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3. The substance of the stand taken by the Bank is some what as follows : The grant of recognition was its voluntary act and had no statutory basis. De-recognition order was purely administrative in nature, such a decision having been taken as the petitioner had violated the terms of the Code of Discipline and had indulged in unlawful activities. The petitioner was not legally entitled to any show cause notice, but it was given ex abundanti cautela to avoid giving any room for debate on the question. Instead of showing cause and giving reply on merits, the petitioner unjustifyingly claimed two months' time to reply and that too by raising a "legal plea". As the recognition carried with it the corresponding obligation to observe the Code of Discipline and "as the association had admittedly not carried on its obligation under the Code of Discipline", the management was justified in withdrawing the recognition. In any event, in the absence of legal right to be recognized "it is open to the Bank to withdraw the recognition for such reasons as it may consider fit and proper."

7. This takes us to the second point as to whether under the facts and circumstances of this case there has been, in fact, violation of the principles. Our answer is in the positive for the reasons that follow : Whether or not there has been violation of the Code of Discipline and whether its certain terms were binding on the Union, what sort of agitation was launched etc., are all questions of fact. There is nothing apparent of admitted in the matter as is wrongly presumed by the Bank. Before expiry of the time to give reply, though on the last day, the Union sought two months' time to give detailed reply. "Incidentally" it was also mentioned that the matter relating to the recognition of a Trade Union of Class III employees is sub-judice. The Bank instead first considering the request for grant of time, as prayed for, or granting such shorter time as it thought reasonable under the circumstances, hurriedly proceeded to pass an order of derecognition in which for the first time the reasons for refusal to grant time are mentioned. It is pertinent to the notice the following lines in the order :

"It is not possible to give extension of time by 2 months to the Association and though it has been given adequate time, it has only taken a legal plea."

The impugned order proceeds on the basis that Union has "nothing to say by way of reply." The two matters (i) about extension of time and (ii) about the case pending in the Court, have been unnecessarily mixed up on the assumption that prayer for time to give reply on merits was linked up by the Union with the Court's case. The use of the word "incidentally" sufficiently clarifies that time was not sought by the reason of pendency of the writ petition in Court. The Bank is right when it comes to the conclusion that the writ petition has nothing to so with the same show cause notice. The Bank has further assumed that "Association has admittedly not carried on its obligation under the Code of Discipline." We see nothing on record to warrant the conclusion of admission. Indeed, ground No. 4 of the petition mentions - rightly or wrongly - "that the petitioner has not accepted the Code of Discipline to which a reference has been made in the order as well as in the show cause notice and the respondent No. 1 could have withdrawn the recognition because of the alleged breaches of the Code of Discipline. It is for this reason that a reply and hearing was necessary." It is true that no such ground is mentioned in the application for time. But, that does not mean that the petitioner had no intention of raising this point. Indeed, the only purpose of seeking time was to raise certain points. Therefore, the basic question is not of raising pleas on merits at that time or the correctness of the stand but of the propriety of claiming an opportunity to do so. Under the circumstances the proper course for the Bank was to first consider the application for extension of time. Nothing would have been lost in granting some reasonable time though it must be said that the management was not obliged to grant time sought for. By virtue of the mere fact that the application was filed on the last day an unreasonably longer time was prayed for, it cannot be said that the petitioner had no intention to raise any defence at all and the application lacked bona fides. Reasonableness is always implied in opportunity, for giving opportunity is not an empty formality. We are, therefore, of the opinion that no opportunity was granted to the petitioner to reply to the show cause notice.