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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Bhargava, J. "these four connected appeals have been filed, by special leave, by the Town Municipal Council, Athani, and are directed against a common judgment of the High Court of Mysore in four writ petitions, filed by the appellant under Art., 226 of the Constitution, dismissing the writ petitions. The circumstances in which these appeals have arisen may be briefly stated.

Four different applications under section 33C,(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") were filed in the Labour Court, Hubli, by various workmen of the appellant. Application (LCH) No. 139 of 1965 was filed by eleven workmen on 28th July, 1965, seeking computation of their claim for overtime work for the period between 1st April, 1955 and 31st December, 1957, and for work done on weekly off-days for the period between 1st April, 1955 and 31st December, 1960. The amount claimed by each workman was separately indicated in the application under each head. The total claim of all the workmen was computed at Rs. 62,420/82P according to the workmen themselves. The second application (LCH) No. 138 of 1965 was presented by 50 workmen on 23rd July, 1965, putting forward a claim for washing allowance at Rs. 36 each from 1st January, 1964 to 30th June, 1965, and cost of uniform at Rs. 40 each from 1st January 1964 to 30th June, 1965 in respect of 18 of those 50 workmen. The third application (LCH) No. 101 of 1965 was filed by one workman alone on 19th April, 1965, claiming a sum of Rs. 8,910/72P in respect of his over-time work and compensation for work done on weekly off days. The fourth application (LCH ) No. 140 of 1965 was filed on 26th July 1965 by 14 workmen making a total claim of Rs. 17,302/60P, for work done on weekly off-days during the period from 1st December, 1960 to 30th June, 1965. 13 of the workmen claimed that they were entitled to payment at Rs, 1190 each, while one workman's claim was to the extent of Rs. 1832/60P. The Labour Court at Hubli entertained all these applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act, computed the amounts due to the various workmen who had filed the applications, and directed the appellant to make payment of the amounts found due. Thereupon, the appellant challenged the decision of the Labour Court before the High Court of Mysore by four different writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The order in Application (LCH) No. 139/1965 was challenged in, Writ Petition No. 741 of 1966, that in Application (LCH) No. 138/1965 in Writ Petition No. 973 of 1966; that in Applica- tion (LCH) No. 101 of 1965 in Writ Petition No. 974 of 1966; and that in Application (LCH) No. 140/1965 in Writ Petition No. 975/1966. The principal ground for challenging the decision of the Labour Court was that all these amounts could have been claimed by the workmen by filing applications under section 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act No. 11 of 1948; and, since that Act was a self-contained Act making provision for relief in such cases, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under the general Act, viz., the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was taken away and excluded. It was further pleaded that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to deal with the claims under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act had become time-barred and such claims, which had become time-barred, could not be entertained by the Labour Court under S. 33C(2) of the Act. Some other pleas were also taken in the writ petitions which we need not mention as they have not been raised before us. The High Court did not accept the plea put forward on behalf of the appellant and dismissed the writ petitions by a common order dated 25th August, 1967. These four appeals are directed against that common order dismissing the four writ petitions. Civil Appeals Nos. 170, 171, 172 and 173 of 1968 are directed against the order governing Writ Petitions Nos. 741/ 1966, 973/11966, 974/1966 and 975/1966 respectively. In these appeals in this Court also, the principal point urged by learned counsel for the appellant was the same which was raised before the High Court in the Writ Petitions, viz., that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to deal with the claims of the workmen under S. 33C(2) of the Act, was barred by the fact that the same relief could have been claimed by the workmen under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act. In the course of the arguments, however, learned counsel conceded that he could not press this point in Civil Appeal No. 171 of 1968 arising out of Writ Petition No. 973 of 1966 which was directed against the order of the Labour Court in Application (LCH) No. 138 of 1965, because the claim in that application before the Labour Court was confined to washing allowance and cost of uniform which are items not governed by the Minimum Wages Act at all. His submissions have, therefore, been confined before us to the other three appeals in which the claim of the workmen was for computation of their benefit in respect of overtime work and work done on weekly off-days.

