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(a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or,
(b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial."

The Full Bench dealing with the proviso and the need for suspension, explained its objects as follows:

"In this context it become necessary to first consider the very nature of an order of suspension made either during the pendency of a departmental proceeding or in reasonable contemplation thereof. It is well settled that suspension is of two kinds -- one by way of punishment, and the other by way of a procedural aid to the holding of disciplinary proceedings. Admittedly herein we are concerned with the latter category. It seems to be undisputed that the concept of suspension during departmental proceeding has only the large objective of ensuring a free and fair conduct of the enquiry that is either pending or is to follow. In this context, the fact that the suspension order is interlocutory or interim in nature can perhaps be hardly denied. The service rules invariably, if not inflexibly, provide for a subsistence allowance during the period and the delinquent official retains his lien on the post during the continuation of the departmental proceeding. This mellows the rigour of the order of suspension and in the event of the enquiry resulting in favour of the official, he would be invariably entitled to the revoking of the order of suspension and the reinstatement to the post with all the benefits of service and salary, (sometimes even without having worked during the said period), as may be provided in the rules. There is thus no finality or irrevocability attaching to an order of suspension, which, as already noticed, retains its character or being interim or interlocutory, in nature. The object and purposes of placing a public servant under suspension during or in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding may be manifold and do not call for any exhaustive enumeration. However, its salient features are well known and may call for a passing notice. Where serious allegations of misconduct are imputed against an official, the service interest renders it undesirable to allow him to continue in the post where he was functioning. In case where the authority deems a further and deeper investigation into the same as necessary, it become somewhat imperative to remove the official concerned from the spheres of his activities, as it may be necessary to find out facts from people working under him or to take into possession documents and materials which would be in his custody. Usually, if not invariably, it would become embarrassing and inopportune both for the delinquent official concerned as well as the inquiring authority to do so, while such official was present at the spot and holding his official position as such. It was sought to be contended that such a situation may be avoided by merely transferring the official. However, it would be for the authority concerned to decide whether such an official, against whom prima facie serious imputations have been levelled; should at all be allowed to function anywhere else. If it so decides, then suspension during the pendency or in contemplation of an inquiry might well become inevitable. It seems to be a fallacy to assume that suspension is necessarily and wholly related to the gravity of the charge. Indeed, it may have to be ordered to facilitate free investigation and collection of evidence. Just as criminal procedure is intended to subserve the basic cause of a free and fair trial, similarly, suspension as an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceeding, is directed to the larger purpose of a free and fair inquiry. It would thus seem that the power of suspension is not only necessary, but indeed, a salutary power, if reasonably exercised either during the pendency or in contemplation of a disciplinary proceeding.

59.

(v) The Supreme Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and another vs. Deepak Kumar Bhola reported in 1997 (4) SCC 1, upheld the order of suspension of a bank employee, who was facing a criminal offence involving in moral turpitude. In the said Judgment, the order of the Allahabad High Court, quashing the order of suspension was set aside and the appeal filed by the bank was allowed.

(vi) The Supreme Court in the decisions in R.P.Kapoor v. Union of India reported in AIR 1964 SC 787l; Balwantray Ratilal Patel v. State of Maharastra reported in AIR 1968 SC 800; A.K.K.Nambiar v. Union of India reported in 1969 (3) SCC 864; V.P.Gidroniya v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 1970 (1) SCC 362; Ministry of Home Affairs v. Tarak Nath Ghosh reported in 1971 (1) SCC 734; Government of Andhra Pradesh v V.Sivaraman reported in 1990 (3) SCC 57; Uttar Pradesh Rajya Krishi Utpadan Manti Samiti Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajah reported in 1993 (2) LLN 11; State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty reported in 1994 (1) LLN 889; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ram Singh reported in 2000 (5) SCC 88; State Bank of India v. Rattan Singh reported in 2000 (10) SCC 396; K.C.Sareen v. CBI reported in 2001 (6) SCC 584; Union of India v Rajiv Kumar reported in 2003 (6) SCC 516, held that a person involved in a criminal case can be placed under suspension till he is exonerated and she can claim only subsistence allowance and he cannot demand revocation of suspension as a matter of right.

46. In the Deputy Inspector General of Police v. S.Govindaraj reported in 2012 (1) CTC 124 it was one of the contentions that there was no specific allegation against the writ petitioner therein, in the F.I.R. However, charge sheet has been filed against him in Special Special C.C.No.7 of 2008. There was no progress in the criminal case, except examining PW1, who had sanctioned prosecution against the writ petitioner therein. In the above reported case, by observing that the writ petitioner therein was kept under prolonged suspension, for nearly 5 years with salary, in the form of Subsistence Allowance, without extracting any work from him, which is nothing but wasting of Government money, and by applying Rule 3(e)(5) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, a Division Bench of this Court has confirmed the order of the learned single Judge, directing revocation of suspension. A perusal of the judgment in S.Govindaraj's case (cited supra) indicates that no decision of the Supreme Court, on the aspect of placing an individual under suspension, involving corruption has been considered. Therefore, this Court is inclined to consider some of the judgments of the Apex Court, dealing with suspension.

64. In the light of the Apex Court decision stated supra, this Court is not inclined to hold that G.O.(D).No.379, Public Works (E1) Department, dated 10.11.2011 as invalid or contrary to the Statutory Rules. Receipt of subsistence allowance, subject to satisfying the statutory provisions, is certainly a matter of right. But revocation of suspension pending trial into corruption charges, cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as it would defeat the purpose of the Statutory Rules, which empower the authority to suspend and continue the same.