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Grounds of Appeal

2. The grounds cited by the appellants / proposed accused against the impugned order are as under :

A. Because the impugned order erroneously and complete derogation of the settled law holds that the appellants had no Crl. Appeal. No. 67/2024 Kishore Biyani Vs. State 2/11 locus standi to file the application u/s 340 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the appellants had made specific submissions and placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Natarajan V. B.K. Subba Rao, AIR 2003 SC 541 and A.R. Antuley V. R.S. Nayak, 1998 SCC (Crl) 372, which have held time and again that an application under section 340 Cr.P.C. is maintainable and can be preferred by even a stranger and resultantly, the proposed accused persons have a locus standi to file the 340 application qua the complaint case.
D. Because, having filed the application which was supported by a duly sworn affidavit and made blatantly false statements, it is imperative that the 340 application of the appellant is allowed a formal complaint is registerded against Crl. Appeal. No. 67/2024 Kishore Biyani Vs. State 3/11 the respondent No.2, in line with the scheme and intent of the Priyanka Srivastava's judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court which sought to curb the increasing instances of the misuse of applications under section 156(3) Cr.P.C. to only harass certain persons, such as the appellants in the present case. E. Because the impugned order erroneously holds that the 340 application is liable to be dismissed since the complaint case is a premature stage as no evidence has been led by the respondent No.2 as the complainant. It is submitted that such an interpretations is completely contrary to the intent of section 340 read with section 195(1) (b) Cr.P.C. since no such requirements or the stage of the application of section 340 have been provided under the said sections. Evidently, false pleadings on affidavit have been made by the respondent No.2 by placing reliance on false documents. It is therefore clear as crystal that the respondent No.2 has committed perjury in terms of Section 340 r/w Section 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C.

therefore, to dismiss the 340 application by holding that it is not maintainable at this stage, when there are no such requirements prescribed under the applicable law as to the stage at which a 340 application is maintainable, is an erroneously drawn conclusion. Resultantly, the impugned order lacks judicial application of mind and therefore, ought to be set aside by this Hon'ble Court.

F. Because the impugned order dismisses the 340 application premised on the hypothetical contingency that in the event the complaint u/s 156(3) Cr.P.C. of the respondent Crl. Appeal. No. 67/2024 Kishore Biyani Vs. State 4/11 No.2 is dismissed, the 340 application shall become infructuous. Even assuming but not admitting that the section 340 application may be rendered infructuous, since at this stage no such occasion has arisen and the complaint case is still being considered by the Ld. Metropolitan Magistrate, dismissal of the 340 application, without the dismissal of the complaint but on the hypothetical that the 340 application may, at some point in future, be rendered infructuous, is completely flawed and suffers from non-application of judicial reasoning.

K. Because, it is pertinent that he 340 application is heard considering the malafide actions of the respondent No.2 and that the appellants have the locus and entitled to be heard in view of the above cited judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

L. Because the case of the respondent No.2 is purely a money claim as the respondent No. 2 was a supplier of goods to future Retail Ltd. For their stores namely "Foodhall" multi brand grocery stores operating in Delhi-NCR. It is an admitted case that the respondent No.2 raised invoices on Future Retain Ltd. against the goods supplied to Foodhall Crl. Appeal. No. 67/2024 Kishore Biyani Vs. State 6/11 stores regularly in the time range of 2-3 months. Most importantly, the civil dispute between the parties is already under the adjudication at the MSME Council and in view of the ongoing adjudication of the sole dispute between the parties, the present criminal proceedings do not lie. M. Because there is a clear distinction between mere breach of contract and an offence of cheating, for an offence of cheating intention of the accused at the time of inducement ought to be looked at and merely the subsequent conduct is not the sole test as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case titled as Anil Mahajan v. thar Industries Ltd. cited as (2005) 10 SCC 228.