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for such sentence shall be stated in the judgment. When the law casts a duty on the judge to state reasons it follows that he is under a legal obligation to explain his choice of the sentence. It may seem trite to say so, but the existence of the 'special reasons clause' in the above provision implies that the court can in fit cases impose the extreme penalty of death. Where a sentence of severity is imposed, it is imperative thatthe judge should indicate the basis upon which he considers a sentence of that magnitude justified. Unless there are special reasons, special to the facts of the particular case, which can be catalogued as justifying a severe punishment the judge would not award the death sentence. It may be stated that if a judge finds that he is unable to explain with reasonable accuracy the basis for selecting the higher of the two sentences his choice should fall on the lower sentence. In all such cases the law casts an obligation on the judge to make his choice after carefully examining the pros and cons of each case. It must at once be conceded that offenders of some particularly grossly brutal crimes which send tremors in the community have to be firmly dealt with to protect the community from the perpetrators of such crimes. Where the incidence of a certain crime is rapidly growing and is assuming menacing proportions, for example, acid pouring or bride burning, it may be necessary for the courts to award exemplary punishments to protect the community and to deter others from committing such crimes (emphasis supplied). Since the legislature in its wisdom though that in some rare cases it may still be necessary to impose the extreme punishment of death to deter others and to protect the society and in a given case the country, it left the choice of sentence to the judiciary with the rider that the judge may visit the convict with the extreme punishment provided there exist special reasons for so doing.

(3) When murder of a member of a Scheduled Caste or minority community etc., is committed not for personal reasons but in circumstances which arouse social wrath, or in cases of 'bride burning' or 'dowry deaths' or when murder is committed in order to remarry for the sake of extracting dowry once again or to marry another woman on account of infatuation. (emphasis supplied) (4) When the crime is enormous in proportion; For instance when multiple murders, say of all or almost all the members of a family or a large number of persons of a particular caste, community, or locality, are committed.

3.6 Dowry Death vis-à-vis Murder:

3.6.1 Dowry death may or may not be a case of murder. Where it is a case of murder, death sentence can be awarded in appropriate cases. But when it is not so, imposition of death sentence may not be in symmetry with the cardinal principle underlying the capital offences in the Indian Penal Code. It may be noted that even before insertion of Section 304B on dowry death in 1984, there have been cases of dowry deaths which were prosecuted for murder under Section 300, IPC. Thus, State (Delhi Administration) Vs Laxman Kumar and others (AIR 1986 SC 250) was a case of bride burning wherein the trial court accepted the prosecution case and considering it to be one of the atrocious dowry deaths, had sentenced each of the respondents to death, namely, the husband, the mother-in-

"15. The case before us is not an accidental fire causing the death. This is certainly a case "being put on fire by someone". The deceased having been burnt is not in dispute. It is a case of bride burning. The Court in State (Delhi Admn.) Vs Lakshman Kumar, 1985 Supp (2) SCR 898 at p.931: (AIR 1986 SC 250 at p.266) has observed that in the case of bride burning, death sentence may not be improper. We agree. The persons who perpetrate such barbaric crime, without any human consideration must be given the extreme penalty. But in the present case, we do not think that the High Court was justified in awarding death sentence on the accused-appellant. In 1977 she was acquitted by the trial court. In 1985 the High Court reversed her acquittal and gave the extreme penalty. It was after a gap of eight yeas. When there are two opinions as to the guilt of the accused by the two Courts, ordinarily the proper sentence would be not death but imprisonment for life. Apart from that, there is no direct evidence that the appellant had sprinkled kerosene on Pushpa and lighted fire on her. There must have been other persons also who have combined and conspired together and committed the murder. It is unfortunate that they are not before the Court. From the Judgment of the High Court, it is apparent that the decision to award death sentence is more out of anger than on reasons. The Judicial discretion should not be allowed to be swayed by emotions and indignation."