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7. Let me now consider the decisions cited by Mr. K. Yamunan, K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri , is a leading case on the issue in question. In that case, both the parties entered in to a compromise whereby the tenant withdrew his defence in the rent control petition and submitted to a decree for eviction unconditionally and the tenant prays for time for vacating upto 5th June, 1969 that the petitioner/landlord agrees to the same and that the tenant agrees to vacate the petition premises and hand over possession of the entire petition premises to the landlord on or before the said date viz., 5th June, 1969 without fail under any circumstances and undertakes not to apply for extension of time. It was agreed by both parties that the memo of compromise was executable as a decree of court. The compromise petition was signed by both the parties as well as the advocates appearing for them. The court, after referring to the petition of the landlord, passed the order recording the compromise memo and ordered eviction by consent by granting time to vacate till 5.6.1969. After the disposal of the rent control petition, the landlord filed execution petition in the City Civil Court, Madras to execute the order of eviction against the tenant. The tenant filed E.A. No. 1314 of 1969 objecting to the execution of the decree on the ground that it was a nullity and inexecutable and as such he prayed for the warrant of possession issued in execution petition to be recalled and to dismiss the execution petition itself. The tenant's main plea was that the decree sought to be executed was one based on compromise or consent without the rent control court having satisfied itself by an independent consideration regarding the bona fide requirement of the property by the landlord for his own occupation and as such the decree contravened Section 10 of the Act. This application was opposed by the landlord saying that the pleas raised by the tenant could not be sustained and that the landlord's case was true and that he unconditionally withdrew his defence and submitted to a decree. Therefore, he pleaded that the decree sought to be executed does not suffer from any infirmity. The City Civil Judge overruled the objections raised by the tenant and dismissed the E.A. The tenant carried the matter to this Court in C.R.P. No. 797 of 1970. This Court by its judgment and order dated 15th September, 1970 has reversed the order of the City Civil Court and accepted the contentions of the respondent- tenant. The learned Judge has held that the decree for eviction dated 31st March, 1969, is solely passed on the basis of the compromise and the Rent Controller has not applied his mind to satisfy himself whether the bona fide requirement of the landlord has been established. On this line of reasoning, the learned Judge held that the eviction order is a nullity and is not executable. The landlord filed an appeal before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court in para 24, para 26 and para 27 of its judgment, observed as follows:

Para 8: It is regrettable that though the appellants go about three years' time to vacate the shop in dispute from the date of the compromise decree, they were ill-advised to fight the litigation further and thus cause delay in the vacating of the shop by another five years. We have no doubt in our mind that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the compromise decree was clearly valid and executable. We uphold the decision of the High Court but on a slightly different basis.

10. In Suleman Noor Mohamed v. Umarbhai Ianubhai , the Supreme Court, while considering an identical case, observed as follows:

While recording the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code, it is not necessary for the court to say in express terms in the order that it was satisfied that the compromise was a lawful one. It will be presumed to have done so, unless the contrary is shown.

11. Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Ramanlal Ranchhddas (Dead) by L.Rs. , is a case arising under the Rent Control Act and the order of eviction is passed on the compromise decree. It was alleged that the decree was a nullity and not executable due to non-existence of statutory ground of eviction. The Supreme Court had held that Courts satisfaction of existence of statutory grounds can be inferred impliedly, from the compromise and that the admission of tenant contained in the compromise can be taken into account. The Supreme Court further observes that the executing court has to examine the question of nullity of the decree on the basis of the record and cannot permit the tenant to lead fresh evidence in that regard. The Supreme Court in the above case held on facts that the tenant impliedly admitted the existence of statutory grounds and hence the decree is executable.

12. Thus, it is very clear from the judgments above referred to, of the Apex Court that the Court is satisfied on consideration of the terms of compromise and if necessary by considering the same in the context of the pleadings and other materials in this case and found that the agreement is lawful, as in any other suit, so in an eviction suit, the court is bound to record the compromise and pass a decree in accordance therewith. Therefore, passing a decree for eviction in the instant case by the Rent Controller on the admission of a tenant in a compromise, is certainly valid in law. The tenant in this case, having agreed to have three years time to vacate the premises, has now filed the present execution application raising the ground of nullity of the order of eviction passed on the basis of consent. It is regrettable that though the tenant has got about three years time to vacate the premises in question from the date of the compromise decree, she was ill-advised to fight the litigation further and thus cause. delay in the vacating of the premises in question by few more years. I have no doubt in my mind that on the facts and in the circumstances of this case, the compromise decree of eviction passed, was clearly valid and executable and therefore, I have no hesitation to uphold the decision of the Rent Controller ordering eviction on the basis of the compromise decree. I am also of the view that the court passed the compromise decree in the presence of both parties and their counsel and after satisfying with the genuineness of the endorsement made by the tenant, agreeing to vacate the premises in question. I have already referred to in detail about the earlier proceedings between the very same landlord and the tenant and the injunction suit filed by him. Therefore, it is not necessary for the Rent Controller to pass a detailed order, once he is satisfied with the genuineness of the endorsement and claim of both parties. The Rent Controller has applied his mind and satisfied himself on the ground on which the landlord sought eviction. Mr. K. Yamunan is also right in his submission that where an objection as to the non-executability of the decree on the ground of nullity is taken the executing court is not competent to go behind the decree, if the decree on the face of it, discloses some material on the basis of which, the Rent Court could be satisfied with regard to the existence of a statutory ground for eviction. In such a case the court must accept and execute the decree as it stands. If, on the face of it, the decree does not show the existence of such material or jurisdictional fact, the executing court may look to the original record of the trial court to ascertain whether there was any material furnishing a foundation for the trial court's jurisdiction to pass the decree it did. The moment it finds that prima facie such material existed, its task is complete. It is, therefore, not necessary for the court to go further and question the presumed or expressed finding of the trial court on the basis of that material. All that it has to see is whether there was some material on the basis of which the rent court could have, as distinguished from, must have been satisfied as to the statutory ground for eviction. To allow the executing court to go beyond that limit, would be to exalt it to the status of a super court sitting in appeal over the decision of the rent court. I therefore find that there are sufficient materials available on record for the rent control court to come to the conclusion that the Rent Controller has applied his mind before passing the order. Even otherwise, there are materials on record in the decree that the Rent Controller has applied his mind before passing the order to the facts that,