Delhi District Court
Needle Industries vs . Sushil Jain. on 19 September, 2016
IN THE COURT OF Ms. VANDANA JAIN
ACMM-02 (CENTRAL) : DELHI
Needle Industries Vs. Sushil Jain.
DD No. : 24/A/04
U/s : 78/79 Trademarks Act
Date of Institution : 04.07.2003
Date of reserving of order : 03.09.2016
Date of announcement : 19.09.2016
Unique I. D. No. : 02401R1043382003
JUDGMENT
1. Serial No. of the case : 382/K/11 2. Name of the Complainant : Ashok Dhawan 3. Date of incident : 17.03.2004
4. Name of accused persons : (1) Sushil Jain S/o Sh Shanti Lal R/o A-247, Dera Walan Nagar, Delhi
5. Offences : U/s 78/79 Trademarks Act 1958.
6. Plea of accused : Pleaded not guilty
7. Final Order : Convicted
8. Date of such Order : 19.09.2016 DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 1 of 23 BRIEF REASONS FOR SUCH DECISION:
1. The brief facts of this complaint case are that complainant is company incorporated in India and its registered office at Ketti, The Nilgiris, Tamil Nadu. Complaint was filed through Ashok Dhawan an officer and constituted attorney of the complainant. Complainant was incorporated in 1949 as a subsidiary of one of the largest manufacturers of needles and other haberdashery products and Needle Industries Ltd of Redditch, England and over the period of time, it has tied with various companies and had spread out in the world and particularly trade mark of PONY and the distinctive devices have become well known trademark in most parts of the world and some of the products manufactured and marketed by it are hand sewing, hardware needles, knitting needles, crocket hooks, knitting pins, snap fasteners, hooks, eyes, safety pins, plastic headed pins, pearl headed pins etc.
2. It is further stated that in India trademark PONY and devices are registered and applied for in classes, 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 20, 23, 24 & 26 of the Schedule IV attached to the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958. It has registered its abovesaid trademark as article under the Indian Copyright Act as well as under Trademark Act and is having enormous DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 2 of 23 sales of its PONY products throughout the world. It is further stated that it had come to the notice of the complainant that some unknown persons in Delhi have been engaged in the business of selling counterfeit products of the complainant company having the same dress up, colours, skin, get up etc. On the basis of this complaint, directions were issued by court for the investigation as well as for search and seizure of the fake articles. Raid was conducted and accused Sushil Jain was found in possession of alleged counterfeit products of the complainant company which were seized and thereafter accused appeared before court and after compliance of Section 207 Cr.P.C, notice u/s 78/79 Trademark Act was framed against accused on 05.10.2005 and matter was listed for prosecution evidence.
3. To prove its case, the prosecution has cited four witnesses and out of which two witnesses have been examined.
4. CW-1 Ashok Dhawan, AR of complainant.
5. CW-2 Ct Raj Singh is a recovery witness.
6. Thereafter, prosecution evidence was closed.
7. Statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was recorded separately to which he denied all the allegations and wished to lead defence evidence. Accused examined himself u/s 315 Cr.P.C. Thereafter, DE was closed.
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8. I have heard the learned APP for state assisted by counsel for complainant as well as counsel for accused. I have also perused the record carefully.
9. Ld counsel for accused has argued that complaint has been filed by Needle Industries (India) Pvt Ltd, however, certificate of registration is in the name of Needle Industries (India) Ltd. Ld counsel has further argued that no document has been exhibited to show that it is the same company even in spite of specific question being asked in cross examination from CW-1 Ashok Dhawan. He has further argued that since the name of the registered proprietor is Needle Industries (India) Ltd and not the complainant, therefore, complaint is liable to be dismissed.
10. Ld counsel has further argued that complaint has been signed by CW-1 Ashok Dhawan on the basis of Power of Attorney which is signed by T.A. Devagnanam, claiming to be Chairman and Managing Director of the company but he has not stated that as to how he got the authority to execute the Power of Attorney. Ld counsel further argued that complainant has failed to exhibit any Board Resolution on record despite specific question being asked in cross examination about the aforesaid point from the witness CW-1 Ashok Dhawan. Ld counsel has argued that complaint has been filed without proper authorization. Hence, it is liable to reject. He has relied upon judgments i.e. Nibro Ltd Vs National Insurance Co AIR DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 4 of 23 1991 Delhi 25 & State Bank of Travancore Vs M/s Kingston Computers (I) P. Ltd decided on 22.02.2011.
11. Ld counsel has further argued that mere registration of trademark is not sufficient. It should also be shown to be used, as what is protected is the right and not monopoly. He has relied upon judgment Veerumal Praveen Kumar Vs Needle Industries (India) Ltd 2001 PTC 889 (Del) (DB).
12. Ld counsel has further argued that witness CW-1 Ashok Kumar had personally knowledge about the accused but deliberately case was filed against unknown persons and premises of only accused was searched despite taking search warrant against unknown persons.
13. Ld counsel has further argued that marks of complainant company is device of Pony and mark of accused is Regal which is registered with the device Horse claiming user since year 2000.
14. Ld counsel has further argued that apart from the aforesaid discrepancies, there are several contradictions in the testimony of CW-1 Ashok Kumar and CW-2 Ct Raj Singh. He has pointed out that there are contradiction in the testimony of witnesses with respect to number of police officials and their ranks who were members of the raiding team, persons who entered in the shop and remained outside, requesting public person to join investigation by IO. Ld counsel for accused has argued that false complaint has been filed by complainant against accused in order to DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 5 of 23 demolish the business of the accused and to enjoy the monopoly in the business. Ld counsel has argued that his needles are of very superior quality than that of complainant company and that is why he has been falsely implicated in this case.
15. On the other hand, learned counsel for complainant has argued that case has been proved against accused beyond reasonable doubt. The complaint was filed in June 2003 and court directed to conduct investigation including search and seizure of infringed goods and on 17.03.2004 raid was conducted at the premises of accused which led to recovery of 3135 packets containing 25 needles infringing products bearing the mark device Pony. He has further argued that Needles Industries (India) Pvt Ltd and Needles Industries India Ltd are one and the same company and AR Ashok Dhawan who was examined as CW-1 had clarified the same and, therefore, it cannot be said that complainant company is different from company who is having the registration of the mark in question in its name. Ld counsel for complainant has further argued that as regards attorney of CW-1 Ashok Dhawan is concerned, he was well authorized by power of attorney executed by Managing Director but it is settled proposition of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate. Ld counsel for complainant has relied upon judgment "Vishwa Mitter of Vijay Bharat Cigarette Stores, DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 6 of 23 Dalhousie Road, Pathankot Vs O.P. Poddar & ors; AIR 1984 SC 5" passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court.
16. Ld counsel for complainant has further argued that complainant company is holder of registered trademark even otherwise the use of mark by complainant company has been established by complainant CW-1 Ashok Dhawan in his examination in chief which has not been rebutted by learned defence counsel. Ld counsel has stated that learned defence counsel has not put anything in cross examination with respect to use of the complainant's mark. He has further stated that accused has taken defence that he is competitor of complainant company meaning thereby that goods of complainant company are being sold in the market and only by that analogy, accused can become a competitor of complainant company and, therefore, this defence of the accused is also not sustainable.
17. As regards the discrepancies in the evidence, learned counsel for complainant has stated that natural witnesses are bound to deviate on the minute narrations and until and unless contradictions are of material nature, same cannot be said to be fatal to the prosecution. He has argued that in the present case there has been discrepancies with respect to number of police officials who conducted the raid where they were present and what efforts were made to join the public witnesses etc but these discrepancies are not material in nature and the evidence as a whole of CW-1 Ashok Dhawan and DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 7 of 23 CW-2 Ct Raj Singh is consistent and uniform and is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Ld counsel for complainant submits that guilt of accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubts and, therefore, he be punished as per law.
