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This Court in that connection referred to the principles laid down by Krishna Iyer,J. in Gujarat Steel Tube vs. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sangh [1980 (2) SCC 593]. As to `foundation', it was said by Krishna Iyer,J. as follows:

".....a termination effected because the master is satisfied of the misconduct and of the desirability of terminating the service of the delinquent servant, it is a dismissal, even if he had the right in law to terminate with an innocent order under the standing order or otherwise. Whether, in such a case, the grounds are recorded in different proceedings from the formal order, does not detract from its nature. Nor the fact that, after being satisfied of the guilt, the master abandons the inquiry and proceeds to terminate. Given an alleged misconduct and a live nexus between it and the termination of service, the conclusion is dismissal, even if full benefits as on simple termination, are given and non- injurious terminolgy is used."

As to motive one other example is the case of State of Punjab vs. Sukh Raj Bahadur [1968(3) SCR 234] where a charge memo for a regular inquiry was served, reply given and at that stage itself the proceedings were dropped and a simple termination order was issued. It was held, the order of simple termination was not founded on any findings as to misconduct. In that case, this Court referred to A.S.Benjamin vs. Union of India (Civil Appeal No.1341 of 1966 dt. 13.12.1966) (SC) where a charge memo was issued, explanation was received, an inquiry officer was also appointed but before the inquiry could be completed, the proceedings were dropped and a simple order of termination was passed, the reason for dropping the proceedings was that "departmental proceedings will take a much longer time and we are not sure whether after going through all the foundation, we will be able to deal with the accused in the way he deserves'. The termination was upheld.

If findings were arrived at in inquiry as to misconduct, behind the back of the officer or without a regular departmental enquiry, the simple order of termination is to be treated as `founded' on the allegations and will be bad. But if the inquiry was not held, no finding were arrived at and the employer was not inclined to conduct an inquiry but, at the same time, he did not want to continue the employee against whom there were complaints, it would only be a case of motive and the order would not be bad. Similar is the position if the employer did not want to inquire into the truth of the allegations because of delay in regular departmental proceedings or he was doubtful about securing adequate evidence. In such a circumstance, the allegations would be a motive and not the foundation and the simple order of termination would be valid.

There is, however, considerable difficulty in finding out whether in a given case where the order of termination is not a simple order of termination, the words used in the order can be said to contain a `stigma'. The other issue in the case before us is whether - even if the words used in the order of termination are innocuous, -the court can go into the words used or language employed in other orders or proceedings referred to by the employer in the order of termination?