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10. As to the point of law, the reference to it in issue 4 as an objection on the ground of " multifariousness" is not accurate, because no relief has been claimed against defendants 2 and 3 on any independent cause of action. Appellant's learned Counsel therefore urged the objection only as one to the joinder of defendants 2 and 3 in view of the limited scope of the Court's jurisdiction under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. He relied strongly on the decision of the Rangoon High Court in Johnson Po Min v. U Ogh (1932) I.L.R. 10 Rang. 342 and also contended that the observations of Mr. Justice Mukerjee in Budh Singh Dudhuria v. Niradbaran Roy (1905) 2 C.L.J. 431 at 439 and Gholam Mowlah v. Ali Hafiz (1915) 28 C.L.J. 4 at 18 and of Sir John Wallis in Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 at 267 support his objection. In all these cases relief had in fact been asked for against the third parties and the learned Judges rightly held that the balance of authority in this country was against granting such relief in suits under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. With due respect, I am however constrained to hold that some observations in these cases are too broadly expressed whatever the position may be. When an absolute stranger in possession of property alleged to belong to the trust either denies the trust or pleads adverse possession against the trust, it seems to me a distinction ought to be drawn between such a case and one in which a person who has come into possession of the alleged trust property through or in the right of the settlor or of a trustee, denies the existence of the trust or the title of the trust to the property in his possession. It does not seem to me right to assimilate the position of the latter to that of a trespasser. It is well-settled that the mere fact of a trustee de jure or de facto denying the existence of the trust or the title of the trust to the property in his possession does not oust the jurisdiction of the Court under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. Is there sufficient justification for treating differently a case in which the trust is denied by one who came into possession under or claims in the right of the settlor or trustee? It is unnecessary for the purpose of this case to discuss the position of an alienee who admitting the trust seeks to maintain the validity of the alienation in his favour.

14. The non-inclusion of certain kinds of relief in Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, has, if I may say so with due respect, sometime been misinterpreted. If a relief is specified in that section, the result will be that a suit for that relief cannot be brought except with the consent of the Advocate-General or the Collector. It was certainly not the intention of the legislature that every suit which may in any sense relate to a trust should be brought only after obtaining such consent. A trustee could undoubtedly sue for the possession of the trust property without such consent; and if the beneficiaries may in certain circumstances be entitled to ask that possession of the trust property be given to a trustee (cf. Venkataramana Aiyangar v. Kasturiranga Aiyangar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 777: I.L.R. 40 Mad. 212 (F.B.) and Chidambaranatha Thambiran v. Nallasiva Mudaliar (1917) 33 M.L.J. 357: I.L.R. 41 Mad. 124) it was apparently not the intention of the legislature that they should obtain the consent of the Advocate-General or the Collector before filing such a suit. This aspect of the matter has to be emphasised because it will show that the non-mention of certain reliefs in Section 92 is not necessarily with a view to impose a disability upon the Court as to make it clear that in respect of those reliefs the previous consent of the Advocate-General or Collector to the institution of the suit is not necessary. It is true that a decree for possession in favour of the plaintiffs is not contemplated in suits under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, but that is sufficiently accounted for by the fact that the plaintiffs in such suits will be relators who will not prima facie be entitled to possession. Again it is true that Section 92 is in a sense an enabling section in that it confers on two or more members of the public a right to seek relief without any proof of special damage. But once the Court is moved, the scope of its enquiry must be determined in the light of what is germane to the various matters indicated in Section 92 and not by reference to the right of plaintiffs to particular reliefs.

24. The learned Judge felt no doubt as to the propriety of retaining the defendant as a party to the proceeding in which they were called upon to determine the effect and validity of the provisions in the will.