18. The contentions of learned counsel for the parties shall be dealt with one by one. As regards the change of the name of the complainant company, learned defence counsel has put a suggestion to the CW-1 Ashok Dhawan suggesting that registered trademarks are not in the name of complainant company to which the witness has replied that Neddles Industries India Pvt Ltd and Needles Industries India Ltd is the same company. Previously the registered office of the complainant company was situated at Mila Pur Madras and later it was shifted to Ketti Neelgiries, Tamil Nadu, Madra. He has stated that he has not brought any record regarding the change of registered office but he can produce the same. He also stated that pin code of the registered office has also changed. No suggestion was given by learned defence counsel with respect to his volunteer portion nor he asked the witness to bring those documents on the next date. Though, he has taken a defence at the stage of final arguments that witness did not produce those documents but this defence is not tenable at this stage as the facts stated by witness in the volunteer portion were not disputed by counsel for accused, therefore, the objection of counsel for accused that the complainant company and the DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 8 of 23 company in whose name the trademarks have been registered are different cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside.
19. Now, coming to the next point, Ld counsel for accused has challenged the authority of witness Ashok Dhawan stating that he was not authorized by company properly as no board resolution has been filed showing authorization of the person who executed power of attorney in the name of witness and, therefore, CW-1 Ashok Dhawan had no authority to file the complaint or to pursue this complaint. He has also relied upon two judgments Nibro Ltd Vs National Insurance Co & State Bank of Travancore Vs Kingston Computers (both Supra). In regard to these judgments, it is stated that these judgments have arisen out of civil case, one Nibro Ltd Vs National Insurance Co AIR 1991 Delhi 25 is a suit filed on the original side and second judgment i.e. State Bank of Travancore Vs Kingston Computers is a civil appeal. Therefore, in both these case, there were civil dispute between the parties but here in the instant case we are dealing with criminal matter i.e. infringement of trademark u/s 78/79 Trademark Act. In this regard, Ld counsel for complainant has relied upon judgment "Vishwa Mitter of Vijay Bharat Cigarette Stores, Dalhousie Road, Pathankot Vs O.P. Poddar & ors; AIR 1984 SC 5" passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court, wherein it has observed that:
Section 4 of the Cr.P.C. 1973 provides for trial of offences under the Indian Penal Code and other laws, Sub Section (1) of Section 4 deals DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 9 of 23 with offences under the Indian Penal Code. Sub Section (2) of Section 4 provides that all offences under any other law (Other than offences under the Indian Penal Code) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Faciculus of sections included in Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code set out conditions requisite for initiation of proceedings. Section 190 provides for cognizance of offences by Magistrate which inter alia provides that subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV, an Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under Sub Section (2), may take cognizance of any offence-(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;... Section 190 thus confers power on any Magistrate to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which consitute such offence. It does not speak of any particular qualification for the complainant. Generally speaking, anyone can put the criminal law in motion unless there is a specific provision to the contrary. This is specifically indicated by the provision of Sub section (2) of Section 4 which provides that all offences under any other law-meaning thereby law other than the Indian Penal Code-
DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 10 of 23 shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with the according to the provisions in the Cr.PC, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. It would follow as a necessary corollary that unless in any statute other than the Cr.PC which prescribes an offence and simultaneously specifies the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences, the provisions of the CrPC shall apply in respect of such offences and they shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the CrPC. One such provision in the CrPC in Section 190 which empowers any Magistrate of the class specified therein to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitutes such offence. If after taking cognizance of an offence it is permissible Under Section 192, such. Magistrate may make over the case to other Magistrate therein specified. Therefore, from a combined reading of Section 4(2) with Section 190 of the CrPC, it transpires that upon a complaint filed by a person setting out facts therein which constitutes the offence before a Magistrate specified in Section 190, the Magistrate will be competent to take cognizance of the offence irrespective of the qualification or eligibility of the complainant DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 11 of 23 to file the complaint. It must, however, be conceded that where a provision to the contrary is made in any statute, which may indicate the qualification or eligibility of a complainant to file the complaint, the Magistrate before taking cognizance is entitled and has power to inquire whether the complainant satisfies the eligibility criteria.
