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The Hedaya proceeds (p. 308) :-
...neither gifts nor charities are affected by being accompanied with an invalid condition, because the prophet approved of Amrees [gifts for life,] but held the condition annexed to them by the grantor to be void. -The author's note to this is, "the condition of restoration upon the demise of the grantee.
The Hedaya continues (p. 309) :-
An Amree, or life-grant, is lawful to the grantee during his life, and descends to his heirs, because of the tradition before quoted.-Besides, the meaning of Amree is a gift of a house (for example) during the life" of the donee, on condition of its being returned upon his death.-The conveyance of the house, therefore, is valid without any return ; and the condition annexed is null, because the prophet has sanctioned the gift, in this instance, and annulled the condition, as before mentioned. An Amree, moreover, is nothing but a gift and a condition ; and the condition is invalid ; but a gift is not rendered null by involving an invalid condition, as has been already demonstrated.
In construing these old texts the Court must endeavour to ascertain the principle laid down according to the true intent and meaning of the words, and it is often impossible or inappropriate to apply the words in a literal sense to the changed conditions of modern life. The principle laid down in the passage quoted seems to me to be that where there is a gift subject to a condition which is repugnant, the gift remains, and the condition is rejected. The case of Amree or gift of property during the life of the grantee on condition that it is to be returned on death is merely an illustration of the principle. In my view the passage quoted was not intended to lay down as a rule of law that whenever a life interest is given, and in whatever form the gift may be expressed, it must be construed as an absolute gift subject to a repugnant condition, so as to defeat in every case the intention of the donor. The normal method of granting a life estate or other limited interest in modern times is not to make a grant of the whole estate subject to a condition, but to confine the estate granted to a limited period, and the passage in the Hedaya seems to me to have no application to a grant in the latter form. There is nothing remarkable in holding that the effect to be given to a testator's manifest intention depends upon the form in which that intention is expressed. 1 may take an illustration of my meaning from English law. A testator desiring to give his daughter an interest in property during spinsterhood may give the estate to the daughter subject to a condition of forfeiture on her marriage : in such a case the condition would fail as being in general restraint of marriage and the gift to the daughter would remain unfettered, so that the intention of the testator would fail. But if the limitation be to the daughter until she shall marry, the estate comes to an end on the happening of the event, and the testator's intention prevails.

114. Thus in Hedaya, Book XXX, Ch. II, (Charles Hamilton's Translation of Hedaya, Vol. Ill, page 308), it is said :-

...neither gifts nor charities are affected by being accompanied with an invalid condition, because the prophet approved of Amrees [ gifts for life, ] but held the condition annexed to them by the granter to bo void.

115. The author's note to this is:-

The condition of restoration upon the demise of the grantee.
The Hedaya continues (p. 309) :-
An Amree, or life grant, is lawful to the grantee during his life, and descends to his heirs, because of the tradition before quoted.-Besides, the meaning of Amree is a gift of a house (for example) during the life of the donee, on condition of its being returned upon his death.-The conveyance of the house, therefore, is valid without any return ; and the condition annexed is null, because the prophet has sanctioned the gift, in this instance, and annulled the condition, as before mentioned. An Amree, moreover, is nothing but a gift and a condition ; and the condition is invalid ; but a gift is not rendered null by involving an invalid condition, as has been already demonstrated.
It was not, however, shown to us how Karimuddin (settlor) could legally create such a life-estate, or grant the property to his next of kin on the determination of the life-estates. In his lifetime he made nogrant, for he kept the possession of the property with himself until his death, and on his death his estate would devolve on his heirs, by Mahomedan law ; and, as said in the case of Ranee Khujooroonissa v. Mussamut Roushun Jehan (1876) L.R. 3 I.A. 291, 307 'the policy of the Mahomedan law appears to be to prevent a testator interfering by will with the course of the devolution of property according to law among his heirs. The creation of any life-estate at all appears quite inconsistent with the Mahomedan Law. See Mussamut Humeeda v. Mussamut Budlun (1872) 17 W.R. 525, It might be that by consent such an estate might be created ; but, as a general rule, the donee in such a case would take an absolute estate.' All our masters are agreed that when one has made a gift and stipulated for a condition that is fasid, or invalid, the gift is valid and the condition void. (Baillie's Moohummudan Law, p. 537). So in the Hedaya, III, p. 309, it is said : 'An amree, or life grant, is nothing but a gift and a condition ; and the condition is invalid ; but a gift is not rendered null by involving an invalid condition.' This case went in appeal to the Privy Council and the decision of the High Court was confirmed in Abdul Gafur v. Nizamudin (1892) I.L.R. 17 Bom. 1, P.C., The case was argued on behalf of the appellant ex parte by Mr. Mayne, who conceded that the case as to wakfnama or settlement could not be supported. He argued, however, that the deed executed by the owner of the property could be supported as a will on the ground that the heirs had consented to it, and relied, for the purposes of his argument, on umes Chunder Sircar v. Mussummat Zahoor Fatima (1890) L.R. 17 I.A. 201, to which I shall refer presently. Mr. Mayne's argument was (p. 3):-