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11. In this backdrop, the question that needs to be answered is--under which clause of the lease or other statutory provision does the LandDO draw power to make demands towards damages for temporary regularisation of unauthorised construction? It is the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner No.17 that the relationship between the petitioner No.17 and the LandDO is entirely governed by the clauses contained in the original lease deed dated 03.07.1941. In fact, it was submitted in ground 'E' of the writ petition that this lease was a government grant and by virtue of Section 3 of the Government Grants Act, 1895, only the terms of the grant and not any other statutory provisions need be looked into. Thus, the entire case for imposition of damages by the Land DO on the petitioner No.17 depended on the terms and conditions of the said lease deed. The learned counsel for the petitioner No.17, submitted that there is no clause in the said lease deed which gave a right to the LandDO to impose damages for the alleged violation of the terms and conditions thereof. The only powers given to the LandDO were of re-entry, if otherwise permissible in law.

13. Before I analyze this clause in the context of the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, it would be instructive to recapitulate that there are two aspects to the matter at hand. The first is the question of demolition of any alleged unauthorised construction and the second is the issue with regard to the power (or the lack of it) of the LandDO to demand payment for damages towards temporary regularisation of unauthorised construction. Insofar as the first aspect is concerned, it is an admitted position that when the alleged unauthorised construction was made (over 50 years ago), no notice within six months thereof was issued to the lessee. That being so, by virtue of Section 195 of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as it was then applicable, the alleged unauthorised construction could not be demolished thereafter. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Delhi Municipality v. Surjit Kaur: held as under in paragraph 6 thereof:-

''2. The Lessee for himself, his heirs, executors, administrators and assigns covenants with the Lesser in the manner following (that is to say)-
(1) xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (2) The Lessee will from time to time and at all times pay and b1 discharge all rates, taxes, charges and assessments of every description which are now or may at any time hereafter during the continuation of this lease be assessed, charged or imposed upon the premises hereby demised or on any buildings to be erected thereupon or on the Landlord or Tenant in respect thereof.'' From a reading of clause 2 (2), it is clear that it is a covenant by the lessee that he shall, from time to time, pay and discharge all rates, taxes, charges and assessments of every description which may be assessed, charged or imposed upon the premises in question or on any buildings to be erected thereupon or on the landlord or the tenant in respect thereof. A plain reading of the said clause 2(2), makes it clear that it speaks of the lessee's liability in respect of the premises in question with regard to payments to third parties (local authorities, etc.) and that too pertaining to rates, taxes, charges and assessments of every description. The liability that is spoken of in this clause is in the nature of payments to other local bodies in the relam of taxation. The words used are ''rates'', ''taxes'', ''charges'' and ''assessments''. All these words are descriptive of levies relatable to taxes. They have nothing to do with damages for temporary regularisation of unauthorised construction which belong to an entirely different genus. The rule of construction in construing written instruments such as the present lease is that the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to, unless it would lead to some absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument. In such an eventuality, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified to avoid the absurdity and inconsistency but only to that extent. [See: V.S. Talwar v. Prem Chandra sharma: (to 424-425); Delhi Development Authority v. Durga Chand Kaushish: ; Krishna Beharilal (died) (by Lrs) v. Gulab Chand and Ors: ; and Ramprashad Sahu and Anr. v. Mt. Basantia: AIR 1925 Patna 729]. In the present case, I find that reading clause 2 (2) in the grammatical and ordinary sense does not produce any absurdity, repugnancy or inconsistency with the rest of the lease. At least none has been pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondents. Reading the said clause in its ordinary and grammatical sense, I do not see how the said clause could be construed as giving the Lesser (presently the Land DO) the power to charge damages for temporary regularisation of unauthorised construction. It does not.

18. Mr Hazarika, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 and 2, then relied upon the Office Order dated 31.03.1976 on the subject -- ''Breaches (charges for change of use/unauthorised constructions, etc.),Procedure to deal with''. The Office Order of 31.03.1976 cannot permit something which is not provided for in the said lease. When the said lease operates as a Government grant, it operates notwithstanding any rule of law or statutory provision. An Office Order is certainly at a level inferior to a statutory provision and, therefore, would not empower the LandDO to charge damages as indicated therein or in the manner mentioned therein. The power or the right to recover damages has to flow from the lease itself. As already indicated above, there is no such clause in the said lease whereunder the LandDO could impose damages for temporary regularisation of unauthorised construction. That being the case, the Office Order dated 31.03.1976 is of no consequence.