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(a) to quash Annexure-1 and the sub sequent proceedings arising out of the said Annexure-1,
(b) to injunct opposite party No. 4 not to proceed with the enquiry; and
(c) to declare the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution as ultra vires.

2. Mr. Das, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, contends that the petition filed by Sri Sahu being addressed to the Secretary and not to the speaker as required under Rule 6 of the Rules is illegal and thus not maintainable. He further contends that the speaker had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to the Committee for making a preliminary enquiry under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 7 since the prior stages contained in Sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) have not been complied with. On the question of constitutional validity, Mr. Das urges that the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution violates the basic structure of the Constitution and is repugnant to Article 388 and ,therefore, must be struck down. On the question whether a petition is maintainable in view of Article 212 of the Constitution, the learned Counsel cites a number of authorities and strongly relies upon the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal v. Union of India, AIR 1987 Punj & Har 263 (Full Bench) and another decision of the Supreme Court in the case of In re, under Article 143, Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745. 3. Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution vests the power with the Speaker of the State Legislature to determine the question whether a member has become subject to disqualification Para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule unequivocally states that a proceeding under para 6(1) shall be deemed to be a proceeding in the Legislature of the State within the meaning of Article 212. Article 212(1) of the Constitutions prohibits scrutiny by Court with regard to the validity of any proceeding in the Legislature of a State on the ground of irregularity of procedure. Article 212(2) makes an officer or member of the Legislature of a State immune from the jurisdiction of the Court on whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution in respect of exercise of those powers by him. In view of para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule the impugned proceedings against the petitioner must be held to be a proceeding in the Legislature of the State, within the meaning of Article 212 of the Constitution and, therefore, the bar of jurisdiction contained in Article 212 of the Constitution would apply. Mr. Das appearing for the petitioner concedes that the speaker has the jurisdiction to decide the question of disqualification of a Member of the Legislative Assembly, but he contends that the infirmities pointed out by him make the proceeding illegal inasmuch as the procedure laid down by law has not been followed and, therefore, this Court will have jurisdiction to entertain and decide the matter. According to Mr. Das, the infirmities are that the petition was addressed to the Secretary and that the Speaker referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges without following the procedure contained in Rule 7(2) and (3) of the Rules. It is also not disputed by Mr. Das that though the application was addressed to the Secretary, yet it is the Speaker who is hi seisin of the matter and has referred the same to the Committee. In my considered opinion, the alleged infirmities are pertaining to the procedure in relation to a proceeding inside the Legislature of a State since the disqualification proceeding by operation of Constitutional provision has been deemed to be a proceeding inside the Legislature of a State. That being so, the Court will have no jurisdiction to go into the question of validity of such proceeding which is within the special jurisdiction of the Legislature itself. It would be sufficient for the purpose of this case to notice an observation of the Supreme Court in this connection in the case of M.S.M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha, AIR 1960 SC 1186, which is as follows (Paragraph 10) :--

9. It is not disputed by Mr. Das, in view of para 6(2) of the Tenth Schedule, that a proceeding under para 6( ) of the same Schedule, namely, a proceeding to resolve the question as to whether or not a member has become subject to disqualification is a proceeding in the Legislature of the State to which the provisions of Article 212 of the Constitution are attracted. It is his submission, however, that notwithstanding such applicability of Article 212, yet so far as the petitioner's challenge is concerned, it is not in relation to a proceeding in the Assembly but questions the very commencement and maintainability of the proceeding on the petition of the Opp. party No. 6, to which the bar under Article 212 would not apply. It is further contended that the bar under Article 212 extends only to irregularities inside the House but not to illegalities. It is also contended by him that the infractions the petitioner has complained of regarding the entertainment of the petition and the manner of its dealing with are not only irregularities but are illegalities which it is open for the petitioner to challenge before this Court. So far as the first submission is concerned, the matter has been dealt with in the judgment prepared by Hon'ble Justice Patnaik. The main plank of Mr. Das's sub-mission in that regard is that the petition was ab initio still born having not been addressed to the Speaker as required under Rule 6(2) of the Rules framed under the Tenth Schedule but having been merely addressed to the Secretary of the Assembly. The submission is that the provisions of Rule 6(2) are mandatory having laid down a command in a negative form that no reference shall be made except in the manner as declared in the rule and that the manner is that so far as a member is concerned the petition relating to his disqualification is to be presented to the Speaker alone. Only when the allegation is against the Speaker himself, the petition has to be addressed to the Secretary. Mr. Das relying upon, AIR 1977 SC 536 (Mannalal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan); AIR 1986 SC 2160 (A. K. Roy v. State of Punjab) and AIR 1975 SC 2182 (Ram Autar Singh Bhadauria v. Ram Gopal Singh), has argued that since the rule itself requires in a compulsory manner the presentation of the petition to be in one manner, its presentation in another manner must be held to be inherently incompetent for which reason the petition ought not to have been entertained at all and should have been rejected in limine. It has also been contended by Mr. Das that on receipt of such an application, the Speaker should not have referred the matter to the Committee of Privileges without first examining whether the petition complied with the requirement of Rule 6 and was under obligation under Rule 7(2) to dismiss the petition once it was pointed out that the petition does not comply with the provisions of Rule 6.

12. Since I reach such conclusions it is not necessary to go into the further question regarding the authority of this Court to examine illegalities inside the House as distinct from only irregularities relating thereto. I do not find any illegality to have been committed in the matter of presentation of the petition. Referring the petition to the privileges committee or other such questions raised are merely matter relating to procedural irregularities. As admitted by Mr. Das and as the provisions of Article 212 itself are, this Court has no jurisdiction to examine any question relating to irregularities in respect of proceedings in the House. Doubtless a question may arise, as was decided in AIR 1960 SC 1186 (M. S. M. Sharma v. Dr. Shree Krishna Sinha) and AIR 1965 SC 745 cited by Mr. Das, whether, when the issue is one affecting a citizen's fundamental right or an illegality or unconstitutionality, the scrutiny by the Higher Courts is taken away, but however such question does not arise here for a detail examination.