25. In Evalappa Mudaliar v. Balakrishnammal (1927) 53 M.L.J. 183 Venkatasubba Rao, J., points out some of the anomalies that must result from the view that a person who denies or repudiates the trust cannot be impleaded in a suit under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. In Subramania Aiyar v. Venkatachala Vadhyar (1916) 4 L.W. 444 the learned judges (Ayling and Srinivasa Aiyangar, JJ.) clearly assume that in a suit under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, a finding can be given that certain properties are trust properties in the presence of persons interested to deny that fact and this they do after referring to the decisions in Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 and Rangasamy Naidu v. Chinnasamy Iyer (1915) 28 M.L.J. 326. This shows a recognition of a distinction between a finding that the property in question belongs to the trust and a declaration that an alienation of trust property is not binding on the trust. In view of the experience of the learned Judges who decided the case, the authority of the case is not, in my opinion, diminished by the fact that (on page 451) they refer to the agreement of counsel to have the decree so amended 'as to make it clear' that the finding as to the trust character of the property should be binding on the alienee in future proceedings. In the Rangoon case Johnson Po Min v. U Ogh (1932) I.L.R. 10 Rang. 342 the learned Chief Justice starts with the assumption (on page 349) that Section 92 which is found in the chapter headed "special proceeding" must have the same scope and object as was ascribed by Lord Eldon in Ex parte Skinner (1817) 2 Mer. 453: 35 E.R. 1013 to proceedings under Lord Romilly's Act. He would recognise no distinction between the question as to the existence or non-existence of a trust as an institution or in respect of particular properties and the question of the validity of that particular alienation of what is admitted to be trust property. He assumes that because a decree for possession could not be given in favour of the plaintiff, it must follow that the Court cannot consider any question relating to the title of the trust to property if it is denied by a stranger. With due respect, I venture to think, for the reasons above indicated, that these assumptions are not correct, nor is his final argument that in suits under Section 92 the plaintiffs cannot invoke the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code. Amongst the Madras cases, he relies on the observations of Sir John Wallis in Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 and makes a passing reference to Evalappa Mudaliar v. Balakrishnammal (1927) 53 M.L.J. 183 only to express his dissent from it. He does not refer to any of the Madras decisions above dealt with. He realises that even in Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 the observations of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., are to a different effect, but he thinks that in Venkataramana Aiyangar v. Kasturiranga Aiyangar (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 Seshagiri Aiyar, J., resiled from this opinion. I must confess I am unable to see anything in the judgment of Seshagiri Aiyar, J., in Venkataramana Aiyangar v. Kasturiranga Aiyangar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 777: I.L.R. 40 Mad. 212 (F.B.) that can be interpreted as going back upon the opinion expressed by him in Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 as to the propriety of having third parties before the Court in certain circumstances, though no relief can be granted against them. The learned Counsel who argued the case before us on behalf of the appellant has not been able to point to any such thing in the judgment in Venkataramana Aiyangar v. Kasturiranga Aiyangar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 777: I.L.R. 40 Mad. 212 (F.B.). If the learned Chief Justice had in view the observation on page 231, I may observe that they only show that Mr. Justice Seshagiri Aiyar regretted that suits even for relief by way of declaration or possession had not been included in Section 92, Civil Procedure Code, but felt bound by the weight of authority to hold that such relief could not be granted in suits under Section 92. There is nothing in this that is opposed to his judgment in Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 because even there he agreed with Sir John Wallis that neither possession nor even a declaration as to the invalidity of an alienation could be given. It is, after a statement of that conclusion that the learned Judge nevertheless held that the alienees would be proper parties. In Vaithi-lingam v. Ramalingam Pillai (1916) 6 L.W. 9 which was decided some months after Venkataramana Aiyangar v. Kasturiranga Aiyangar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 777: I.L.R. 40 Mad. 212 (F.B.) the learned Judge (sitting with Ayling, J.) referred, with apparent approval to Raghavalu Chetty v. Pellati Sitamma (1914) 27 M.L.J. 266 and affirmed the application of Order 1, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, to suits undtr Section 92. In Parameswaram Munpu v. Narayanan Nam budri (1916) 31 M.L.J. 279: I.L.R. 40 Mad. 110 the learned Judges assume that Order 1, Rule 10 is applicable to suits under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code.

27. It is not clear whether Sir John Wallis was of opinion that Order 1, Rule 10, Civil Procedure Code, cannot be availed of in suits under Section 92, Civil Procedure Code. The observations of Mukerjee, J., in pages 17 and 18 of Gholam Mowlah v. Ali Hafiz (1915) 28 C.L.J. 4 equally leave it in doubt whether the learned Judge was of opinion that the rule did not apply or merely that it was of no assistance in the circumstances of the particular case, Sanderson, C.J., only refers to Order 1, Rule 3 and not to Rule 10. I do not refer at any length to the decisions of the High Court of Allahabad and Bombay because Page, C.J., recognises that they not merely permit the joinder of third parties but would even go further. I respectfully agree with the opinion expressed in Lachman Prasad v. Munia (1925) I.L.R. 47 All. 867 at 871.