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The argument of Mr. Sorabji, however, was that the cess amounted to unreasonable restriction and could not be said to be for a public purpose, in that, it benefits neglectful and defaulting owners at the cost of owners who have been looking after their properties and consistently carrying out tenantable repairs, thus preventing their buildings from being reduced to dangerous conditions. In this connection, he relied on certain passages from Cooley on Taxation (4th ed.), vol. 1, American Jurisprudence, vol. 51 on Taxation and the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments v. Lakshmindra.(1) The argument was that the tax was objectionable as it equated buildings in dangerous and dilapidated conditions with those in good and sound condition, thus, laying down a fictional equality in the teeth of factual and physical inequality. Counsel relied for that argument on K. T. Moopil Nair v. The State of Kerala(2) and urged that the tax should be declared invalid on the principles laid down therein. He also argued that the classification of buildings into three categories imposing different rates of tax was not based on any rational principle as even recently constructed buildings and buildings not needing or likely to need structural repairs were brought into the class of buildings subject to the cess. There was next an assumption, he argued, not based on realities, that a building constructed before a certain number of years would need structural repairs although it has been kept in proper condition and therefore not needing such structural repairs. A building constructed several years ago might be in better condition if consistently taken care (1) [1954] S.C.R. 1005,1040.

(2) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 77.

of than the one built later but not taken care of, yet such a building, only because it was built earlier, is subjected to a higher rate of tax. Sec. 27 and the Schedule created discrimination between properties (a) inter se in the same category, (b) between buildings in different categories, and

(c) in imposing the same percentage, on buildings in the same category though their actual conditions are totally different and also between buildings in different ,categories. Thus, buildings in category A, built say in 1900 and those built in 1939 are treated as equals. Even buildings erected ,at about the same time need not be equal in condition, as, in the ,case of one tenantable repairs might have been consistently carried ,out or structural repairs might have recently been carried out than the one in which no such repairs, tenantable or structural, have so far been carried out. Even if such a tax was necessary, its levy should have been made dependable on the actual condi- tions of the buildings and after a survey of the necessity and the extent of structural repairs required. Further, buildings in sound condition and not needing structural repairs ought to have been ,exempted. The Act, thus, does not take notice of the actualities in the sense that though a building built in 1939 but wherein extensive repairs have been carried out in 1968 would be a better building than another built in 1950, yet the former has to pay .the tax at a higher percentage than the latter. The categorisation ,of the buildings, therefore, was arbitrary and not based on any rational principle. Counsel also attacked the exemptions given :to buildings falling under cls. (g), (h), (i) and (j) of S. 28 as being irrational and without being founded on any principle. Lastly, he urged that the classification between buildings constructed before the Act and those constructed thereafter was not valid since there was no nexus between the date fixed under the Act and the objects of the Act. Even assuming that the Act were to be found to be valid, those buildings which were sound in condition and were likely to remain so throughout the life of the Act ,could be separated from the rest and a restraint against tax being enforced in respect of them can be imposed. The attack against ,the validity of the Act thus falls under two heads : (a) that the cess is not for a public purpose as it results in bounties to owners whose buildings need structural repairs at the expense of those whose buildings are sound and are not likely to need any such repairs, and

Ch. IV of the Act deals with the levy of the cess and the buildings subjected to its imposition. Though s. 27 imposes the tax on buildings and lands, the exemptions given to buildings exclusively occupied by the owners, to buildings exclusively used for non-residential purpose, to residential buildings exclusively occupied on leave and licence, to open lands not build upon and to buildings which might be erected after the date on which the Act comes into force. have the effect of confining the tax to residential houses occupied by tenants existing at the date of the commencement of the Act. Sec. 29 divides the buildings so taxed into categories A, B and C. Buildings built prior to September 1. 1940 fall into category Al. those build between September 1, 1940 and December 31, 1950 fall into category B and those built between Janury 1, 1951 and the date immediately before the date on which the Act was brought into force fall into category C. Under the Schedule, category A buildings are charged at the rate of 25% of the rateable value and at 4% if any building in that category is structurally repaired by the Board. If a building falls in category B, it is charged at 20% and at 30% if it is structurally repaired, and buildings falling in category C have to bear the tax at 15%, and at 20% if any one of them is structurally repaired by the Board. The Act thus makes three kinds (1) Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 81 Law Ed. 1245 at pp. 1261 and 1265.

The levy of the cess under s. 27 of the Act is not based on the principle of qid pro quo. Its object is not to repair all residential premises, but to preserve and prolong their lives in order to avert the dilema caused by the acute shortage of residential accommodation on the one hand, and the reluctance and/or inability of the owners to carry out repairs resulting from the (1) 79 Law. Ed. 1468.

Rent Act, on the other, and to establish an agency so that structural repairs to buildings in dangerous or ruinous conditions can be carried out. The finances for these objects are provided from. a fund from the impugned cess and contributions by the State and the Corporation. The contention that some of the buildings falling in catego- ries B and C would not need structural repairs throughout the life of the Act or that such repairs would be carried out in buildings not cared for by defaulting landlords, takes no notice of the fact that the primary object of the Act is not to repair all buildings subject to cess but to prevent the annually recurrent mischief of' house collapses and the human tragedy and deprivations they cause. The cess being thus levied to prevent such disasters, there is no question of unequal treatment between one class of owners and another. The classification of buildings into three categories is based, as already stated, on their age and the construction current during the periods of their erection. It is, therefore, based on an intelligible differentia and is closely related to the objects, of the legislation. There is, therefore, no question of unequals being treated as equals, as each building in respect of which the cess is payable falls within the surveillance of the Board and has to be structurally repaired if the need were to arise. The principle laid down in Moopil Nairs case(1) or in New Manek Chowk Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad(2) clearly does not apply to the present case.