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10. It is pointed out that, in fact, what happened was that in the aftermath of the demolition, appellants, along with others, were relocated to the newly constructed portions by way of provisional allotment and without insisting on the strict compliance of the terms of Clause 7. They were not in a position to produce documents showing that they were Nazul lease holders. It is wrong to think that under Clause 9, even those Nazul lessees, whose leases had expired, could apply within the extended time for getting the benefit of freehold rights. All that is intended was to extend the time limit, within which the applications could be filed by the persons, who had valid lease. Appellants have not produced any document to substantiate their case that they are Nazul lease holders. This is besides pointing out that the applications of the appellants have been rejected. It is also wrong to contend that under the order dated 02.12.2011, it is contemplated that those, whose properties came to be demolished, could stake a claim to have their other properties made freehold. All that was intended was to take the property affected by the demolition into consideration and to provide for making of the freehold to the said extent only. It is submitted that there is no need to hear the appellants or to comply with natural justice as such. In the factual background leading upto the order of the High Court in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 87 of 2012, the approval given by the Government to redevelopment plan was pressed upon us and it was contended that there is no need for an opportunity of hearing as it would be an exercise in futility. There was a clear need to vest the land in terms of Clause 10 as there was a need to make use of the said land for public purpose. There was no vested rights with the appellants to claim the freehold rights. The land belonged to the Government. Under the redevelopment plan, the said lands were needed clearly for public purpose. In absence of any legal right and in the context of the admitted facts, clearly, there is no need to issue notice to the appellants. As far as the action of the Vice Chairman of the MDDA, who had earlier written to the District Magistrate to vest the land, acting as a District Magistrate and, in his capacity as such, passing the impugned order being afflicted with the vice of bias, it is the doctrine of necessity, which is pressed before us. The question is posed as to what other order could have been passed by the District Magistrate. It is submitted that the power under Clause 10 of the Nazul Policy of 2009 is vested with the District Magistrate. When he was acting as a District Magistrate, having regard to all facts including the direction issued by the High Court in Writ Petition (PIL) No. 87 of 2012, if the District Magistrate took the decision to vest the land, when there was no other authority, which could have taken this decision under law, clearly it is not vulnerable to attack on the ground of bias. Regarding the contention that the order passed by the District Magistrate was not served on the appellants and they could not challenge the order, and this amounted to violation of principle of natural justice, Sri Vinay Garg would submit that the appellants were clearly aware of the order dated 07.08.2013 by virtue of the facts, which have been narrated above and even in the absence of a formal communication as such by the District Magistrate, having an actual or constructive knowledge would be sufficient for the appellants to have challenged the order if they wished. He would also submit that this Court may notice that the writ petition is filed after nearly 14 years after filing of the applications by the appellants seeking freeholding of their lands. If the period is to run from the order dated 02.12.2011, the writ petition is filed after more than three years. The learned counsel for the respondents drew our attention to Paragraph 10 of the writ petition, which reads as follows:

13. On these submissions, Sri Vinay Garg would reiterate that there is no basis to set aside the impugned order and to remit it for reconsideration as the matter was argued threadbare before this Court and the arguments would reveal that they are bereft of any merit as no legal right of the appellants existed for claiming freehold as claimed and as the District Magistrate has vested only those properties, which were not the subject matter of the demolition. There can be no question of applying the principles of natural justice in such a scenario. No other order could have been passed, runs the argument. As regards the plea of res judicata and the absence of adjudication in the earlier round of writ petition, it is submitted that it is open to the appellants to take the plea of estoppel, which they have, even according to the judgments relied upon by the appellants. He would submit that the principle of res judicata in a case other than the civil suit is not governed as such by Section 11 of the CPC. Even Section 11 of the CPC does not create principles of res judicata, but they are only enacted in recognition of the principle of res judicata, which is a principle of repose, which means that a man should not be vexed twice. In writ jurisdiction, the Courts are not shackled by the requirements in Section 11 and having regard to the course of litigation indulged in by the appellants, this Court may not grant relief in this writ petition. In regard to the decisions relied upon by the appellants relating to the need to communicate an order, he would distinguish them and also submit that these decisions recognize the principle that what is required is knowledge, which is either actual or constructive and it is clear that there was knowledge with the appellants. The petitioners in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 694 of 2014 are confronted with res judicata, whereas petitioners in Writ Petition (M/S) No. 2929 of 2013 are confronted with constructive res judicata.

"2. In our opinion, the judgment of the High Court is right and cannot be interfered with by this Court. Apart from the reasons given by this Court in the earlier judgment to the effect that the order must be made known either directly or constructively to the party affected by the order in order to enable him to prefer an appeal if he so likes, we may give one more reason in our judgment and that is this : It is plain that mere writing an order in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Officer is no order in the eye of law in the sense of affecting the rights of the parties for whom the order is meant. The order must be communicated either directly or constructively in the sense of making it known, which may make it possible for the authority to say that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. In a given case, the date of putting the order in communication under certain circumstances may be taken to be the date of the communication of the order or the date of the order but ordinarily and generally speaking, the order would be effective against the person affected by it only when it comes to his knowledge either directly or constructively, otherwise not. On the facts sated in the judgment of the High Court, it is clear that the respondent had no means to know about the order of the Taxation Officer rejecting his prayer until and unless he received his letter on October 29, 1964. Within the meaning of Section 15 of the U.P. Motor Vehicle Taxation Act that was the date of the order which gave the starting point for preferring an appeal within 30 days of that date."

25. An order to be treated as communicated in the context must be made known. The knowledge could be either direct or constructive. It is sufficient that the party affected must be deemed to have known the order. The court also took the view that the date of putting the order in communication, under certain circumstances, could be taken as the date of communication of the order and even the date of the order, but generally, knowledge must be attributable to the person affected. He may have knowledge either directly or constructively. In the facts of the case, the Court took the view that the respondent had no means to have received the letter.