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Showing contexts for: design to commit in Bhimrao Ashruji Mhaske vs State Of Maharashtra And Anr. on 9 March, 1990Matching Fragments
6. The Petitioner also challenges the vires of amendment to section 151 by Maharashtra Act No. VI of 1981. Before examining the challenge, it is necessary to set out the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, enacted by the Parliament:---
"151. (1) A Police Officer knowing of a design to commit any cognizable offence may arrest, without orders from a Magistrate and without a warrant, the person so designing, if it appears to such officer that the commission of the offence cannot be otherwise prevented.
(iii) attempting to commit, or committing, or instigating, inciting or otherwise abetting the commission of mischief within the meaning of section 425 of the Indian Penal Code in respect of public property or to detain a person in custody on receiving knowledge that such person has a design to commit any cognizable offence. The expression "cognizable offence" is defined under the Code. The power does not enable the police officer to detain a person in view of knowledge of design to commit any other activities which do not fall within the category of "cognizable offence". The power conferred by amended sub-section (3) of section 151 of the Code is also circumscribed by the provisions of sub-section (1) of section 151 of the Code. Merely because the Judicial Magistrate is required to be satisfied that the circumstances of the case are such that release of the person is likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order does not authorise the Magistrate to import the definition of "public order" as set out in the Act. The Magistrate must confine the enquiry while ascertaining whether the circumstances of the case are such that release of the person is likely to be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order by ascertaining whether the person has a design to commit any cognizable offence. The expression "prejudicial to the maintenance of public order" must be read with reference to the "design to commit any cognizable offence."
It is not permissible to expand the ambit and scope of section 151(1) of the Code by reference to the amended sub-section (3). The State Legislature did not desire to expand the powers conferred on the Police Officer by amendment of sub-section (3), but the power to detain a person who has a design to commit any cognizable offence is retained and merely the period is extended beyond twenty four hours but within outside limit of thirty days. The Judicial Magistrate while exercising powers under sub-section (3) of section 151 of the Code, therefore, must ascertain whether the Police Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person has a design to commit any cognizable offences and commission of such cognizable offence would be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It is not permissible to take into account any other activity of the person which may be prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, unless and until it is connected with a design to commit a cognizable offence. The power to detain a person in custody cannot be exercised de-hors the design to commit any cognizable offence.
9. It is also required to be made clear that the power conferred on the Judicial Magistrate under sub-section (3) by the Legislature is a very powerful weapon and the exercise thereof should be with care and precaution. The liberty of a person is deprived because the Police Officer claims that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person has a design to commit any cognizable offence. The judicial intervention is provided by the Legislature with the assurance that the Judicial Officer would not detain the person in custody unless and until the Judicial Magistrate reaches an objective satisfaction that the claim of the Police Officer is just and proper. The power to extend the custody of the person is not to be exercised in a mechanical fashion merely because the Police Officer claims that he has reasonable grounds to believe that the detention of the person for a period longer than twenty-four hours is necessary. The Legislature desired and that is clearly reflected in sub-section (3) that the Judicial Magistrate even after satisfaction that the detention is necessary for a duration beyond twenty-four hours shall not detain the person at a time for a period exceeding fifteen days. There is no compulsion on the Magistrate to extend the period of detention for fifteen days at a time and indeed the Magistrate should be extremely circumspect in extending the period and in no case should extend the period beyond minimum possible. The power to detain without enquiry is a drastic power and the Magistrate should be careful that these powers are not exercised by the Police Officer to the determine of the citizen. The Magistrate should also ensure that whenever the power is exercised under sub-section (3) of section 151 of the Code, then the grounds are furnished forthwith to the person to be detained. That would enable the person so detained to make an effective representation to the Sessions Court. We hope and trust that the Judicial Magistrates would exercise their powers with circumspection and the Police Officer will not be permitted to deprive the liberty of a person without reasonable and satisfactory grounds that the person to be detained has a design to commit any cognizable offence as prescribed by law. The power conferred by section 151 both on the Police Officer and the Judicial Magistrate is of a drastic nature and the exercise thereof should be only on satisfaction that the requirements of the section are compiled with. In our judgment, the proper construction of section 151 sub-section (3) as set out hereinabove would obviate any prejudice or hardship to the citizens. Even though sub-section (3) of section 151 of the Code is found inter-vires, the exercise of the powers should be in accordance with directions given in this judgement.