One illustration would indicate what can be a provision to the contrary as contemplated by Sub section (2) of Section 4 of the CrPC. Section 195(1) provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence set out therein except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively subordinate. Similarly Sub section (2) of Section 195 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any of the offences specified therein except on the complaint in writing to that Court, or to some other Court to which that Court is subordinate. Section 198 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any of an offence, punishable under Chapter XX, of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Section 199 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Section 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 provides that no prosecution DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 12 of 23 for an offence under the Act, not being an offence Under Section 14 or Section 14-A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person authorized in this behalf, by general, or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government. Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence against the Act (other than an offence with respect to which proceedings are instituted Under Section 545), which is alleged to have been committed by any company or any officer thereof, except on the complaint in writing of the Registrar, or of a shareholder of the company, or of a person authorized by the Central Government in that behalf. It is not necessary to multiply the illustration. It is thus crystal clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance under Section 190 and unless any statutory provision prescribes any special qualification or eligibility criteria for putting the criminal law in motion, no Court can decline to take cognizance on the sold ground that complainant was not competent to file the complaint. Section 190 of the CrPC clearly indicates that the qualification of the complainant to file a complaint is not relevant. But where any special statute prescribes offence and makes any special DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 13 of 23 provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. Even with regard to offences under the Indian Penal Code, ordinarily, anyone can set the criminal law in motion but the various provisions in Chapter XIV prescribe the qualification of the complainant which would enable him or her to file a complaint in respect of specified offences and no Court can take cognizance of such offence unless the complainant satisfies the eligibility criterion, but in the absence of any such specification, no Court can throw out the complaint or decline to take the cognizance on the sold ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint.
Section 89 of the Trade Mark Act provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence Under Section 81, Section 82 or Section 83 except on a complaint in writing made by the Registrar or any officer authorized by him in writing. This provision manifests the legislative intention that in respect of the three specified offence punishable Under Section 81, 82 and 83, the Registrar alone is competent to file the complaint. This would simultaneously show that in respect of other offences under the Act, the provision contained in Section 190 of the CrPC read with Sub section (2) of Section 4 would permit anyone to file DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 14 of 23 the complaint. The indication to the contrary as envisaged by Sub section (2) of Section 4 of the CrPC is to be found in Section 89 and that section does not prescribe any particular eligibility criterion or qualification for filing a complaint for contravention of Sections 78 & 79 of the Act. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was in error in rejecting the complaint on the sole ground that the complainant was not entitled to file the complaint. This judgment is squarely applicable to the present case as in Trademark Act 1958 does not provide anywhere that for prosecuting u/s 78/79 Trademark Act, complainant should be a specific person. Therefore, this judgment is squarely applicable to the present case.
20. Therefore, in view of the aforesaid judgment and fact that power of attorney is on record in favour of CW-1 Ashok Dhawan, these arguments of Ld defence counsel is also not tenable and is liable to be set aside.
21. Now coming to his next argument, Ld defence counsel argued that mere registration of trademark is not sufficient and mark must also be used a what is protected is a right and not monopoly. In this regard the testimony of CW-1 Ashok Dhawan is very important. In the examination in chief of CW-1 Ashok Dhawan he has given a detailed description of the company stating that he is the AR of the complainant company and authorized to file, verify, prosecute in the present case as per power of attorney of their Chairman and Managing Director dt 15.04.2003. They started their DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 15 of 23 business in 1949 and dealing in haberdashery items like hand sewing needles, snap fastener, knitting pins, hooks and eyes, and jean buttons. They are the largest exporter from India. It is traded under trademarks of Pony, they have registered trade mark of Pony and Pony four legs from 1966 and started using Pony device with two legs from 1990 and they are also having copyright of the artistic work. Sample of the pony devices are Ex. CW1/B. Registration certificate are Ex. CW1/C (colly). Their trade marks are registered world wide in respect of Pony and its device. Apart from the trademark registration the complainant is the owner of the copy right wested in the Pony device. The copies of the copy right registration certificate are marked as CW1/B.
