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Showing contexts for: compromise decree in Balwinder Singh And Ors. vs Amar Kaur on 28 January, 2000Matching Fragments
4. The suit was contested by the defendants. Defendants 1 and 2 are sons of defendant No. 3. According to these defendants, the suit land was previously owned by Kartar Singh alias Dinger, father of Defendant No. 3. Plaintiff is wife of the said Kartar Singh. Defendants have further asserted that defendants No. l and 2 have become the owner of the suit land on the basis of the sale deed executed by their grand father Kartar Singh. The suit land was given to the plaintiff by the defendants under a compromise for her maintenance only. Thus, she acquired no ownership rights in it. However, the defendants admitted that a civil suit was filed by the plaintiff against her husband Kartar Singh and a compromise decree was passed by the Court of Shri S.K. Chopra, the then Sub Judge, 1st Class, Ludhiana, and the said decree was subsequently corrected on 21.2.1981 by the Court of Shri D.S. Chatha, as there was some clerical mistake. It is denied by the defendants that they have taken the possession of the land measuring 2 bighas. According to the defendants, the entire land measuring 24 bighas is still in the possession of the plaintiff. Therefore, the question of restoration of the possession of 2 bighas of land does not arise. According to the defendants, the plaintiff was only made a limited owner under the compromise decree dated 31.5.1979 corrected on 21.1.1981 and she could enjoy the fruits of the possession under the said compromise in lieu of her maintenance whereas the ownership always remained with defendants No. 1 and 2. The defendants further alleged that infact the plaintiff wanted to alienate the land. Defendants No. 1 and 2 requested the plaintiff not to alienate the property. The suit has been filed simply to harass defendants No. 1 and 2 so that the plaintiff may conveniently sell the property.
10. The only question which now falls for determination before this Court is as to whether plaintiff became absolute owner of the suit land under the above decree or only a restricted owner.
11. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that the case of the plaintiff is fully covered by the provisions of Sub-section(1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, as she acquired the property under compromise decree in lieu of her pre-existing right of maintenance. He has placed reliance upon the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in V. Tulasama and Ors. v. V. Sesha Reddi, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1944; Santhanam K. Gurukul v. Subramaniam, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2024 and Smt. Padma Vati Ahuja v. Dasondhi Ram and Ors., 1986 S.L.J. 25 in support of his above contention.
8. In this manner, the present appeal of the defendants who are not satisfied with the judgment and decree dated 19.10.1987 passed by the first appellate Court. 9. I have heard the counsel for the parties and with their assistance have gone through the record of this case.
10. The argument which was raised by the counsel for the appellants is that under the compromise decree dated 31.5.1979, the plaintiff got the property for the first time for her maintenance only and, in these circumstances, the provisions of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter called 'the Act') will not apply. She could only enjoy the fruits of the land measuring 24 bighas but the intentions of the plaintiff are bad and in the garb of that compromise decree she wants to alienate and transfer the same and this right is not open to the plaintiff, therefore, her suit has been rightly dismissed by the trial Court.
24. My attention was also invited to Smt. Gulwant Kaur and Anr. v. Mohinder Singh and Ors., A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 2251 and Santhanam v. Subrammanya, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 2024. These authorities fortify my view that the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act would apply in the present case.
25. Thus, the substance of the above discussion is that the property in suit was given to Amar Kaur acknowledging her pre-existing right of maintenance. She did not acquire the property for the first time under the compromise decree though it is written in the compromise decree that this property has been given for her maintenance, yet she will become the full-fledged owner of the property as rightly observed by the first appellate Court. I endorse the reasons adopted by the first appellate Court and do not see any merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.