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12. Creditably, the learned Counsel on both the sides have presented certain precedents to fortify their contentions. But this Court will deal with the questions on their worth and depth. It is too late in the day to fetter the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to deal with any matter before it and exercise powers without fetters or embargoes to do justice, within the four corners of the Constitution and sometimes even beyond when it concerns the basic structure of the Constitution, (Kesavananda Bharathi v. State of Kerala, and Minerva Mills Limited v. Union of India, ). By evolving the basic structure theory, the powers of the Court to evolve the method of dispensing justice sometimes beyond Constitution, was conceded. The best illustration is the latest pronouncement of the Supreme Court confirming the Full Bench decision of this Court ignoring the bar on Courts in relation to matters entertainable by the Administrative Tribunals (Part IV-A, Article 232-A and 323-B of the Constitution-Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, ). A Full Bench of this Court in Badruka College of Commerce v. State of AP, , declared the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution as follows :

14. Another anchor of the challenge to the maintainability of the writ petitions is the right of the petitioners to be absorbed regularly or appointed is no fundamental right which can be pleaded, established or accepted in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is true that right to employment is not a fundamental right. In State of Bihar v. Secretary, AIR 1994 SC 736 it was held that empanelling of candidates selected does not acquire indefeasible right to be appointed and the empandment would be only a condition of eligibility for appointment but does not create vested right of appointment. In A.V. Nachne v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1126 it was held that a claim based on settlement is not a fundamental right and cannot be enforced under Article 226 of the Constitution. These precedents, bear no basis to consider the real issues in these batch of cases. The petitioners are not trying to enforce any right of appointment as a fundamental right on the ground of empanelment but they are complaining of the failure of the statutory duty of the respondent bank as a State in not implementing the concluded terms of the settlement inasmuch as the directions of this Court in W.P.No.4194/97 to implement it within a particular date. Therefore, fundamentally such precedents or principles are distinguishable on the facts and the scope of these writ petitions. On the other hand, the precedents are plenty that the Courts have interfered in such matters where there is an established right and the violation and the failure to exercise the statutory duty, by a State, and where there is discrimination based on certain matters among the persons equally placed and equally to be appointed or absorbed. (Air India Statutory Authority v. United Labour Union and others, 1997 (2) Supreme 165, D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A. Industries Limited, 1993 (4) SCC 126 = 1993 (4) SLR 126, Ashok Kumar v. Chairman, BSRB, and Jacob M. Putthu Parambil v. Kerala Water Authority, AIR 1990 SC 2228, which will be dealt within detail at the appropriate stage. But it would be appropriate to remind the legal thinking and the thinkers that the fundamental rights envisaged in Chapter III of the Constitution are not exhaustive and there may be many fundamental rights sprouting from the basic structure of the Constitution which are not defined in the Constitution so as to decipher and to ensure the same. In Unnikrishnan v. Union of India, the Supreme Court declared the law as a land mark and as a human right that it is not necessary that the right should be expressly stated as a fundamental right in Chapter III and new rights can be read into and inferred from the rights stated in Chapter III. It is also possible in the context of reading the fundamental rights and Directive Principles of State Policy as supplementary and complimentary to each other any new fundamental right as a basic structure of the Constitution can be made out and ensured. It was pointed out therein that any such interpretation must be done having due regard to the preamble and the Directive Principles of State Policy. There are some fundamental rights which flow from right to life within the meaning of Article 21 of the Constitution. We can still examine whether the right to absorb in the regular vacancy by virtue of the facts and circumstances of the case attracts Article 21 of the Constitution as in the present case, and could be a fundamental right as the basic structure of the Constitution. Or otherwise, the true intent of the Constitutional guarantees, particularly with reference to Article 21 in which night to live is implicit, would be a farce. Therefore, if the petitioners are able to make out such a fundamental right within Chapter III or in the basic structure of the Constitution having due regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court may not have any reason to withhold to exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution.

30. Mr. Manohar, the learned Counsel for the respondent/Bank is projecting the helplessness of the bank to implement the settlements to absorb all the empanelled workers including the petitioners for want of vacancies arising before 31-3-1997. Already it is indicated that the bank could not have prepared panels without reference to the vacancies arising plus 10% for the purpose of preparation of the panels. Moreover, when the persons in the panels were to be absorbed as a full and final settlement between the Federation and the Bank, pleading inability on such grounds will not absolve the bank. The alternative to retrench or terminate such employees like the petitioners beyond 31-3-1997 by not implementing the settlements would be illegal and would be definitely unfair labour practice within the meaning of Section 2(ra) of the ID Act which cannot be allowed to be perpetrated. Mr. Manohar, theleamed Counsel relying upon Ashok Kutmr's case (16 supra) contended that in view of the equal opportunity, any appointment to vacancies arising subsequently without notifying the same just because the wait listed persons were there would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In that case, the same respondent bank (SBI) and other Nationalised Banks in Eastern region of India gave a requisition for recruitment of certain vacancies. In the year 1983, the Recruitment Board for SBI has prepared a select list of 3100 candidates to be appointed by the State Bank of India and since the vacancies had arisen to the extent of 6700, the Nationalised Banks had made a mess of the recruitment of the candidates in excess of the notified vacancies. In that background it was stated that Articles Hand 16 of the Constitution enshrine fundamental right to every citizen to claim consideration for appointment to a post under the State and the appointment of the persons kept in the waiting list by the respective recruitment boards to the vacancies that had arisen subsequently without notifying them for recruitment is unconstitutional. The facts presented therein are totally different from the facts of this case. There was no question of any settlement between the employees or the Federation and the Bank for implementation. There was no settlement not to recruit further till empanelled candidates have been absorbed as in the present case. In no way Ashok Kumar's case supra and the present case bear similarity to draw the principle. This case involving the settlements, almost the awards, were to be implemented in any manner according to the terms thereunder as a wholetime exercise without leaving any other remedy to them except the one covered by the awards. The obligation of the State like the bank to absorb such candidates either within the scope of the settlements or otherwise would be a legal and constitutional requirement. In Jacob M. Puthuparambil's case (supra) it was held that where appointment of employees by way of stop gap arrangement till regular appointments are made is resorted to and continued for more than two years, and possessing requisite qualifications, they are entitled to be regularised. In that case also appointments were made and intended to serve emergent situations which could not brook delay and that such appointments were intended to serve the stated purpose and not long term ones that the rule was not intended to till a large number of posts in the service but only those which could not be kept vacant till regular appointments were made in accordance with the rules, but once the appointments continued for long, the services had to be regularised if the incumbent possessed the requisite qualification for the post. Even according to the bank herein such appointments were made as stop gap due to emergency and when they were allowed to work for long period in such vacancies, they were bound to be regularised as long as they possess the requisite qualifications. Possibly with that spirit, die settlements in question were brought about. In Air India Statutory Authority Corporation case (supra), the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 10 of Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 held that when the conditions of work which is perennial in nature as envisaged in subsection (2) of Section 10 are satisfied and when continuance of contract labour stands prohibited and abolished, the consequence would be that the principal employer is under statutory obligation to absorb the contract labour and they will be treated as regular employees from the date on which contract labour system in establishment gets abolished. It is also held therein that where there is violation of such a principle, there is a right of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution which is recognised now as a basic structure of the Constitution. On analogy in principle the same rule applies to the present case also wherein the petitioners whose services had been taken for long periods although intermittently although assured of one time consideration for absorption under the settlements and when the bank thought of grudging it to implement, the petitioners were justified in seeking judicial review of their rights under the settlements which should be accepted to be a basic structure of the Constitution.