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Petitioners belong to MIG, each of whom registered himself as an intending applicant for a flat in MIG scheme and each of whom has been allotted a flat either in Rajouri Garden, Prasad Nagar or Lawrence Road. Number of persons desirous of having a flat registered with the Authority far outnumbered the available flats with the result that lots had to be drawn and the lucky ones got a letter of allotment to pay the price set out in the brochure in respect of each scheme and to obtain a flat. Each petitioner had paid the price and has entered into possession of the allotted flat. All the petitioners now contend that the Authority has levied and collected a surcharge as part o: purchase price of flat arbitrarily and without the authority of law and has collected the same from them in violation of its object of functioning on 'no profit no loss' basis and thereby made a huge profit. They further contend that they have been subjected to discriminatory treatment in contravention of Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as no surcharge has been collected from allottees of flats in MIG schemes prior to November 1976 and subsequent to January 1977 except these three schemes and one Wazirpur MIG scheme. Further, no other MIG scheme flats have been subjected to such unauthorised levy of surcharge. It is pointed out that the levy of surcharge has been scrapped in 1978. The petitioners contend that levy of surcharge has no nexus to the object for which the Authority was set up namely, providing housing accommodation at reasonable price by the Authority whose declared policy is 'no profit no loss'. It was said on behalf of the petitioners that even if the Authority was set up for providing housing accommodation to the people in different income groups (keeping in view their financial capacity/affordability) yet a statutory body like the Authority operating on 'no profit no, loss' basis must have a scientifically prescribed formula for working out its price structure and that must be uniformly applied to all those who apply for flats and to whom they are allotted and such a statutory Authority cannot discriminate in working out the disposal price of the flats by including surcharge in respect of some MIG schemes within a certain specified period, a surcharge not authorised by law and not sanctioned by the Authority as a component of price and unknown to pricing of flats, while others similarly situated and similarly circumstanced and belonging to the same income group enjoyed the benefit cf getting flats at cost price and, therefore, petitioners have been accorded discriminatory treatment in the matter of price of flats allotted to them. Petitioners, therefore, contend that even if they applied for flats anc got registered and were offered flats and accepted the same at the price stated in the brochure and even if it has resulted in a concluded contract yet the Court should not turn a blind eye to such gross discrimination by a statutory authority charged with a duty to provide housing accommodation acting on the declared policy of 'no profit no loss'. It was simultaneously contended that the Vice- Chairman of the Authority authorised to determine the prices of flats in each income group has not made any order or has not given any direction for levy of surcharge and that the levy of surcharge was wholly unauthorised.

A preliminary objection was raised by the Authority that the petitions are not maintainable under Art. 32 of the Constitution inasmuch as The petitioners have not come to the Court for enforcement of a t fundamental right conferred upon the petitioners under Part III of the Constitution but the petitioners have invoked jurisdiction of this Court for a relief of re-opening concluded contracts. It was also submitted that if the Court accepts the contention of the petitioners they would derive an unfair advantage over others who may not have applied for flats because of the price set out in the brochure and if surcharge is excluded they may have applied for flats at a lower price and, there fore, also the Court should not entertain the petitions.

Though we are not inclined to reject the petitions on this preliminary objection as we have heard them on merits it is undeniable that camouflage of Art. 14 cannot conceal the real purpose motivating these petitions, namely, to get back a part of the purchase price of flats paid by the petitioners with wide open eyes after flats have been securely obtained and petition to this Court under Art. 32 is not a proper remedy nor is this Court a proper forum for re-opening the concluded contracts with a view to getting back a part of the purchase price paid and the benefit taken. The undisputed facts are that petitioners offered themselves for registration for allotment of flats that may be constructed by the, Authority for MIG scheme. After the registration and when the flats were constructed and ready for occupation brochures were issued by the Authority. One such brochure for ', allotment of MIG flats in Lawrence Road residential scheme is Annexure R-1. This brochure specifies the terms and conditions including price on which flat will be offered. It also reserved the right to surrender or cancel the registration, the mode and method of paying the price and handing over the possession. There is an application form annexed to the brochure. Annexure 'A' to the brochure sets out the price of flat on the ground floor, first floor and second floor respectively. It sets out the premium amount payable for land as also the total cost in respect of the flats on the ground floor, first floor and second floor. The statement also shows the earnest money deposited at the time of the registration and the balance payable. It is on the basis of these brochures that the applicants applied for the flats in Lawrence Road and other MIG schemes. They knew and are presumed to know the contents of the brochure and particularly the price payable. They offered to purchase the flats at the price on which the Authority offered to sell the same. After the lots were drawn and they were lucky enough to be found eligible for allotment of flats, each one of them paid the price set out in the brochure and took possession of the flat, and thus sale became complete. There is no suggestion that there was a mis-statement or incorrect statement or any fraudulent concealment in the information supplied in the brochure published by the Authority on the strength of which they applied and obtained flats. How the seller works out his price is a matter of his own choice unless it is subject to statutory control. Price of property is in the realm of contract between a seller and buyer. There is no obligation on the purchaser to purchase the flat at the price offered. Even afar registration the registered applicants may opt for other schemes. His light to enter into-other scheme opting out of present offer is not thereby jeopardised or negatived and applicants so outnumbered the available flats that lots had to be drawn. With this background the petitioners now contend that the Authority has collected surcharge as component of price which the Authority was not