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Shri Chetan Dass Dewan desires to press before us some of the averments made by the respondents in an application presented in the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Karnal, for the transfer of the case out of which the present proceedings have arisen. The learned counsel wants to show that the respondents have not only been not repentant for what they have done but they have aggravated the contempt by making the application for transfer in the Court of the learned District and Sessions Judge. Indeed Shri Dewan submits that the subsequent acts of the respondents constitute a far clearer case of contempt and, therefore, this Court should proceed to take action on the basis of that application I may point out that an application was presented in this Court in November, 1965 (Criminal Miscellaneous 1094 of 1965 in Criminal Original 87 of 1965) with which was attached the notice and a copy of the application served on Shri Sher Singh in this application the only prayer the counsel seems to have pressed was that the documents produced be placed on the record and an order to that effect was made by Gurdev Singh J. on 8-12-1965. Obviously, the respondents had no notice of that application and quite clearly without such a notice, it would not be proper for us to proceed to consider the question of contempt on the basis of the application for transfer Faced with this situation. Shri Dewan asked for time to make an appropriate application in this court on the material now available so that the respondents may be given due notice of the case sought to be pressed by Shri Dewan. In the interest of justice. We consider it proper that the position of the learned Advocate-General be crystallised and made more clear than what we find from the application dated 5-7-1965. This would be fair to both the parties."

12. The case was adjourned to October 18, 1966. On that date Mr. Chetan Dass Dewan, Deputy Advocate-General, made a petition which came before the Special Bench and it was marked as Criminal Original No. 184 of 1966, with the heading 'Puniab State v. 1. Shri Rule P Kapur and 2 Mr Shila Kapur respondents". In this petition Mr Dewan referred to the details of the first contempt petition by the deceased petitioner with the facts in the Court of Mr R P Gaind, subordinate Judge 1st class at Karnal starting from June 2, 1965, to the stage of the transfer application coming before the District Judge of Karnal. He made reference to the facts in detail. Then he referred to the second petition of the deceased petitioner made on November 19, 1965, the application of respondent 1 made on December 10, 1965, the parawise reply made by the respondents on January 3, 1966, to the original contempt petition of the deceased petitioner, also reproducing paragraphs 14, 16, 18, 20, 24, 25, 30 and 35 of the transfer application by respondent 2 through respondent 1 in the District Court, and then reproducing paragraphs 5, 6, 13 and 20 from the rejoinder of the respondents made on December 6, 1965, and the reply on January 3, 1966. He also reproduced paragraphs 1, 4, 8 and 11 of respondent 1's petition made on December 10, 1965, for having a reference of the matter to a larger Bench. On all this material the learned Deputy Advocate-General said that contempt of Court had been committed by the respondents. As a copy of that petition had not been given to the respondents, the learned Judges allowed time to them to make a reply. However, respondent 1 urged an oral preliminary objection that "The present petition is incompetent in view of the pre-existing petition registered as Criminal Original 87 of 1965 He would like this Bench to hear oral preliminary objection now and adjudicate upon it He has also repeated his submissions that the original petition, dated 5-7-1965, should be heard and the petition presented today ruled out as incompetent". The learned Judges pointing out that such an objection may be taken by the respondents in their reply observed that "there is no question of splitting up the case into two separate parts on the existing record at this stage." So the case was adjourned to October 25, 1966 for reply of the respondents with an order that arguments were to be heard 'on the entire case'.

29. Of the four counts in regard to which contempt of Court is alleged to have been committed by the respondents, count 2 refers to paras 9 to 18 of the transfer application made on September 13, 1965, by respondent 2 through respondent 1, in the Court of the District Judge at Karnal to obtain transfer of the case between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner to some other Court. Briefly, the substance of what is stated in those paragraphs, which is objectionable, is that the Subordiante Judge (Mr. R P.Gaind) by his order of June 4, 1965, Annexure IV to the rejoinder of the respondents, in saying that no approach had been made to him by anybody in the case between the parties and by refusing to hold inquiry into the anonymous letter. Annexure 'C', created serious apprehension in the minds of the respondents as to his motive in not ordering probe into the alleged conduct of the petitioner (defendant), and that the return of the anonymous letter, Annexure 'C' was delayed for nearly three to four weeks, thus, according to the respondents giving security to the petitioner (defendant) bv what has been described by them as a collusive act of the Subordinate Judge which enabled him (the petitioner) to file his first contempt petition in the High Court on his own choosing of time and forum. The contempt of Court Imputed to the respondents in this respect, so far as the Court of the Subordinate Judge. Mr. Rule P. Gaind, is concerned, is broadly on the basis of imputation of motive to him in not ordering probe into the contents of Annexure 'C' and in the delay of the return of that letter, and the alleged collusive act by him in this respect to enable the petitioner to file the contempt petition. These allegations were made by the respondents in the transfer application under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure as stated. The respondents have explained that in such an application, in the nature ot things, allegations personal to a presiding judicial officer have to be alleged so as to be a ground for transfer. And it is said that the same were made by the respondents in good faith having regard to the circumstances, though it becomes clear from the comments of Mr R P. Gaind, Subordinate Judge, given on the transfer application, a substantial part of which has already been reproduced above, that he was not responsible for the delay and had no motive in not ordering the inquiry as he was not approached, and that it was respondent 1 who wai responsible for delay In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar (1959) SCR 1367 at pp. 1382 and 1383 - (AIR 1959 SC 102 at pp. 106 & 107) there is reference to the matter of a transfer application and allegations therein against a judicial officer and the intention with which the allegations may have been made. But the consideration is in relation to the question of intention to offer insult under Section 228 of the Penal Code and the discussion is confined to that aspect only. So those observations are of no assistance in the present case Although the facts in M. Y. Shareef v. Hon'ble Judges of the High Court of Nagpur. 1955(1) SCR 757 - (AIR 1955 SC 19), are not parallel to the facts of the present case, but in that case their Lordships did take into consideration the mistaken view of the contemners of their right and duties in subscribing to the transfer application by their client making aspersions against the Judges, which were said to amount of contempt of Court. The respondents have obviously taken a mistaken and a misconceived view of the facts on the basis of which they have drawn unjustified inferences as appears clear from the comments of the learned trial Judge on the state of facts in this behalf, in regard to the manner in which the learned Subordinate Judge handled the question of the application of respondent 1 accompanying the anonymous letter, Annexure 'C'. So that it becomes doubtful whether with such mistaken and misconceived approach the offence of contempt of Court in this respect can be said to have been committed by the respondents substantially and. in any case, it amounts to no more than a technical contempt of which the Court does not take notice. This, however does not mean that merely because allegations amounting to contempt of Court have been made in a transfer petition no action will be taken in a proper case. It depends upon the tacts and circumstances of a case whether action is called for and an instance of such a case is Revashankar'i case, 1959 SCR 1367 - (AIR 1959 SC 102).

34. There remains one other argument of respondent 1 to notice in this respect so far as this count is concerned, though fame argument has been also advanced in relation to count 4. It is an attempt at plea of justification, although in Brahma Prakash Sharma's case, AIR 1954 SC 10 Paragraph 19 of the judgment, their Lordships observed that-

"It may be that pleas of justification or privilege are not strictly speaking available to the defendant in contempt proceedings."

In spite of this it has been argued by respondent 1 that intention is material in such cases, Homi Rustomji Pardivala v. Sub-Inspector Baig, AIR 1944 Lah 196; the contemner should have acted with untruth or malice, AIR 1936 PC 141. Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras (1952) SCR 425 = (AIR 1952 SC 149) and Reva-shankar's case. (1959) SCR 1367 = (AIR 1959 SC 102), or with improper motive (Barhma Prakash Sharma's case), AIR 1954 SC 10, or in absence of bona fides (again Brahma Prakash Sharma's case). AIR 1954 SC 10 or without prejudice Rizwan-Ul-Hasan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. AIR 1953 SC 185, or without reasonable care and caution (Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy's case). 1952-3 SCR 425 = (AIR 1952 SC 149), or in an unwarranted manner (Brahma Prakash Sharma's case. AIR 1954 SC 10 and Reva-shankar's case, 1959 SCR 1367 = (AIR 1959 SC 102), or without a prima facie ground (again Revashankar's case) 1959 SCR 1367 = (AIR 1957 SC 102). Respondent 1 has further urged that what he has done has been in public good and thus cannot be contempt according to Brahma Prakash Sharma's case, AIR 1954 SC 10. It has already been shown that it is not correct that the main and the dominant purpose of respondent 1 in producing the document in the trial Court was a demand for a genuine inquiry, but the purpose was to embarrass the trial Judge, to impede & interrrupt the course of Iustice. &i to affect the mind of the trial Judge and to deflect him from the right course in the administration of justice in the trial of the cause between the respondents' society and the deceased petitioner. In the circumstances how can respondent 1 urge that he had intention other than what is apparent from the circumstances of the case, or how was Ms conduct warranted, or done with reasonable care and caution, or in public interest. Although the facts of all the cases cited above are entirely different from those of the present case and the observations of Their Lordships have to be understood having regard to the facts of each case, but even so none of these factors is, in the circumstances of this case, In favour of respondent 1 or supports his cause in any way. He has contended that he is entitled to lead evidence to prove all these matters to justify his conduct and in this respect relies upon some reported cases. The first case is Debi Prasad Sharma v. Emporor, AIR 1943 PC 202, in which certain statement made by a District Judge about a circular issued by the Chief Justice of Allahabad led to contempt proceedings, and evidence was adduced to prove whether or not the District Judge made the statement. The second such case was of Homi Rustomji Pardivala, AIR 1944 Lah 196 in which the evidence was directed to whether the petition given by the petitioner in that case had or had not been received by a certain date, because it was said that by the time it was received the petitioner had already been released or was immediately due to be released. In Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy's case, 1952-3 SCR 425 = (AIR 1952 SC 149) the contemner was found not to have been able to substantiate allegations against a magistrate based on hearsay. In in re. Hira Lal Dixit. (1955) 1 SCR 677= (AIR 1954 SC 743) the only question of evidence that arose was whether or not a pamphlet had been published and circulated in the premises of the Supreme Court. And lastly in Revashankar's case. 1959 SCR 1367 = (AIR 1959 SC 102) their Lordships observing that prima facie what was stated in the transfer application amounted to contempt, did not say anything in regard to the truth or otherwise of the allegations and sent the case back to the High Court for decision on merits in accordance with law. In not one of these cases was evidence allowed to be Introduced in justification on the matters listed above on which respondent 1 has said that evidence should have been allowed. It has already been shown that the list of witnesses filed by him and the subsequent ap-