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"The whole law of negligence in accident cases is now very well settled, and, beyond the difficulty of explaining it to a jury in terms of the decided cases, its application is plain enough. Many persons are apt to think that, in a case of contributory negligence like the present, the injured man deserved to be hurt, but the question is not one of desert or the lack of it, but of the cause legally responsible for the injury. However, when once the steps are followed the jury can see what they have to do, for the good sense of the rules is apparent. The inquiry is a judicial inquiry. It does not always follow the historical method and begin at the beginning. Very often it is more convenient to begin at the end, that is at the accident, and work back along the line of events which led up to it. The object of the inquiry is to fix upon some wrong-doer the responsibility for the wrongful act which has caused the damage. It is in search not merely of a casual agency but of the responsible agent. When that has been done, it is not necessary to pursue the matter into its origins; for judicial purposes they are remote. Till that has been done there may be a considerable sequence of physical events, and even of acts of responsible human beings, between the damage done and the conduct which is tortious and is its cause. It is surprising how many epithets eminent judges have applied to the cause, which has to be ascertained for this judicial purpose of determining liability, and how many more to other acts and incidents, which for this purpose are not the cause at all 'Efficient or effective Cause', 'real cause', 'proximate cause', 'direct cause', 'decisive cause', 'immediate cause', 'causa causans', on the one hand, as against, on the other, "causa sine qua non', 'occasional cause', 'remote cause', 'contributory cause', 'inducing cause', 'condition', and so on. No doubt in the particular cases in which they occur they were thought to be useful or they would not have been used, but the repetition of terms without examination in other cases has often led to confusion, and it might be better, after pointing out that the inquiry is an investigation into responsibility, to be content with speaking of the cause of the injury simply and without qualification."

That was a case of the deceased going in a cart and driving on a level crossing. He did not hear or see, the approaching car until it almost knocked down the cart Benjamin Sands, one of the occupants, was killed. In the circumstances, it was held that it was not a case of contributory negligence This entitled the plaintiff to his claim for damages because in that case the defendant company, although not committing a negligent act subsequently to the plaintiff's negligence, had incapacitated him by its previous negligence from exercising such care as would have avoided the result of the plaintiffs negligence. It was not a case of no gate having been put up at the level crossing, but a case of deciding what was meant by proximate cause of the accident It would depend upon a consideration of the facts of the case and the conduct of the parties. In a case of level crossing, therefore, the antecedent conduct of the railway man in not closing the gate or not fixing up a gate where one should be put up, or not making any proper arrangement where a busy thoroughfare passes to cross the railway track, by way of signals or otherwise would make the railway administration liable. In (1870) 5 QB 258 the principle of the duty of the railway company in regard to railway crossings has been laid down in clear terms and this class of cases has been put in a distinct category of "negligence as to the crossing. In that case when the defendant's line was originally opened gates were erected across the occupation road, and there was a gate-keeper kept, but the defendant had ceased to keep a gate-keeper some years before the accident, and the gates were left unfastened. Lush, J. at page 264 of the report said: