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"23. In view of the language used in Section 340 CrPC the court is not bound to make a complaint regarding commission of an offence referred to in Section 195(1)(b), as the section is conditioned by the words "court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice". This shows that such a course will be adopted only if the interest of justice requires and not in every case. Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold a preliminary enquiry and record a finding to the effect that it is expedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be made into any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). This expediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing not the magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by such forgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect or impact, such commission of offence has upon administration of justice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery may cause a very serious or substantial injury to a person in the sense that it may deprive him of a very valuable property or status or the like, but such document may be just a piece of evidence produced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidence may have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidence on the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal. In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient in the interest of justice to make a complaint. The broad view of clause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants, would render the victim of such forgery or forged document remediless. Any interpretation which leads to a situation where a victim of a crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded."

The next judgment cited by Shri Naqvi is in the case of Sachida Nand Singh and another Vs. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1998 SC 1121, and has placed reliance upon para nos. 9, 12, 24 of the said judgments which are quoted hereinbelow:-

"9. That apart it is difficult to interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a b ar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the court. Any such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences. For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document is detected an the forgery is sure that he would imminently be embroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get that document produced in any long drawn litigation which was either instituted by himself or some body else who can be influenced by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is a settled proposition that if the language of a legislation is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is capable of causing mischievous consequences should be averted. Quoting from Gill vs. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd. (1963-1-W.L.R.929) Maxwell has stated in his treaties (Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. Page 105) that "if the language is capable of more than one interpretation we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to unreasonable result and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonable practicable result". The clause which we are now considering contains enough indication to show that the more natural meaning is that which leans in favour of a strict construction, and hence the aforesaid observation is eminently applicable here.

12.That apart it is difficult to interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) as containing a b ar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merely because the document concerned was produced in a court albeit the act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in the court. Any such construction is likely to ensue unsavoury consequences. For instance, if rank forgery of a valuable document is detected an the forgery is sure that he would imminently be embroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get that document produced in any long drawn litigation which was either instituted by himself or some body else who can be influenced by him and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for the entire long period of pendency of that litigation. It is a settled proposition that if the language of a legislation is capable of more than one interpretation, the one which is capable of causing mischievous consequences should be averted. Quoting from Gill vs. Donald Humberstone & Co. Ltd. (1963-1-W.L.R.929) Maxwell has stated in his treaties (Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn. Page 105) that "if the language is capable of more than one interpretation we ought to discard the more natural meaning if it leads to unreasonable result and adopt that interpretation which leads to a reasonable practicable result". The clause which we are now considering contains enough indication to show that the more natural meaning is that which leans in favour of a strict construction, and hence the aforesaid observation is eminently applicable here.

The second judgment relied upon by Shri Naqvi in the case of State of Karnataka VS. Hemareddy and another (Supra) dealt with a fabricated sale deed which was not put in evidence at any stage of suit and in that context it was held that the bar under Section 195(1)(b) was not attracted. Thus, the judgment cited is distinguishable on the facts of the present case.

The next judgment cited by Shri Naqvi in the case of Sachida Nand Singh and another Vs. State of Bihar (Supra) dealt with the issue of the bar contained under Section 195(1)(b) (ii) Cr.P.C. and held that the bar would not be applicable in the case where the forgery of document was committed before the document was produced in Court. Thus, the said judgment also can be distinguished on the facts of the present case.