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(15) Two points are made in the above observation, namely, (1) the college or the Managing Committee is not a statutory body, and (2) the order terminating the contract of service was not an order of a statutory body acting in breach of mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. There need be no dispute regarding the first observation. As we have stated above, a private college and its Managing Committee can exist outside a statute. They are not created by a statute and in that sense they are not statutory bodies. But if statutory powers and duties are conferred on them, then they will be acting under a statute. But the decision of the Supreme Court in Vidya Ram Misra's case was that the termination of the service of the lecturer Misra was not made in breach of a mandatory obligation imposed by a statute. In this respect, it is to be distinguished from the present case where the only authority or discretion possessed by the Principal is under Ordinance and, therefore, of a statutory nature. There is no question of it being of a contractual nature. The main thrust of the decision of the Supreme Court in Vidya Ram Misra's case was that the writ petition could not be maintained for the breach of a service contract. It is to be noted that even a suit for specific performance of a service contract could not be maintained. The rights of the petitioners in the present case are not based on contracts but on statutory provisions. In Vidya Ram Misra's case, the college was said to be not a statutory authority. In the present case, the Principal is a statutory authority in the sense that here is a public office recognised and governed by the Delhi University Act, 1922 and Ordinance 7 Confers statutory powers on the holder of that office. The ratio of the decision in Vidya Ram Misra's case is limited by the particular facts of that case which are quite different from the facts of the present case. Private colleges admitted to the privileges of a statutory University were hold to be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in the following two recent Full Bench decisions after distinguishing the Supreme Court decision in Vidya Ram Misra's case, (II) namely (i) Vaish College (Society) Sharnli v. Sri Lakshmi Narain, Air 1974 Allahabad 1 (FB), and (ii) Harijander Singh v. Selection Committee, Kakatiya Medical College, . Therefore, in these respects, the preseat case is more analogous to Prabhakar Ramakrishna Jodh v. A. L. Pande, , in which the termination of the services of a lecturer by his college was held to have been in breech of the College Code which was "law" being Ordinances framed under the University of Saugar Act. The observation of the Supreme Court in Vidya Ram Misra's case has to be taken as a whole. With respect, it would not exclude the jurisdiction of this Court in the present case in dealing with the power and/or the discretion of the Principal governed by Ordinance VII. "If the Principal is shown to have acted contrary to the provisions of Ordinance Vii, this Court would have power under Article 226 to deal with the action of the Principal because it would be action of a person holding the public office and acting in public capacity. A public office need not be created by a statute. Even if it is governed and regulated by a statute, it would be regarded as public.