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The Founder President of Ambedkar Revolution Front has filed this writ petition for issuance of a writ of certiorarified mandamus to quash the order of the second respondent dated 22.01.2014 and direct the respondents to permit the petitioner to conduct a peaceful procession and a meeting at Manalmedu, Nagapattinam District on 05.02.2014.

2.It is the case of the petitioner that he is the Founder and President of Ambedkar Revolution Front and he has been working for the welfare of the people. On 05.02.2006, one Shankar @ Manalmedu Shankar was killed in fake encounter and the petitioner made arrangements to celebrate his 7th death anniversary on 05.02.2014. Therefore, the petitioner sent a representation to the respondents, seeking permission to conduct a peaceful procession from Manalmedu Bazar to Kalathur Memorial on 05.02.2014. While so, the second respondent, by letter dated 22.01.2014, declined to give permission, stating that Section 30(2) of the Police Act is in force in the area and if permission is granted, law and order problem would arise.

9. In the case of S.Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram, cited supra, the Supreme Court had held that the democracy is a government by the people via open discussion. The democratic form of government itself demands its citizens an active and intelligent participation in the affairs of the community. The public discussion with peoples participation is a basic feature and a rational process of democracy which distinguishes it from all other forms of government. The democracy can neither work nor prosper unless people go out to share their views. The truth is that public discussion on issues relating to administration has positive value. The Supreme Court further held that there must be freedom of thought and the mind must be ready to receive new ideas, to critically analyse and examine them and to accept those which are found to stand the test of scrutiny and to reject the rest. Article 19(2), freedom of expression cannot be suppressed on account of threat of demonstration and processions or threats of violence. That would tantamount to negation of the rule of law and a surrender to blackmail and intimidation. It is the duty of the State to protect the freedom of expression since it is a liberty guaranteed against the State. The State cannot plead its inability to handle the hostile audience problem. It is its obligatory duty to prevent it and protect the freedom of expression.

30. Thus, both the rights of freedom of speech and expression and the right to assemble peaceably are subject to reasonable restrictions from the point of view of public order, security of State, etc., and they are not absolute rights.

36. It is thus evident that public order is a matter within the domain of the State Legislature and the State Executive. That being so, it is not proper for the Judiciary to interfere in matters relating to public order, unless there is violation of some constitutional or statutory provision. There are various considerations for the administration in this matter and the Court should not ordinarily interfere with administrative decisions in this connection. It must be remembered that certain matters are by their very nature such as had better be left to the experts in the field instead of the courts themselves seeking to substitute their own views and perceptions as to what is the best way to deal with the situation. In the present case, this Court should not interfere in a matter which relates to the administration, which is in the best position to know about the public order. What public order problem would arise if speeches are permitted or prohibited in connection with the arrest of Sankarachariyar and other incidental matters? How should the problem be tackled? It is the administration that best knows these problems and their solution. This Court should therefore exercise self-restraint and should not embarrass the administrative authorities in this connection.

iv) yet another decision of this Court in W.P.No.1017 of 2010 dated 12.05.2010, in the case of M.Balaguru vs. The Commissioner of Police, Egmore and others;

"12. Section 41 of the Chennai City Police Act, 1888 clearly empowers the police authority to regulate assemblies, meetings and processions in public places. When the police receive Intelligence report with regard to the disturbance of law and order problem, to prevent the same, it is their duty to prohibit the conduct of the meeting. Power to regulate includes power to cancel the permission already granted for valid reasons. In this case, the second respondent has given valid reasons in the counter affidavit by stating that Intelligence report was received apprehending likelihood of law and order problem and imminent possibility of unrest and disturbance of public order and tranquility. When the police is vested with the said power under Section 41 of the Act, the petitioner cannot contend that the permission already granted ought not to have been cancelled. The ground reality about the likelihood of disturbance of public order and tranquility can be ascertained only by the Officer, who is in charge of the area based on the Intelligence report and this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot find out whether there was any sufficient ground to arrive at a decision to cancel the permission already granted. Since no mala fide is alleged against the second respondent and the permission having been granted by the very same second respondent for the subsequent meeting held on 22.3.2010, I am of the view that the cancellation of permission originally granted to conduct the meeting on 5.1.2010 based on the Intelligence report cannot be found fault with.