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"It may be of interest to notice that Falshaw C.J. had earlier taken a different view in Chanan Singh v. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation, but said that he had no hesitation in agreeing with Dua J's view because he realised that this earlier view was based on an over simplification. In the latest case the Andhra Pradesh High Court also, following the earlier decision of Madhya Pradesh, Madras and Punjab held that the State Government had exceeded its powers to frame Rule 17 as no such power to prescribe limitation under the provisions of Section 96(1) (b) or under Section 78 (2) can be said to have been delegated to the State Govt. We, however, find that Section 78(2) does not delegate any power to the Government to make rules but only requires the Insurance Court to follow "such procedure as may be prescribed by rules made by the State Govt." which rules can only be made under Section 96 of the Act. In the view we have taken it is unnecessary to examine the question whether legislative practice also leads to the same conclusion though in the Madras and the Punjab decisions that was also one of the grounds given in support of their respective conclusions. The contrary view expressed by a Bench of the Allahabad High Court is in our opinion not good law. We may before parting with this case point out that the legislature has since chosen to specifically prescribe 3 years as limitation period by addition of. Sub-section (1-A) to Section 77 while deleting Section 80. Section 77 (1-A) provides that "Every such application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose". By this amendment the claim under Clause (d) as well as the one under Clause (f) of Sub-section (2) of Section 75 which provides for the adjudication of a claim by the Insurance Court for the recovery of any benefit admissible under the Act for which a separate limitation was fixed under Section 80, is now to be made within three years from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. This amendment also confirms the view taken by this Court that the power under Section 96(1) (b) does not empower the Government to prescribe by rules a period of limitation for claims under Section 75."