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9. It can hardly be debated that the good governance demands that steps are taken for providing shelter to the citizens and, more so, when there is heavy pressure on the land in congested city. Due to numerous reason, there is a stalemate in respect of construction of new buildings and there is also apathy in maintenance of existing buildings and the sufferer is always the common man who ill-affords to spend a fortune for acquisition of shelter over his head. A judicial notice can be taken that in congested areas of this City, the old buildings which were constructed prior to September 1, 1940 are in extremely dilapidated condition and still are occupied by scores of people at the risk of their lives only because of their inability to secure any alternate accommodation. It is a bounden duty of the democratically elected Government to ensure that steps are taken to protect the shelter over the heads of unfortunate citizens. The buildings which are constructed for occupation of limited number of people are now occupied by desperately large number only due to scarcity of accommodation. The landlord of such buildings are not inclined to effect structural repairs or to undertake repairs due to exorbitant prices of the material and because of freezing of the rent prevalent in year 1940. The cumulative effect of all these factors is regular collapse of buildings resulting into loss of valuable human life. It was, therefore, incumbent upon the Government to take steps to ensure that structural repairs are carried out or dilapidated buildings are pulled down and reconstructed. Due to inability of the Government to generate sufficient financial resources and to persuade the owners to undertake the task, it was decided by the legislature to find out a solution by securing participation of the occupiers in stupendous task of the work of structural repairs or reconstruction. The advantage to the occupiers could be secured by requiring the occupiers to contribute towards the expenses of repairs or reconstruction and on an assurance that the occupiers would be owners of the premises on formation of Co-operative Housing Society. The Government rightly felt that the burden upon each of the occupier would not be so heavy in contribution of expenses in repairs compared to the advantage which would be secured by the occupier being the purchaser of the tenement. The submission of Shri Setalvad that the object of enactment of provisions of Chapter VIII-A is merely to carry out the work of structural repairs or reconstruction and had no nexus whatsoever to the object of distribution of material resources to subserve the common good cannot be accepted. The availability of the land in the City of Bombay is extremely limited and it is not possible to increase the available quantity of land and if the citizens are to be assured of a reasonable shelter, then it is necessary to distribute this meagre asset as equitably as possible to subserve the common good. They provisions of Chapter VIII-A confers right upon the Housing Society of the occupiers to enjoy additional F.S.I. then available to the owner of the premises and the additional F.S.I. is made available with an object that additional tenements would be constructed and some dishoused people can be provided with the shelter. In the year 1965, the State Government had appointed Bedekar Committee to examine the problem and the principal causes of collapses as found by the Committee to examine the problem and the principal causes of collaspes as found by the Committee are set out in the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Vivian Joseph Perreira and another v. The Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay and others, . The causes are:

11. Section 103-A provides that the provisions of the Chapter shall apply to all the ceased buildings which are erected before September 1, 1940 and classified as Category A under sub-section (1) of section 84. The proviso prescribes that if out of a total number of occupiers of buildings falling under Category A, 50 per cent or more are using the tenements for commercial or non-residential purpose, then the provisions of Chapter are not attracted. Shri Setalvad submitted that there is no justification whatsoever to restrict application of Chapter only to buildings which are situated within Greater Bombay. The learned Counsel pointed out that the category of buildings in Categories A, B and C are made under section 84 for the purpose of determining the cess to be assessed on these buildings and liability to pay repairs and reconstruction cess is only in respect of buildings situated within Greater Bombay. It is not in dispute that the provisions of Bombay Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board Act, 1969 were applicable in respect of levy of cess to buildings in City of Bombay. It was contended that in case the object of the legislation is to preserve the old buildings by undertaking work of structural repairs or by reconstruction, then the object could not be limited only to buildings situated in Greater Bombay and creation of a class of buildings only in Greater Bombay is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as the classification has no nexus to the object to be achieved. It was also urged that it cannot be assumed that only those buildings in Category A require structural repairs or are required to be reconstructed. It was submitted that the buildings which are constructed after September 1, 1940 and falling under Categories B and C may equally require structural repairs or even reconstruction and there is no rationale why legislation restricted the application of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A only to buildings falling within category A. Shri Setalvad submitted that the classification is not genuine and the Legislature blindly adopted the classification made for the wholly different purpose of levy of repairing and reconstruction cess by classification of different buildings. It was also contended that there are dilapidated buildings requiring structural repairs or reconstruction outside the limits of City of Bombay and, more so, in the old towns like Pune, Nasik, Kolhapur, etc., and the Legislature did not take into consideration the buildings in those cities and the Government is unable to explain why the application of provisions of Chapter VIII-A is limited only to buildings in City of Bombay. We are unable to accede to the submission of the petitioners that limiting the application of the provisions of the Chapter to buildings in the City of Bombay and to the buildings which were constructed prior to September 1, 1940 results into vice of discrimination. In the first instance, it must be remembered that it is not necessary for the Legislature to commence work of improvement of buildings all over the State at the same time and it is perfectly permissible to adopt new methods initially to a certain area. The implementation of the provisions of Chapter requires performance of several functions by the Board as well as the State Government and the machinery and the man--power available with the Board cannot attend to dilapidated buildings all over the State at the same time and, therefore, it was perfectly open for the Legislature to initially select an area where there is greater need to effect structural repairs or reconstruction of dilapidated buildings. It also cannot be overlooked that number of dilapidated buildings in City of Bombay are far large in number than those outside the City of Bombay and situated in districts. The pressure on the buildings and the amenities available in the buildings situated in City of Bombay is very heavy. The saline atmospheric conditions prevalent in the City and nearness to the sea and heavy monsoon contributes to rapid deterioration of the structures and, more so, where precautions are not taken to maintain them from time to time. The number of dilapidated buildings in the city and the available data about the rate of collapse of such buildings was available with the Legislature and it must be presumed that the Legislature must have decided to implement a new scheme of participation of occupiers in the structural repairs or reconstruction initially in the city in view of greater need to provide safety measures and the shelter to occupiers of buildings in the city. The contention that there are large number of buildings even in the City of Bombay which are constructed subsequent to September 1, 1940 and are in need of structural repairs and, therefore, grouping together of only those buildings which were constructed prior to September 1, 1940 is erroneous cannot be accepted. The Legislature has ultimately to draw a line and it is not possible with the limited resources available to attend to all the dilapidated buildings in the city at the same time. In our judgment, the complaint that the restriction of application of the provisions only to buildings constructed prior to September 1, 1940 and that too in the City of Bombay is discriminatory cannot be accepted. The State Legislature can always extend the application of the provisions of the Chapter to other areas by taking into consideration how the scheme functions in the City of Bombay. In our judgment, the challenge to provisions of section 103-A as being violative of Article 14 cannot be accepted.

12. Turning to section 103-B, it was contended by Shri Setalvad that the section is attracted only in respect of those buildings which require structural repairs or required to be reconstructed and there cannot be any dispute about the accuracy of the submission. Indeed, the Government accepted that the right conferred upon the occupiers under section 103-B is available provided the building requires structural repairs or is required to be reconstructed. Shri Setalvad submitted that the expression "structural repairs" is not defined for the purpose of Chapter VIII-A. The meaning of expression "structural repairs" is defined under section 2(36) and that definition can certainly be imported while considering the expression "structural repairs" in section 103-B. It was also submitted that though sub-section (1) of section 103-B refers to the application to the Board requesting the State Government to acquire the land in the interest of better preservation, the expression "better preservation" is not independent of the structural repairs and the submission is correct and deserves acceptance. The advantage of sub-section (1) of section 103-B is available provided the occupiers of the building are desirous of carrying out structural repairs or reconstruction as the case may be, and which is necessary. Shri Setalvad complained that the provisions of sub-section (1) are extremely vague and arbitrary and in support of the submission urged that the expression "occupier" as defined under section 2(23) of the Act will include even a rank trespasser. It was urged that the Legislature cannot deprive the owner of the property to confer rights on rank trespassers. The submission proceeds on the assumption that the expression "occupier" will take in its sweep even a trespassers, but, in our judgment, the assumption is ill-founded. The definition of expression "occupier" in section 2(25) is inclusive and Clause (e) covers person who is liable to pay to the owner damages for use and occupation of any land or building. It was contended that this clause enables the trespasser to claim that application can be filed by him as he is liable to pay damages for the use and occupation to the owner. We are unable to read Clause (e) to conclude that a trespasser is entitled to claim character of occupier. In our judgment, what the Legislature contemplated by clause (e) are such persons whose initial entry on the land or the building was in accordance with law but whose continuance thereon on termination of their right makes them liable to pay damages. For instance, a licensee in occupation of any land or building is covered by Clause (d) and if the licence under which the licensee is in occupation stands terminated, then such person will be required to pay to the owner damages for use and occupation. The legislature contemplated such kind of cases while enacting section 2(25)(e). We are not prepared to accept the contention that Clause (e) includes trespasser and that was also not the claim made on behalf of the State Government. Reference was made to the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in 1991 Maharashtra Law Journal 263, Taj Mohamed Yakub v. Abdul Gani Bhikan, and to which one of us (Pendse, J.) was a party. While considering an identical expression in section 2(e)(v) of the Maharashtra Slum Area (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) Act, it was held that a person who wrongfully uses the land is liable to pay damages and, therefore, would be covered by the expression. The Division Bench put this construction on the clause in that Act by perusal of various sections of the Act which clearly contemplated that person in occupation of area declared as slum area irrespective of character of possession of such person is an occupier. It was held that the provisions were enacted for improvements of the slum area and unless a wider meaning is given to the expression, it will not be possible for the Competent Authority to evict the occupants from the building and also to carry out expansion of work of improvement of the slum area. It would also not be possible for the Competent Authority to recover from such trespasser expenses incurred by the Competent Authority for maintenance of works or enjoyment of amenities provided for improvement of the slum area and, therefore, a wider meaning was required to be given. In the present case, it was not necessary to extend such a wider meaning to clause (e) because the object of the present Act is entirely different from that of the Slum Areas Act. Shri Setalvad submitted that it is not permissible to read down the clause so as to exclude the trespasser but we are unable to accede to the submission for more than one reason. In the first instance, the plain reading of clause (e) excludes the rank trespasser in occupation and, therefore, there is no occasion to read down the provision and secondly even if it is necessary to read down clause (e), it is only for the purpose of achieving the object of the Legislature, and therefore perfectly permissible.

15. Shri Setalvad then submitted that the provisions of section 103-C are also unreasonable and extremely vague. We are unable to find any merit in the contention because the section deals with the circumstances which take place after the owner is divested of the title to the building or land in acquisition proceedings. Sub-section (1) of section 103-C provides that any land transferred to a Co-operative Society shall be used for the purpose for which it was used before acquisition and the Society shall carry on structural repairs or reconstruct as the case may be and for no other purpose. This sub-section ensures that Co-operative Society or the occupiers do not use the premises for any purpose other than one for which it was earlier used. It also imposes an obligation upon the Housing Society to carry out structural repairs or reconstruction of the building, as the case may be. Sub-section (2) of section 103-C prevents a member of the Society from transferring the interest in a tenement, while sub-section (3) deals with the failure of the Society to carry out structural repairs or reconstruction and the consequence flowing there-from. Sub-section (3) provides that in case the Co-operative Society or the occupiers contravenes the provisions of sub-section (2) by effecting transfers or fails to carry out the structural repairs or the reconstruction, then the authority constituted under the Act shall resume such land and transfer the same to any other Co-operative Society of the occupants of the tenements in the transit camp. The Legislature has clearly provided that the Co-operative Society of the occupiers is bound to carry out the structural repairs and shall not transfer any tenements. In case the society is unable to carry out structural repairs or reconstruction, then the authority will resume the building and hand over to another Co-operative Housing Society of persons who are residing in transit camp due to dishousing. The persons whose tenements have collapsed in a building crash are provided accommodation in transit camp for a short duration and the legislation provides that if one Society fails to carry out structural repairs, then it should be given to another society but consisting only of members who are residing in transit camp and are badly in need of shelter in the tenements. We are unable to find what is unreasonable in this provision. A faint attempt was made to urge that the sub-section does not provide that the second society to be formed is also under the same obligation to carry out structural repairs. It is impossible to find any merit in the submission because second society is bound to have the same rights and obligations as the first Society. In any event, we are unable to appreciate why the former owners who are divested of title should worry about the consequential steps to be taken under the Statute. Once the owner of the building is divested of the title in acquisition proceedings and is paid compensation as provided under the Act, then the building vests in the authority or the Board and it is not for the petitioners to debate as to what should be done in case the first Society fails to carry out structural repairs. It was not contended that in case any of the tenements fell vacant in the Society, the Chapter does also provide as to how those tenements should be disposed of. It is obvious that the society can dipose of the tenements only to those who are needy persons and who will be selected by the authority for accommodation.