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26. Having stated my view of the law on the point I shall now proceed to a discussion of the cases and authorities cited at the Bar.

27. Most of these decisions trace their descent from (1874) 16 Eq. 275 (A). Lord Selborne came to the conclusion in that case that a Court of Equity would not, at the instance of a settlor or his legal personal representative, adversely set aside a settlement by which the settlor conferred on a stranger the absolute beneficial interest in property legally vested in trustees, although such settlement might have been made for an illegal consideration not appearing on the face of the instrument. In that case the settlement was made in contemplation of a cohabitation under colour of a ceremony of marriage known to both parties to be invalid because the marriage between a widower and his de-erased wife's sister was prohibited by art Act of Parliament and was held to be contrary to public policv. It was held by Lord Selbome that the suit could not be maintained. Many points distinguish this case from the present case before us. First, there is no difference between the Court of Equity and a Court of Law in India, nor does the Indian law make anv difference between equitable interest and the legal interest; secondly, the suit in equity in Ayerst v. Jenkins (A), was brought at the desire of persons beneficially interested in an estate against the surviving trustees of the settlor, and was therefore a case of devolution of proprietary interests; thirdly, the relief in Ayerst v. Jenkins (A), was sought by the representative, not merely of a particeps criminis, but of a voluntary and sole donor, and also against a completed transfer of specific chattels, by which the legal estate in those chattels was absolutely vested in trustees; fourthly, in commenting on the case of Wootton v. Wootton dealing with mutual settlement made on the occasion of a fictitious marriage, from which both parties desired, or were at least willing to be relieved, and where it was said that the door of this court should not be closed against persons repenting of such an unlawful connection, on the ground that being desirous of extricating themselves from fetters which, if relief were refused, might practically bind them to it, Lord Selborne expressly observed that it was consistent with all sound principle, and with all authority, to recognise the importance of the distinction between a completed voluntary gift, valid and irrevocable in law, as was the case in Ayerst y. Jankins (A), of transfer of shares to the trustees and a bond or covenant for an illegal consideration, which had no effect whatever in law. This major distinction appears insufficiently emphasised and appreciated in many of the Indian decisions in the past. Lord Selborne in Ayerst v. Jenkins (A), mentions another distinction between executed and executory contracts, referring to the well-known decision of the Master of Rolls in Whalev v. Norton, 1687) 1 Vern 483 (G), which His Lordship quotes as an authority for the proposition that "this court would extend relief as to things executory, which, if done, it may be, might stand."