It may be mentioned that the objection to the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was raised on behalf of the appellant not only in the writ petitions before the High Court, but even before the Labour Court itself when that Court took up the hearing of the applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act. However, the ground for challenging the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was confined to the point mentioned by us above. It was not contended either before the Labour Court or in the writ petitions before the High Court that the applications were not covered by the provisions of s. 33C(2) of the Act. The plea taken was that, even though the applications could be made under s. 33C(2) of the Act, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to proceed under that provision of law was barred by the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act. Mr. B. Sen, appearing on behalf of the appellant, wanted permission to raise the question whether these applications before the Labour Court were at all included within the scope of s. 33C(2) of the Act; but, on the objection of learned counsel for the respondents, the permission sought was refused. As we have mentioned earlier, the jurisdiction of the Labour Court on this ground was not challenged either before the Labour Court itself or before the High Court. No such ground was raised even in the special leave petition, nor was it raised at any earlier stage by any application. It was sought to be raised by Mr. Sen for the, first time in the course of the arguments in the appeals at the time of final hearing. We did not consider it correct to allow such a new point to be raised at this late stage. However, another new point, which had not been raised before the Labour Court and in the writ petitions before the High Court, was permitted to be argued, because it was raised by a separate application, presented before the hearing, seeking permission to raise it. The new question sought to be raised is that, even if the applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act were competent and not barred by the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, they were time-barred when presented under article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963. The question of limitation was incidentally mentioned before the, Labour Court as well as the High Court, relying on the circumstance that applications under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act could only have been presented within a period of six months from the date when the claims arose. At that stage, reliance was not placed on article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act; but, well before the final hearing, a written application was presented on behalf of the appellant seeking permission to raise this plea of limitation in these appeals. Notice of that application was served on the res- pondents well in time, so that, by the time the appeals came up for hearing, they knew that this point was sought to be raised by the appellant. A question of limitation raises a plea of want of jurisdiction and, in these cases, this question could be decided on the basis of the facts on the record, being a pure question of law. It is in this background that we have permitted this question also to be raised in these appeals, though it was not put forward either in the High Court or before the Labour Court. Thus, we are concerned in these appeals with the two aspects relating to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to, entertain applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act because of the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, and the plea that the applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act were time-barred Dr at least part of the claims under the applications were ame- barred in view of article 137 of the schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963.

On the first question, both the Labour Court and the High Court held that the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was excluded because of s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act has no force, on the assumption that the claims made in these applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act could have been presented before the Labour Court under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act. In our view, this assumption was not justified. As we shall indicate hereafter, the claims made by the workmen in the applications under S. 33C(2) of the Act could not have been made before the Labour Court under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act, so that it is not necessary for us to decide the general question of law whether an application under s. 33C(2) of the Act can or cannot be competently entertained by a Labour Court if an application for the same relief is entertainable by the Labour Court under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act. The long title and the preamble to the Minimum Wages Act show that this Act was passed with the object of making provision for fixing minimum rates of wageaein certain employments The word "wages" has been given a wide meaning in its definition in S. 2(h) of that Act and, quite clearly, includes payment in respect of overtime and -for work done on weekly off-days which are required to be given by any employer to the workmen under the provisions of that Act itself. Section 13(1), which deals with weekly off-days, and section 14(1), which deals with overtime, are as follows :-

We have mentioned these provisions of the Minimum Wages Act, because the language used at all stages in that Act leads to the clear inference that that Act is primarily concerned with fixing of rates-rates of minimum wages, overtime rates, rate for payment for work on a day of rest-and is not really intended to be an Act for enforcement of payment of wages for which provision is made in other laws, such as the Payment of Wages Act No. 4 of 1936, and the Industrial Disputes Act No. 14 of 1947. In s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act also, provision is made for seeking remedy in respect of claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates, of wages or in respect of payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 13 or of wages at the overtime rate under section 14. This language used in s. 20(1) shows that the Authority appointed under that provision of law is to exercise jurisdiction for deciding claims which relate to rates of wages, rates for payment of work done on days of rest and overtime rates. If there be no dispute as to rates between the employer and the employees, section 20(1) would not be attracted. The purpose of s. 20(1) seems to be to ensure that the 'rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act are complied with by the employer in making payments and, if any attempt is made to make payments at lower rates, the workmen are given the right to invoke the aid of the Authority appointed under s. 20(1). In cases where there is no dispute as to rates of wages, and the only question is whether a particular payment at the agreed rate in respect of minimum wages, overtime or work on off-days is due to a workman or not, the appropriate remedy is provided in the Payment of Wages Act. If the payment is withheld beyond the time permitted by the Payment of Wages Act even on the ground that the amount claimed by the workman is not due, or if the amount claimed by the workman is not paid on the ground that deductions are to be made by the employer, the employee can seek his remedy by an application under section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act. In cases where section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act may not provide adequate remedy, the remedy can be sought either under section 33C of the Act or by raising an industrial dispute under the Act and having it decided under the various provisions of that Act. In these circumstances, we are unable to accept the submission made by Mr. Sen on behalf of the appellant that s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act should be interpreted as intended to cover all claims in respect of minimum wages or overtime payment or payment for days of rest even though there may be no dispute as to the rates at which those payments are to be claimed. It is true that, under s. 20(3), power is given to the Authority dealing with an application under s. 20(1) to direct payment of the actual amount found due; but this, it. appears to us, is only an incidental power granted to that Authority, so that the directions made by the Authority under s. 20(1) may be effectively carried out and there may not be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. The power to make orders for payment of actual amount due to an employee under s. 20(3) cannot, therefore, be interpreted as indicating that the jurisdiction to the Authority under s. 20(1) has been given for the purpose of enforcement of payment of amounts and not for the purpose of ensuring compliance by the employer with the various rates fixed under that Act. This interpretation, in our opinion, also harmonises the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act with the provisions of the Payment of Wages Act which was already in existence when the Minimum Wages Act was passed. In the present appeals, therefore, we have to see whether the claims which were made by the workmen in the various applications under s. 33C(2) of the Act were of such a nature that they could have been brought before the Authority under s. 20(1) of the Minimum Wages Act inasmuch as they raised disputes relating to the rates for payment of overtime and for work done on weekly off days.