ammal v. Commr. of Income-tax, Madras', (A), that on the death of the widow the estate devolved on the daughter as the heir of her father and accordingly ordered the application. It is the correctness of this view that is questioned by defendants 1 and 2 in this revision. The point for determination is whether on the death of the widow Rama-banamma, her husband's share survives to his coparceners, defendants l and 2, as contended by the petitioners or whether it devolves on his own heirs as maintained by the first respondent Krishna Prasadam. No authority directly deciding this question has been cited before us, but counsel on both sides relied on observations made in the course of Judgments in cases arising under the Act, as lending support to their respective contentions. The question, however, falls to be considered primarily on the construction of the relevant provisions of the Act because the right claimed by the respondent is not one recognised by the Hindu common law, but is wholly a creature of the Act and must be found within the four corners thereof. The contention of the first respondent is based on Sections 3(2) and 3(3) of the Act which runs as follows:

"Section 3(2): When a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had. Section 3 (3): Any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu woman's estate, provided however that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner."

6. It was contended that even if Section 3(2) could not be construed as bringing about a division in status, the effect of Section 3(3) was to confer the estate on the respondent as the heir of her father and to bar the rights of defendants 1 and 2 to take the same by survivorship. The argument Is that the interest taken by a widow under Section 3(2) is described in Section 3(3) as what is known as "woman's estate" under the Hindu law; that one of the incidents which the law annexes to that estate is that on the death of the limited owner the estate devolves on the heirs of the last male-holder and that, therefore, the estate taken by the widow under Section 3(2) should devolve on her husband's heirs. The question is whether the words "woman's estate" in Section 3(3) import that the properties should devolve after the death of the widow on her husband's heirs. Reliance wss placed on the following passage in Mayne's Hindu law and Usage, 11th Edn. page 753:

"The distinctive feature of the estate is that, at her death, it reverts to the heirs of the last male owner, or to the heirs of the last full female owner in the case of Stridhana property."

With respect, it is not quite accurate to state that it is an incident of a woman's estate that it should revert to the heirs of the last maleholder. There may be considerable difficulty in describing the precise character of a woman's estate in terms of legal phraseology known to British jurisprudence. It is now a life estate as understood in that system; the widow is entitled to represent the estate in certain events; she is entitled to alienate it absolutely in case of necessity and for certain purposes recognised as proper under the law. But when all is said, the fact remains that a woman's estate is not an estate of inheritance and that is stated clearly enough by Mayne when he adds "she never becomes a fresh stock of descent". It is, therefore, a contradiction in terms to speak of woman's estate as reverting to the heirs of the last maleholder. In law, the woman's estate dies with her and there is nothing left of it which could revert. It is true that when the estate comes to an end the properties devolve on the heirs of the last maleholder. But that, however, is no more a distinctive feature of the woman's estate than is darkness a distinctive feature of the Sun, for the reason that when the Sun sets darkness comes on the scene. It would be erroneous to regard the expression "woman's estate" in Section 3(3) as enacting by implication that on the death of the widow the estate devolves on the heirs of her husband. That would in substance be substituting the Dayabhaga rule of succession in the place of the Mitakshara law of survivorship and for that, as already stated, there is no foundation in the statute. The true purpose of Section 3(3) is not to confer rights on persons other than the widow, but to limit her rights over the estate to which she becomes entitled under Section 3(2). The substance of the matter is that she cannot alienate the properties except for purposes recognised by Hindu law as proper and binding. Incidentally, it may be observed that if the widow takes as heir under Section 3(2), there is no need to enact a provision like Section 3(3) because as heir the widow will take only a woman's estate. On the other hand, if the widow takes as the surviving half of her husband, it may be open to argument whether she is not entitled to alienate the property absolutely in the same manner as her husband and the need for such a provision as it contained in Section 3(3) becomes obvious.