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14. The finding of the learned Judge that a separate suit has to be filed must be rejected outright since the scheme framed by the Bench of this Court had clearly provided for the parties to approach the District-Judge for any directions or modifications. Therefore, the continuous control vests with the District Judge who shall exercise his jurisdiction, when his directions are sought for or allegations are made warranting enquiry into the affairs of the Trust. The Court cannot wash its hands of the matter. The learned Judge while dealing with the issue regarding the election of the first respondent as the Managing Trustee without waiting for the petitioner and the third respondent, rejects it on the ground that though notice was sent regarding the meeting to be held for appointment of the Managing Trustee, the other two trustees did not attend the meeting and therefore, the election of the first respondent as Managing Trustee was passed and properly accepted by District Court. The District Court, it must be said, has not adverted its attention to what was actually happening in the Trust. The complaint of the petitioner is that by inducting his wife as trustee, the first respondent has virtually obtained a stranglehold over the affairs of the Trust. There are four trustees. The first respondent and the second respondent who are husband and wife, and the petitioner and the third respondent. As per Clause 8 of the Scheme half of the trustees shall form a quorum. Therefore, the presence of the first respondent and the second respondent will constitute a quorum and they really do not need the presence of the others. The Managing Trustee has the right of casting vote. So, any project or proposal, launched by the first respondent would be supported by the second respondent and in the event it is opposed by the petitioner and the third respondent, the first respondent as Chairman Trustee will exercise the right of casting vote and the deed is done. The presence of the petitioner and the third respondent has been reduced to cypher. A similar situation arose about 80 years ago in the Parthasarathy Temple at Madras that caused anguish to the Judges who dealt with the suit under Section 92, CPC. There were three trustees. There was a confrontation between two of them and the third, who was the second defendant was a Yes-man to one of the trustees. This is what the learned Judges say, "It is also established that at least for some years past the first and second defendants have been always agreeing together and been practically of one opinion in all matters. The necessary result of this has therefore been as though there were for the institution not three trustees but only two. If defendants 1 and 2 had always agreed to agree on every question, the position of the third defendant is reduced to perfect nullity and helplessness.

...As regards the 2nd defendant, it is abundantly clear that for some considerable time had has been a sort of a cypher so far as temple affairs are concerned, but unfortunately a cypher that has made up his mind to stand always by the integral 1st defendant.' The position is very similar here. The second respondent is there only to agree to the first respondent on every question. Therefore, the institution is being administered not by four trustees but by two trustees who act as one. In fact, as held by the learned Judges in the above case, even if none of the individual charges have been made out or proved, still the total effect of tyranny of the majority cannot be overlooked. The District Judge ought not to have dealt with it merely by looking at service of notice and the existence of the quorum and consequent passing of resolutions. It is apparent without any deep investigation that there is total and absolute control of the affairs of the trust by the first respondent alone reducing everyone else to the status of voiceless participants. It may be that he has acted all along in the interest of the Trust. But, when the scheme provides for the presence of four trustees, then it means that the voices of each of the trustees should be heard. They have the power to realise funds by sale or conversion of the immovable property and investing them in approved securities. They have the power to lease out the immovable property belonging to the trust for the best rent available. It is not denied that the trust owns vast extent of immovable and movable properties. The averment made in the petition that, the annual interest alone from the trust properties amounts to a sum of Rs.20 lakhs has not been seriously denied. The fact that the trust has at its disposal vast funds is apparent from the fact that a donation had been made to the Lions Club, Tiruvarur for a sum of Rs. 1 lakh, in favour of the Eye Hospital. In fact, this donation was made initially without getting proper approval and thereafter, it appears to have been ratified. The learned Judge has held that no fault can be fastened on the first respondent for this because donation had been given for a laudable object. The point that the learned Judge failed to see was that the funds that have been parted with are trust funds and not an individual's money that can be disbursed at his will. It is precisely this attitude of the first respondent to take decisions unilaterally without the concurrence of the other trustees, which is the basis of the petitioner's grievance. Whether it is a laudable object or not, the Trust should not function autocratically without hearing all the trustees. This Trust has been functioning like that

15. The learned Judge has dealt with the various allegations made by the petitioner one by one. The learned Judge had correctly arrived at the conclusion that the Board of trustees is spilt into two units one consisting of respondents 1 and 2 and the other consisting of the petitioner and the third respondent. As regards the propriety of the appointment of the second respondent, he arrived at the conclusion that the second respondent had been appointed by a proper resolution placed on the board of trustees which was subsequently approved and ordered by the scheme Judge in I.A.No.230 of 1991. The scheme court therefore, answered the first issue in favour of the second respondent, that her appointment was in order. As regards the other allegations made by the petitioner, the learned Judge as stated earlier held that there can be no modification in the scheme which gives the Managing Trustee the right of casting vote since the scheme has been framed by the High Court and the District Judge, who is subordinate to the High court cannot alter the scheme. The learned Judge failed to see that even the High Court directed the parties to approach the District court as and when it was necessary. If a trustee was found guilty of misconduct, definitely the Scheme Judge has the power to remove the trustee. It a particular object of the Trust becomes incapable of performance, the Trustees can approach the Scheme Judge for directions. The Scheme Judge can pass such orders as are necessary to advance the object of the Trust.