22. Now, coming to the cross examination of CW-1 Ashok Dhawan, nowhere in the cross examination, learned defence counsel has given a suggestion suggesting that complainant company is not dealing with the items mentioned in the examination in chief of the complainant as above. Nowhere, it was suggested to the witness that complainant company is not the largest exporter from India. The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in V.N Deosthali Vs State 2010 (2) AD (Delhi) 80 observed that "where a witness deposes a particular fact and no suggestion to contrary is given to him in cross examination, party against whom deposition is made, is deemed to have admitted that fact."
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23. CW-1 Ashok Dhawan in his cross examination dated 29.07.1008 has stated that "I am looking after the marketing job as a Regional General Sales Manager. I am looking after the marketing work. With regard to marketing, I mean sales, and look after competition, I mean marketing. By competition I mean whatever other brands are available in the market we have to report to our head office. I joined the company in 1972 as Sales Representative. Right from the beginning I in the sales department." No suggestion was given by defence counsel against answers given by the witness as above. It is clearly stated that aforesaid statement that he is the market personnel meaning thereby, marketing personnel would exist only when there is something which has to be marketed or sold which clearly shows that complainant products were well in use. Above all the defence counsel has suggested to the complainant in cross examination dated 29.05.2010 that the products sold by Sushil Jain are of superior quality and are cheaper than the products of the complainant company and there is competition which the complainant company is unable to sustain. This suggestion clearly shows that complainant company is selling its products in the market, meaning thereby that trademark of the complainant company was in use at the time of filing of complant. Therefore, averments of the counsel stating that trademark is not in use and, therefore, no offence u/s 78/79 Trademark Act is made out is clearly unsustainable and must be set DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 17 of 23 aside.
24. As regards contradiction, it is stated that there are contradiction with respect to number of police officials and their ranks who were members of the raiding team, persons who entered in the shop and remained outside, requesting public person to join investigation by IO. In this regard, it is observed that stated that complainant was cross examined seven times by the defence counsel for a period of two years i.e. from year 2008 till 2010 whereas alleged offence took place in March 2004. Thereafter, CW-2 Raj Singh was examined in January 2012 and he was cross examined in December 2012, March 2015 and, thereafter in November 2015. The last cross examination of CW-2 Ct Raj Singh was recorded in November 2015 i.e. after eleven years of commission of the alleged offence, meaning thereby, that being a police official, he must have witnessed n number of recoveries during these period and it is unreasonable and impractical to expect correct answers with respect to questions on number of police persons present at the spot, request made by IO to public person to join investigation, the person inside the shop, outside the shop. Natural witness cannot depose in a parrot like manner. Minor contradiction and embellishment which do not affect the case of the complainant in material dimension cannot be given such weightage so as to discard entire case of the prosecution/complainant if their testimony support the prosecution case DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 18 of 23 on material aspects which is so in the present case. The case and testimony of the witnesses as a whole has to be trustworthy and credible. The support in this regard is gathered from the judgment Leela Ram (Dead) Through Duli Chand Vs State of Haryana and Anr (1999) 9 SCC 525 it is observed that :-
"The court shall have to bear in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations: whereas some become speechless, some start wailing some others run away from the scene and yet there are some who may come forward with courage, conviction and belief that wrong should be remedied. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. There cannot be any set pattern or uniform rule of human reaction and to discard a piece of evidence on the ground of his reaction not falling within a set pattern is unproductive and a pedantic exercise.
