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11. We may at once state that it is not the contention that if Section 23-D (1) alone is taken into account, there is-anything in it to render it invalid as being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Indeed, no such contention can at all be raised in view of the express decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Prasad Jain . In paragraph 7 of the judgment which occurs at page 1768 of the report, their Lordships state:

It is not disputed by the appellant that the subject matter of the legislation: viz., Foreign Exchange, has features and problems peculiarly its own, and that it forms a class in itself. A law which prescribes a special procedure for investigation of breaches of foreign exchange regulations will therefore be not hit by Article 14 as it is based on a classification which has a just and reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. The vires of Section 23(1)(a) is accordingly not open to attack on the ground that it is governed by a procedure different from that prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure that indeed is not controverted by the appellant that being so, does it make any difference in the-legal position that Section 23-D provides for transfer by the Director of Enforcement of cases which he can try, to the court? We have not here, as in a law, which confers on an officer an absolute discretion to send a case for trial either to a court or to a Magistrate empowered to-try cases under a special procedure. Section 23-D confers authority on the very officer who has power to try and dispose-of a case to send it on for trial to a court, and that too only when he considers that a more severe punishment then what he-is authorised to impose, should be awarded. Tn a Judicial system, in which there is a hierarchy of courts of tribunals, presided over by Magistrates or officers belonging to different classes, and there is a devolution of powers among them graded according to their class, a provision such as Section 23-D is necessary for proper administration of justice. While on the one hand a serious offence should not go without being adequately punished by reason of cognisance thereof having been taken by an inferior authority, the accused should on the other hand' have in such cases the benefit of a trial' by superior court that is the principle underlying Section 349 of the Criminal Procedure Code, under which Magistrates-of the second and third class, are empowered to send the case for trial to the District Magistrate or sub-divisional Magistrate, when they consider that a more severe punishment then they can inflict is called for. In our view the power conferred on the Director of Enforcement under Section 23-D to transfer cases to a court Is not unguided or arbitrary, and does not offend Article 14, and Section 23(1)(a) cannot be assailed as unconstitutional.