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(2) Where the interest of a licensor, who is a tenant of any premises is determined for any reason, the licensee, who by section 15A is deemed to be a tenant, shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be deemed to become the tenant of the landlord, on the terms and conditions of the agreement consistent with the provisions of this Act."

When the Act was enacted a sub-tenant was saved from the eviction if sub-tenancy had been created prior to February 13, 1948. Under the Ordinance of 1959, which was subsequently replaced by the Bombay Act 49 of 1959, a lawful sub-tenancy created prior to May 21, 1959 was also saved. Again by the amending Act (Bombay Act 18 of 1987) lawful sub-tenancies created prior to February 1, 1973 were saved. Thus a sub-tenant is protected if sub-tenancy, which is lawful, is created prior to February 1, 1973.

Section 28 of the Act deals with jurisdiction of the Courts.

Mr. Gopal Jain, learned counsel for the appellants realised the weakness of his case for eviction on the ground of sub-tenancy as provided in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act. Creation of sub-tenancy in favour of the second respondent by the first respondent has been proved to be lawful from the date much earlier to the year 1959. Under Section 14 of the Act second respondent is deemed to have become tenant of the appellants on the same terms and conditions as they would have held from the tenant if the tenancy had continued. Mr. Jain then contended that since the tenant had contravened the provisions of Section 12 of the Act he was liable to eviction and since the second respondent, the sub-tenant claims through him, he is also liable to eviction inasmuch under clause (11) of Section 5 of the Act tenant includes sub-tenant. We do not think that is the correct interpretation to be given to clause (11) of Section 5 of the Act. Under Section 14 of the Act sub-tenant becomes tenant only after the tenancy of the tenant is determined. In the notice dated January 16, 1975, the appellants have claimed rent only from the first respondent. It is his tenancy which is determined and the allegation is that the first respondent inducted the second respondent to the suit premises. In the suit also it is the first respondent against whom ground for eviction on the ground of non-payment of rent under Section 12 of the Act is advanced. The first Appellate Court rightly held that a money decree for non-payment of rent cannot be passed against the second respondent when it was the first respondent who was in arrears of rent as claimed by the appellants and that the second respondent becomes liable to pay rent of the premises only from the date tenancy of the first respondent is determined. Then Mr. Jain wanted to invoke the doctrine of privity of estate and in that connection he referred to a decision of this Court in Surendra Kumar Jain vs. Royce Perira [(1997) 8 SCC 759]. In this case the Court said that findings as arrived at by the appellate court are findings of fact and were not liable to be interfered with by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. In that case while the respondent-owner had filed a suit against the appellant for possession and for the arrears of paying guest charges, appellant had contended that he was not a paying guest but was a tenant and in support of his plea he relied on a letter written by the owner to the Bombay Municipal Corporation in tax proceedings where he said that the appellant was paying rent of Rs.200/- per month. The respondent-owner, however, produced a letter of the appellant wherein he admitted that he was a paying guest. On this finding the Court dealt with the question of the doctrine of privity of estate as under

"There is another aspect from which s. 14 must be considered. The right of the sub-tenant is subject to the provisions of the Act and not an absolute right. The section, therefore, is controlled by the other sections of the Act, and if they entitle the landlord in a given case to obtain possession, s. 14 cannot come in the way. Section 12 entitles the landlord to obtain possession for non-payment of rent and s. 13 for other reasons. If, therefore, the landlord is entitled to obtain possession under any of these sections s. 14 must give way. It would be preposterous to suggest that a tenant who has destroyed the value of the property by unauthorized alterations should be able to successfully prevent the landlord from obtaining possession by parting it to a sub-tenant or who has not paid rent for years should prevent the landlord from obtaining possession by inducting a sub-tenant when notice is given. Again in a case where a landlord has sued both the tenant and sub-tenant for possession on the ground that he wants the premises for his personal use it could not be intended that he must thereafter start another litigation against the sub-tenant. For if s. 14 is allowed to have uncontrolled effect after the termination of the tenants tenancy the sub-tenant would become the tenant, and then he could claim a fresh notice for eviction. The section, we think, means that the sub-tenant would be deemed to have become a tenant, if the landlord is otherwise not entitled to possession. Since by s. 15 as amended, sub-tenancy and assignment in the case of specified sub-tenants or assignees is rendered legal, landlords right to recover possession on the ground of sub-letting or assignment in such a case is taken away, the sub-tenant or assignee would be entitled to retain possession."
"If in a suit against the tenant other persons are joined on the allegation that they are sub- tenants and if an eviction is sought only on the grounds which are personal to the tenant, then a decree in ejectment against him will result in conferring direct tenancy rights on the lawful sub-tenants. They cannot be ejected in that suit on those grounds. On the other hand, if the landlord seeks possession on the grounds which are not personal to the tenant and which concern the premises themselves, then it is open to the landlord in the same suit to plead and prove those grounds not only against the tenants but against the other persons impleaded in the suit and who are ultimately held to be lawful sub-tenants. In such a case the issues would be heard and decided between the landlord on the one side and the tenants and sub-tenants on the other. If the sub-tenants are not impleaded even in such a suit then the landlord, after obtaining a decree against the tenant, will have to file a fresh suit against the sub-tenants, who by then had become his direct deemed tenants by virtue of s. 14 of the Rent Act. In my opinion this would be the proper interpretation of s. 14 of the Rent Act when that section is read along with the other relevant provisions of the Rent Act. The construction indicated by the Division Bench will make s. 14 wholly meaningless. I will give only one illustration to indicate the fallacy which is inherent in that interpretation. The tenant may commit rent defaults for more than six months. He may not have any defence to an action founded on rent defaults. Under s. 12 (3)(a) the Court has no option but to pass a decree against him. But the sub-tenants may have regularly paid the rent to the tenant and their only fault will be that during the term of their sub-tenancy they have not forced or compelled the tenant to pass on the money received by him to the landlord. It will be wholly unreasonable to expect the sub- tenants to perform such an onerous duty. In my opinion it is one of those grounds which is personal to the tenant and if his tenancy comes to an end on that ground, the sub-tenants become the direct tenants by virtue of the provisions of s. 14 of the Rent Act and they will be protected under the Rent Act."