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Showing contexts for: kidnapping complete in Thakore Tejaji Devaji And 4 Ors. vs State Of Gujarat on 20 March, 2006Matching Fragments
10. Like the offence punishable under Section 380 of IPC, the offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC is also not a continuing offence. When a minor is kidnapped and taken out from the custody of a lawful guardian, the offence of kidnapping is completed. The case placed by the prosecution that minor Kailash had left the house and left the shelter of her parents on 01.06.1997 at about 11.30 p.m. was the act because of inducement given to her by accused No. 1 Tejaji. If the evidence led by prosecution is considered as a whole, it emerges that she had developed some affection for accused No. 1 Tejaji and, therefore only, accused No. 1 Tejaji must have been tempted to go to the residence of the complainant in odd hours of 11.30 p.m. The parents of victim Kailash were to attend marriage ceremony of one relative in a nearby village, is the fact that accused No. 1 Tejaji might not be knowing. Only family members of complainant including victim Kailash were supposed to know this fact situation. So, victim Kailash appears to have conveyed to accused No. 1 Tejaji that her parents are not available and they are going to some other village and probably they may not return before the midnight and, therefore, accused No. 1 Tejaji had been to the residence of victim Kailash and took her with him. So, taking of Kailash from the bungalow of the complainant was an act of kidnapping of a minor and taking out such a minor from the lawful custody of the parents. In absence of cogent evidence, it would not be either legal or proper for us to say that the courage to go to the residence of victim Kailash must have been provided by some of the co-accused or mother Jaibaben -accused No. 2 because accused No. 2 Jaibaben had left the house in the afternoon. The prosecution has tried to show that the decision to go to her own village in District Banaskantha by accused No. 2 Jaibaben was because of some conspiracy hatched, is based on some conjecture. It is also possible that accused No. 1 Tejaji must be contemplating to take victim Kailash straightway to his native village and under that contemplation, he has sent his mother accused No. 2 Jaibaben in the afternoon on 01.06.1997 to his native village Raner. Leaving the house by Accused No. 3 Jaibaben in the after-noon hours on 01.06.1997, would not make her an abettor of the offence of kidnapping. If the scheme of Section 107 of IPC is scanned closely, this conduct can not be said to be either an overt act or omission resulting into abetment because at that relevant point of time when accused No. 2 Jaibaben left the house, kidnapping was under contemplation, probably, and that offence was not committed or completed in the house when offence punishable under Section 363 was committed by accused No. 1 Tejaji and at that time accused No. 2 Jaibaben was not in the house and the younger brother of accused No. 1 Tejaji namely accused No. 3 Velaji Devaji is acquitted of the said charges after trial and it is not the say of the prosecution nor evidence on record that at the time when Kailash left the shelter of her parents, accused No. 5 Mangiben was present or had actively participated in inducing minor girl. So, foreseeing the arguments of ld. APP Mr. Raval for the State that there is satisfactory evidence at least against accused No. 1 qua offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC and finding recorded by the ld. Trial Judge in holding the appellant accused No. 1 Tejaji guilty of the said offence can not be said to be erroneous. The ld. Trial Judge was supposed to appreciate simultaneously the nature of evidence led by the prosecution in proving the age of victim girl Kailash and as discussed in earlier paras, it is established that Kailash was aged less than 16 years i.e. 15 years & 11 months and obviously therefore below 18 years of age and she left the house under inducement of accused No. 1 Tejaji. So, we are not inclined to disturb the finding recorded against accused No. 1 Tejaji for the offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC. However, we are of the view that the ld. Trial Judge ought not to have convicted any of the other accused for the offences punishable under Section 363 R/w Section 114 of IPC. It is not necessary to reproduce Section 107 of IPC and scheme of Section 114 of IPC. In absence of any overt act in committing the offence punishable under Section 363 of IPC by any of the co-accused who are before us, it will not be possible for us to uphold the finding recorded by the ld. Trial Judge to link rest of the co-accused i.e. accused Nos. 2, 4 to 6 with the offence punishable under Section 363 R/w Section 114 of IPC. So, except appellant accused No. 1 Tejaji Devaji, according to us, the rest of the accused appellants have been erroneously held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 363 R/w 114 of IPC and their conviction requires to be quashed and set aside.