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4. Mr. Muthukrishna Iyer who appears for the respondents supports the judgment of the lower Court on the ground that if a document is a forgery it could not be enforced against any of the parties the to and urges that Section 87 can only apply to a document which has been properly executed and not to a document which in it* inception is a forgery. His argument is that if the plaintiff and the 1st' defendant's father agreed that the 2nd defendant's signature or mark should be forged, the whole document is a forgery and cannot be enforced against the 1st defendant,' though he was consenting party to the forgery. He relies upon the observation of Mr. Justice Sadasiva Iyer in Amirtham Pillai v. Nanjah Goundan 23 Ind. Cas. 464 : 26 M.L.J. 257 : 15 M.L.T. 204 : (1914) M.W.N. 250 : 1 L.W. 243: "A material portion of the promissory note being a forgery, it seems to come within the principle of the decisions which hold that a material alteration invalidates the whole note." This observation is only obiter for in that case, it was intended that two persons should be jointly liable on a pro-note and the finding was that the 1st defendant did not join in its execution. The Subordinate Judge's decree against the 2nd defendant was reversed by the learned Judge on the ground that "the 2nd defendant could not be made liable as he agreed to be liable only if the 1st defendant was jointly made liable." In C.R.P. No. 601 of 1912, the District Munsif found that of the three alleged executants only two signed the pro-note and the 3rd executant's signature was not genuine and gave a decree only against the two executants. Miller, J., relying on Gour Chandra Das v. Prasanna Kumar Chandra 33 C. 812 : 3 C.L.J. 363 : 10 C.W.N. 783 reversed the decree and dismissed the suit on the ground that there was a material alteration which nullified the instrument. The respondent was not represented in the High Court in that case. These two cases are distinguishable from the present on two grounds: