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3. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M. Nagaraj and others v. Union of India and others (2006) 8 SCC 212, wherein validity of Articles 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) was under challenge on the ground that these Articles violated the basic structure of the Constitution, has clearly laid down the law in relation to equal opportunity in employment. For the sake of convenience Articles 16 (4-A) and (4-B) are quoted herein under :-

"16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment.--(1)-(4)*** (4-A) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which, in the opinion of the State, are not adequately represented in the services under the State.

4. In paragraphs 101, 102 and 104 of the judgement in the case of M. Nagaraj (supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under :-

"101. The key question which arises in the matter of the challenge to the constitutional validity of the impugned amending Acts is -- whether the constitutional limitations on the amending power of Parliament are obliterated by the impugned amendments so as to violate the basic structure of the Constitution.
102. In the matter of application of the principle of basic structure, twin tests have to be satisfied, namely, the "width test" and the test of "identity". As stated hereinabove, the concept of the "catch-up" rule and "consequential seniority" are not constitutional requirements. They are not implicit in clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16. They are not constitutional limitations. They are concepts derived from service jurisprudence. They are not constitutional principles. They are not axioms like, secularism, federalism, etc. Obliteration of these concepts or insertion of these concepts does not change the equality code indicated by Articles 14, 15 and 16 of the Constitution. Clause (1) of Article 16 cannot prevent the State from taking cognizance of the compelling interests of Backward Classes in the society. Clauses (1) and (4) of Article 16 are restatements of the principle of equality under Article 14. Clause (4) of Article 16 refers to affirmative action by way of reservation. Clause (4) of Article 16, however, states that the appropriate Government is free to provide for reservation in cases where it is satisfied on the basis of quantifiable data that Backward Class is inadequately represented in the services. Therefore, in every case where the State decides to provide for reservation there must exist two circumstances, namely, "backwardness" and "inadequacy of representation". As stated above, equity, justice and efficiency are variable factors. These factors are context-specific. There is no fixed yardstick to identify and measure these three factors, it will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. These are the limitations on the mode of the exercise of power by the State. None of these limitations have been removed by the impugned amendments. If the State concerned fails to identify and measure backwardness, inadequacy and overall administrative efficiency then in that event the provision for reservation would be invalid. These amendments do not alter the structure of Articles 14, 15 and 16 (equity code). The parameters mentioned in Article 16(4) are retained. Clause (4-A) is derived from clause (4) of Article 16. Clause (4-A) is confined to SCs and STs alone. Therefore, the present case does not change the identity of the Constitution. The word "amendment" connotes change. The question is--whether the impugned amendments discard the original Constitution. It was vehemently urged on behalf of the petitioners that the Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates that the impugned amendments have been promulgated by Parliament to overrule the decisions of this Court. We do not find any merit in this argument. Under Article 141 of the Constitution the pronouncement of this Court is the law of the land. The judgments of this Court in Virpal Singh [Union of India v. Virpal Singh Chauhan, (1995) 6 SCC 684 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1] , Ajit Singh (1) [Ajit Singh Januja v. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 715 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 540] , Ajit Singh (2) [Ajit Singh (2) v. State of Punjab, (1999) 7 SCC 209 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 1239] and Indra Sawhney [Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 : 1992 SCC (L&S) Supp 1] were judgments delivered by this Court which enunciated the law of the land. It is that law which is sought to be changed by the impugned constitutional amendments. The impugned constitutional amendments are enabling in nature. They leave it to the States to provide for reservation. It is well settled that Parliament while enacting a law does not provide content to the "right". The content is provided by the judgments of the Supreme Court. If the appropriate Government enacts a law providing for reservation without keeping in mind the parameters in Article 16(4) and Article 335 then this Court will certainly set aside and strike down such legislation. Applying the "width test", we do not find obliteration of any of the constitutional limitations. Applying the test of "identity", we do not find any alteration in the existing structure of the equality code. As stated above, none of the axioms like secularism, federalism, etc. which are overarching principles have been violated by the impugned constitutional amendments. Equality has two facets -- "formal equality" and "proportional equality". Proportional equality is equality "in fact" whereas formal equality is equality "in law". Formal equality exists in the rule of law. In the case of proportional equality the State is expected to take affirmative steps in favour of disadvantaged sections of the society within the framework of liberal democracy. Egalitarian equality is proportional equality.
"8-A. Entitlement of consequential seniority to a person belonging to Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.--Notwithstanding anything contained in Rules 6, 7 or 8 of these Rules, a person belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes shall, on his promotion by virtue of rule of reservation/roster, be entitled to consequential seniority also".

8. On 13.5.2005, Rule 8-A of Rules, 1991 was omitted by the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Seniority (Second Amendment) Rules, 2005. However, it was provided in the said rules that the promotions made in accordance with the revised seniority, as determined under Rule 8-A prior to the commencement of the Rules, 2005, would not be affected. Thereafter, on 14.9.2007 by way of the Uttar Pradesh Government Servants Seniority (Third Amendment) Rules, 2007, Rule 8-A was inserted in the same language, which has been extracted in the preceding paragraphs, and the said amendment was given retrospective effect providing that it would be deemed to have come into force on 17.6.1995.

"86. We are of the firm view that a fresh exercise in the light of the judgment of the Constitution Bench in M. Nagaraj [(2006) 8 SCC 212 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 1013 : AIR 2007 SC 71] is a categorical imperative. The stand that the constitutional amendments have facilitated the reservation in promotion with consequential seniority and have given the stamp of approval to the Act and the Rules cannot withstand close scrutiny inasmuch as the Constitution Bench has clearly opined that Articles 16(4-A) and 16 (4-B) are enabling provisions and the State can make provisions for the same on certain basis or foundation. The conditions precedent have not been satisfied. No exercise has been undertaken. What has been argued with vehemence is that it is not necessary as the concept of reservation in promotion was already in vogue. We are unable to accept the said submission, for when the provisions of the Constitution are treated valid with certain conditions or riders, it becomes incumbent on the part of the State to appreciate and apply the test so that its amendments can be tested and withstand the scrutiny on parameters laid down therein.