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"... Marks are often classified in categories of generally increasing distinctiveness; following the classic formulation set out by Judge Friendly, they may be (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; (4) arbitrary; or (5) fanciful. ...The latter three categories of marks, because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source of a product, are deemed inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection. In contrast, generic marks-those that "refe[r] to the genus of which the particular product is a species,‖ Park N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.22, citing Abercrombie & Fitch Co20, supra, at 9-are not registrable as trademarks. Park 'N Fly22, supra, at 194.

24. The term ‗generic' refers to the ‗genus' to which a particular product or service is a species of.

25. The term ‗descriptive' refers to a word/mark which describes an article/service, its qualities, ingredients or characteristics.

26. However, often the lines differentiating different categories of marks are blurred. Often, distinctions between suggestive, fanciful and arbitrary marks may seem artificial.

31. The term ‗fanciful' refers to a mark which is an invented word solely for use as trademarks. When a common word is applied in an unfamiliar way, it is called an ‗arbitrary' mark. For instance, ―Ivory‖ would be generic when used to describe a product made from the tusks of elephants but would be arbitrary when applied to a soap.

32. Fanciful and arbitrary terms enjoy all rights accorded to suggestive marks and are also entitled to registration without proof of secondary meanings.

33. Keeping in view the aforesaid mandate of law, this Court is of the view that a word may be generic qua a specific business or trade or industry but not across the board for all business or trades or industries. For instance, the word ―Arrow‖ is a generic word qua archery business, but is an arbitrary word qua shoes.‖ Applying the understanding of suggestive marks contained in para 30 from Teleecare Network19, ―armour‖, when used for sportswear would, at best, be suggestive, as it would need a degree of imagination to visualize that the term was used because the apparel in question was intended to be protective in nature. In the present case, however, as Mr. Bansal correctly submits, the sports apparel on which the plaintiff's marks are used is not protective. ―ARMOUR‖, when used for such apparel, cannot, therefore, be regarded even as suggestive, but is prima facie arbitrary.