25. It is indeed necessary to note that hardly one comes across a witness whose evidence does not contain some exaggeration or embellishments-sometimes there could even be a deliberate attempt to offer embellishment and sometimes in their over anxiety they may give slightly exaggerated account. The court can sift the chaff from the corn and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. Total repulsion of the evidence is unnecessary. The evidence is to be DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 19 of 23 considered from the point of view of trustworthiness-If this element is satisfied, they ought to inspire confidence in the mind of the court to accept the stated evidence though not however in the absence of the same." . This argument of learned counsel for accused is also set aside.
26. On reading of the whole of the testimony of CW-1 and CW-2, it is clear that they have proved beyond reasonable doubt that raid was conducted and 3135 packets of infringed articles were recovered from premises of accused. In fact it is interesting to note here that accused got himself examined u/s 315 Cr.P.C. as DW-1 and he admitted his signature on the seizure memo Ex. PW2/A on point D-1, though he stated that CW-1 Ashok Dhawan had obtained his signature on seizure memo in police station but he further stated that he did not make any complaint regarding his signature obtained on seizure memo. It is strange that a normal person can take anybody's signature on a document which is against that person and that person would sign in routine and would not even object to the same. This statement of accused is not at all convincing and the signatures of the accused which have been admitted by him on seizure memo shows that raid was conducted and recovery of the infringed articles i.e. 3135 packets of needles were effected from his premises. It is not at all the case of accused that premises did not belong to him. He also admitted during his cross examination that in the year 2004, he was using the name Regal on DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 20 of 23 the needles sold by him. It is interesting to note here that needles which have been recovered from the possession of accused also bearing the name Regal, therefore, identity and recovery of case property is also established.
27. Now coming to the point whether there is infringement or not , it is stated that complainant's trademark is Pony and shape/device two legged and four legged Pony device which is also registered trademark of complainant. This fact is admitted by accused in his defence evidence. Then on the glimpse of the original wrappers as well as needles of the accused, it is concluded that on both the articles are devices of Pony/Horse has been made which cannot be distinguished by a common man/ layman. The mark used by accused though bears different words below it but device appears to be the same which is deceptive in nature and can easily cheat a bonafide purchaser/customer. Therefore, it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused had trademark of complainant on his products and he was found in possession of those goods to which falsely trademark was applied in huge quantity.
28. Section 79 of Trademark Act 1958 provides as under:-
"Penalty for selling goods to which a false trademark or false trade description is applied.- Any person who sells, or exposes for sale, or has in his possession for sale or for any purpose of trade or DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 21 of 23 manufacture, any goods or things to which any false trademark or false trade description is applied or which, being required under Section 117 to have applied to them an indication of the country or place in which they were made or produced or the name and address of the manufacturer or the person for whom the goods are manufactured, are without the indication so required, shall, unless he proves-
(a) that, having taken all reasonable precautions against committing an offence against this section, he had at the time of the commission of the alleged offence no reason to suspect the genuineness of the trade mark or trade description or that any offence had been committed in respect of the goods; and
(b) that, on demand by or on behalf of the prosecutor, he gave all the information in his power with respect to the person from whom he obtained such goods or things; or
(c) that otherwise he had acted innocently;
be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both:
This Section includes possession of false goods to which false trademark has been applied either for sale or exposed for sale. In the cross examination of CW-1, It has been clearly stated that goods were properly stacked in the shelves of the shop of the accused. No other interpretation can be carved out DD No. 24-A/04 Page no. 22 of 23 except for the one that goods were stacked in shelves of the shop of the accused for the purpose of sale.
29. Therefore, accused Sushil Jain is held guilty for the charge framed for the offence u/s 78/79 Trademarks Act 1958.
30. Let he be heard on the point of sentence.
Announced in the open court (VANDANA JAIN)
on 19.09.2016 ACMM-02/CENTRAL
DELHI
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