Document Fragment View

Matching Fragments

6. In the meanwhile, faced with an order of detention of his export consignments, passed by the Assistant Commissioner Customs (Drawback) under Section 142(1) of the Customs Act, 1962, the petitioner deposited the entire sum of drawback together with interest i.e. Rs. 99,69,684 towards principal and Rs. 71,73,851 towards interest aggregating to Rs. 1,71,37,545 by means of three challans dated 22.7.1998 (Rs. 25 lakhs), 6.11.1998 (Rs. 1.25 crores) and 27.1.1999 (Rs. 21,37,545).

7. The revision petition filed by the petitioner was disposed of by an order dated 11.6.1999 of the Joint Secretary, Government of India, Department of Revenue. The central government in the said order confined the issue to the recovery of the central excise component of the drawback in the event of non-realisation of export proceeds. Following the decisions of the Honble Supreme Court in Cannanore Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. v. Collector of Customs and Central Excise and Amba Lal v. Union of India AIR 1961 SC 264 it was held that Rule 16A of the Duty Drawback Rules 1995 could not be retrospective and that all payments made towards the Central Excise component of drawback before Page 3671 6.12.1995 cannot be recovered even though the export proceeds have not been realised. Consequently, the central government set aside the orders passed by the lower authorities and allowed the Revision Application with consequential relief.

The consequential relief is to allow the central excise portion of the drawback and recovering the custom portion of the drawback. The provisions of Section 75 of the Act have been held as applicable to the recovery of the amount of Custom component of drawback where export proceeds have not been realized by restricting the issue in the instant case to the central excise component of drawback only. Even the claimants have agreed to the applicability of Section 75 of the Act for the recovery of custom component as shown in para 4(8) of the said order. Thus only the amount pertaining to the central excise component of drawback deposited by the claimants in pursuance of the said impugned order No. 3/98 dated 9.6.98 is liable to be refunded to them as the consequential relief in terms of the order of the Joint Secretary in revision application.

17. Mr.S.K.Dubey, the learned Counsel for the Respondents, first refers to the counter affidavit filed by the Respondents wherein it is pointed out that the relevant guidelines governing grant of drawback on readymade garments during Page 3674 the relevant period clearly indicate that the rate of drawback was a combination of the customs and excise components. The applicable rate of drawback during the period between 1.1.1991 to 24.10.1991 was 9% FOB value of which 4% was allocated to customs and 5% to central excise; from 25.10.1991 till 31.5.1992 it was 7% of which 2% was allocated to customs and 5% to central excise; from 1.6.1992 till 31.5.1993 it was 8% of which 2% was allocated to customs and 6% to central excise and from 1.6.1993 till 31.5.1994 it was 7.5% of which 2% was allocated to customs and 5.5% to central excise. It is accordingly submitted that the splitting up of the drawback into the customs component and excise component was not unusual and this has been clearly understood by the exporters themselves.

(8) Whereas there is valid reason for recovering the drawback on the imported material, there is no justification for doing so in the case of excise duty paid on the locally produced materials used in the manufacture of the exported goods;
(10) The Commissioner (Appeals) has not touched Section 37 of the Central Excise Act. What the applicant was given was Central Excise duty and not Customs duty as drawback.

29. Clearly, this led the central government, and in our view correctly, to confine the plea to the refund of the excise duty component. The operative portion of the order dated 11.6.1999, setting aside the orders dated 1.7.1998 and 21.9.1998, has to be read in this context. It is not possible, therefore, to accept the contention of the petitioner that the entirety of those orders were set aside by the central government. In other words, the order dated 11.6.1999 cannot be read as directing the refund of both the excise component as well as the customs component of the drawback. For the reasons already explained, it was impermissible in law for the petitioner to have been refunded the customs duty component of the drawback.