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And the last Supreme Court decision in East India Industries (Madras) (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income-tax. A trust was created for various objects, one of which was to manufacture, buy, sell and distribute pharmaceutical, medicinal, chemical and other preparations. The objects included several chargeable and religious purpose. One of the paragraphs of the trust deed provided that the objects should be independent of each other and that the trustees had the discretion to apply the trust property in carrying out all or any of the objects as the trustees might deem fir. The Supreme Court held that the carrying on of a business of manufacture, sale and distribution of pharmaceutical, medicinal and other preparations was neither a charitable nor a religious purpose and since the trustees could, under the deed, validly divert the whole income of the trust to one of the heads, viz., the carrying on of a business of manufacture, sale and distribution of pharmaceutical, medicinal and other preparations, the said object being non-charitable, the trust property was not held wholly for religious of charitable purpose within the meaning of section 4(3)(i) of the Indian Income-tax Act.

The decision of the Calcutta High Court is Commissioner of Income-tax v. Keshari Singh Nahar. In the trust before the Calcutta High Court provisions were made for public charitable objects. But, a further provision was made that a building in the property should be given to the descendants of the settlors family if they required it for any purpose like marriage, public meeting, etc. It was argued that this provision made the trust a private trust; but his contention was overruled by the Calcutta High Court. The High Court pointed out that the primary object of the trust was public charity, and merely because some reservations of a private nature were also contained in the document, the trust would not become any the less public charitable trust.

The principles that may be collected from the several decisions noted above, in so far as they are relevant for the purpose of the case before us, may now be summarised. A section of the public as distinct from specified individuals, is also "the public"; and an "object of public utility" need not be one benefiting the whole making or even all persons living in a particular country or province. If the direct beneficiaries under a trust are "the public", the trust does not lose its public character merely for the reason that reservations or preferences are made in favour of the founders poor relations or the poor members of his family. The question whether a trust is one wholly for religious or charitable purposes has to be decided on the dominant intention of the settlor or founder; and unless the charitable objects involved is an object of general public utility, the trust will not be a public charitable trust, so that a trust where the dominant intention of the founder is to provide for his poor relations will not be a public charitable trust. Similarly, a trust providing for the poor relations of the founder, and when they are all exhausted or when they become extinct, providing for public charities, will not be a public charitable trust. Again, if there are public charitable purposes and also provisions for the benefit of the relations of the founder and the trustees are given the discretion to spend the entire income on one or more of the heads with the possibility of the entire income being spent on the relation then also the trust will not be one wholly for charitable purposes. Lastly, as Leach C.J. and Chagla C.J. have pointed out, to provide for the poor descendants or relations of the founder is not a charitable purpose unless the object involves public utility.