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31. Learned counsel for the petitioners have also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka, reported in (2018) 12 SCC 61, relevant portion of which reads as under:-
"11. We do not find any merit in this contention. We are of the view that a voter in a particular panchayat cannot be rendered remediless if he is aggrieved by the election of the Adhyaksha of the Panchayat. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala [Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225] , a thirteen-Judge Bench of this Court held that Article 368 of the Constitution does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution. The basic structure of the Constitution could not be altered by any constitutional amendment and it was held in unambiguous terms that one of the basic (33 of 75) [CW-17993/2019] features is the existence of constitutional system in judicial review. This view was followed by a Constitution Bench in Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India [Minerva Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, (1980) 3 SCC 625] . In L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India [L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 577] , a seven-Judge Bench of this Court has held that jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution.
12. In I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N. [I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N., (2007) 2 SCC 1] , a Bench of nine Judges has again held that power of judicial review is the part of the basic structure of the Constitution. The power to amend cannot be equated with the power to frame the Constitution.
13. It is thus clear that power of judicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution is an essential feature of the Constitution which can neither be tinkered with nor eroded. Even the (34 of 75) [CW-17993/2019] Constitution cannot be amended to erode the basic structure of the Constitution. Therefore, it cannot be said that the writ petition filed by Respondents 6 to 9 under Article 226 of the Constitution is not maintainable. However, it is left to the discretion of the court exercising the power under Articles 226/227 to entertain the writ petition."
30. The above exposition requires further elucidation. If the grievance put forth, falls within any of the grounds enumerated, for the filing of an election petition under Sections 89 and 108 of the Election Commission Act, Article 243 ZG(b) of the Constitution would come into play, and the grievance urged, would have to be redressed by filing an election petition, after the conclusion of the election. The High Court, would in the exercise of judicial restraint, relegate such a petitioner to his remedy of an election petition. This exercise of judicial restraint cannot be equated with lack of or bar of jurisdiction. Thus, the Full Bench in Lal Chand's case (supra) did not commit any error of law, while holding that Article 226 of the Constitution, being an integral part of the basic structure of the Constitution, could not be diluted and exercise thereof could not be barred by any provision of the Constitution of India. The judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ponnuswami's case and Mohinder Singh Gill's case (supra), were apparently not brought to the notice of the Full Bench. The principle of judicial/jurisdictional restraint enunciated therein was apparently not placed before the Full Bench.
34. Reliance has also been placed by learned counsel for the petitioners on the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (50 of 75) [CW-17993/2019] reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261, relevant portion of which reads as under:
"76. To express our opinion on the issue whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we must first attempt to understand what constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution. The doctrine of basic structure was evolved in Kesavananda Bharati case [(1973) 4 SCC 225] . However, as already mentioned, that case did not lay down that the specific and particular features mentioned in that judgment alone would constitute the basic structure of our Constitution. Indeed, in the judgments of Shelat and Grover, JJ., Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., there are specific observations to the effect that their list of essential features comprising the basic structure of the Constitution are illustrative and are not intended to be exhaustive. In Indira Gandhi case [1975 Supp SCC 1] , Chandrachud, J. held that the proper approach for a Judge who is confronted with the question whether a particular facet of the Constitution is part of the basic structure, is to examine, in each individual case, the place of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity of our Constitution as a fundamental instrument for the governance of the country. (supra at pp. 751-752). This approach was specifically adopted by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills case [(1980) 3 SCC 625] (at pp. 671-672) and is not regarded as the definitive test in this field of Constitutional Law.