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CHARGE 2: That the store transactions were made based on hand receipts only and not on physical production of the materials.

CHARGE 3: That requisitions for blue metal were given by the Section Officers to the Divisional Engineer (El. & Cl.). Based on his directions the quantity noted in the requisitions being specified by the Divisional Engineer (Elecl.). But they have not actually received any materials against the requisitions so given.

3. With regard to the first charge memorandum, the charges 1 to 3 are interlinked with one another. The enquiry Officer exornerted the petitioner of charge No. 3, of the first charge memorandum. Even with regard to the charges 1 and 2. The Enquiry Officer held that the latter parts of these charges are not proved, thereby holding that the petitioner could not be accused of having done something with a view to prevent the detection of fictitious purchase nor the petitioner did something wilfully and intentionally to account for fictitious payments. However, on the charges 1 and 2, acting upon the letter of the State Bank of India, dated 19.2.1976, the Enquiry Officer came to the conclusion that the cheque dated 3.4.1970 was encashed only on 6.4.1970 after the petitioner, who until 4.4.1970 was the Assistant Engineer/Construction/Tiruttani; got transferred to Trivellore. Apart from other contentions raised by A.L. Somyaji, learned Counsel for the petitioner, the contention that the acting upon the bare letter from the State Bank of India, dated 19.2.1976 with regard to the encashment of the cheque; especially when the petitioner has questioned the legal and factual propriety of acting upon that letter, has vitiated the findings on charges 1 and 2 of the first charge memorandum is substantial one and has got to be countenanced in view of the pronouncements of the highest Court in the land S. Ramalingam, learned Counsel for the respondent, would submit that this letter would amount to a certificate coming from official sources, and that is certainly a relevant factor to be taken note of and acted upon. If the contents of the letter have not been put in issue, and have been admitted by the petitioner, it could be stated that placing reliance on the same is in order. But here we find the petitioner even in the course of the enquiry did advance an objection that this letter could not be accepted and acted upon without the Officer of the State Bank of India, who gave the same speaking about its contents and without the original cheque which got encashed being produced during the course of the enquiry. This objection has been summarily brushed aside by the Enquiry Officer. This only has led to the bare letter, which if at all would amount to a statement by the concerned Officer of that letter and that statement having been taken behind the back of the petitioner, should not be treated as substantive evidence and acted upon as such. In this connection, learned Counsel for the petitioner draws my attention to the following pronouncements of the highest Court in the land.

11. There are other common points also taken by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, and I am dealing with them as follows:

It is contended that the petitioner has been put to prejudice on account of the delay in the prosecution of the present charge memorandum in 1978, since the incidents relate to the year 1970-71. I find the petitioner never advanced a grievance of prejudice at any point of time earlier and the petitioner could not be stated to have been disabled from putting forth any effective defence on account of any delay. On the facts of the case, I am not persuaded to hold that the delay aspect must be taken note of to hold that it has vitiated the domestic enquiry. It was also contended that the misconducts thrown against the petitioner were hot those enumerated in the Regulations. This contention could not be countenanced because Regulation 5 is generously couched so as to take in not only misconducts enumerated, but also misconduct which would come within the expressions "good and sufficient reasons". There was also a contention that there was an earlier charge memorandum in 1974, which was prosecuted, and the petitioner challenged the second show cause notice before this Court and the enquiry was dropped, and it is not possible to resurrect the charges and prosecute them by way of a second enquiry. The first enquiry was found to have suffered a technical flaw, and as rightly pointed out by Mr. S. Ramalingam, learned Counsel for the respondent, taking note of the legal opinion expressed in this behalf, the first enquiry was not prosecuted, and the second enquiry was necessitated only on account of the above factor. Under these circumstances, it could not be stated that the second enquiry was totally incompetent.