authorised or entitled to collect. Even if there may be any merit in this contention, though there is none, such a relief of refund cannot be the subject-matter of a petition under Art. 32. And Art. 14 cannot camouflage the real bone of contention. Conceding for this submission that the Authority has the trappings of a State or would be comprehended in 'other authority' for the purpose of Art. 12, while determining price of flats constructed by it, it acts purely in its executive capacity and "is bound by the obligations which dealings of the State with the individual citizens import into every transacting entered into the exercise of its constitutional powers But after the State or its agents have entered into the field of ordinary contract, the relations are no longer governed by the Constitutional provisions but by the legally valid contract which determines rights and obligations of the parties inter se. No question arises of violation of Art. 14 or of any other constitutional provision when the State or its agents, purporting to act within this field, perform any act. In this sphere, they can only claim rights conferred upon them by contract and are bound by the. terms of the contract only unless some statute steps in and confers some special statutory power or obligation on the State in the contractual field which is apart from contract" (see Radhakrishna Agarwal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.) Petitioners were under no obligation to seek allotment of flats even after they had registered themselves. They looked at the price and flats and applied for the flats. This they did voluntarily. hey were advised by the brochures to look at the flats before going in for the same. They were lucky enough to get allotment when the lots were drawn. Each one of them was allotted a flat and he paid the price voluntarily. They are now trying to wriggle out by an invidious method so as to get back a part of the purchase price not offering to return the benefit under the contract, namely, surrender of flat. I The Authority in its affidavit in reply in terms stated that it is. willing to take back the fiats and to repay them the full price. The transaction is complete, viz., possession of the flat is taken and price is paid. At a later stage when they are secure in possession with title, petitioners are trying to get back a part of the purchase price and thus trying to re-open and wriggle out of a concluded contract only partially. In a similar and identical situation a Constitution Bench of this Court in Har Shankar & ors. etc. etc. v. The Dy. Excise & Taxation Commr. & ors. has observed that those who contract with open eyes must accept the burdens of the contract along with its benefits. Reciprocal rights and obligations arising out of contract do not depend for their enforceability upon whether a contracting party finds it prudent to abide by the terms of the contract. By such a test no contract would ever have a binding force. The jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 of the Constitution is not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligations voluntarily incurred. It would thus appear that petitions ought not to have been entertained. However, as the petitions were heard on merits, the contentions canvassed on behalf of the petitioners may as well be examined The principal contention canvassed on behalf of the petitioners is that the treatment meted to them by the Authority is discriminatory inasmuch as no surcharge was levied on flats in MIG scheme constructed and allotted prior to November 1976 and after January 1977. MIG flats involved in these petitions were constructed and were available for allotment in November 1976 and the lots were drawn in January 1977. There is one more MIG scheme at Munirka where the allotment took place at or about the same time but in which case no surcharge was levied. The contention is that once for the purpose of eligibility to acquire a flat, the criterion is grounded in income brackets, MIG, LIG, et . those in the same income bracket form one class even for the purpose of determining disposal price of flat allotable to them irrespective of situation, location or other relevant determinants which enter into price calculation and therefore, in the same income group there cannot be differentiation by levying of surcharge in some cases and charging only the cost price in other cases and that the discrimination is thus writ large on the face of the record because by levying surcharge in case of petitioners they have been treated unequally and with an evil eye. It is difficult to appreciate how Art. 14 can be attracted in the circumstances hereinabove mentioned. Cost price of a property offered for sale is determined according to the volition of the owner who has constructed the property unless it is shown that he is under any statutory obligation to determine cost price according to certain statutory formula. Except the submission that the Authority has a proclaimed policy of constructing and offering flats on 'no profit no loss' basis which according to Mr. Nariman has a statutory flavour in the regulations enacted under the Act, the Authority is under no statutory obligation about its pricing policy of the flats constructed by it. When the flats were offered to the petitioners the price in round figure in respect of each flat was mentioned and surcharge was not separately set out and this price has been accepted by the petitioners. The obligation that regulations are binding on the Authority and have provided for a statutory price fixation formula on 'no profit no loss' basis will be presently examined but save this the Authority is under no obligation to fix price of different flats in differed. schemes albeit in the same income group at the same level or by any particular statutory or binding formula. The Authority having the trappings of a State might be covered by the expression 'other authority' in Art. 12 and would certainly be precluded from according discriminatory treatment to persons offering to purchase flats in the same scheme. Those who opt to take flats in a particular income- wise area-wise scheme in which all flats came up together as one project, may form a class and any discriminatory treatment in the same class may attract Art. 14. But to say that throughout its course of existence the Authority would be bound to offer flats income-groupwise according to the same price formula is to expect the Authority to ignore time, situation, location and other relevant factors which all enter the price structure. In price fixation executive has a wide discretion and is only answerable provided there is any statutory control over its policy of price fixation and it is not the function of the Court to sit in judgment over such matters of economic policy as must be necessarily left to the Government of the day to decide. The experts alone can work out the mechanics of price determination; Court can certainly not be expected to decide without' the assistance of the experts (See Prag Ice & oil Mills and Anr. etc. v. Union of India) In the leading judgment it has been observed that mechanics of price fixation have necessarily to be left to the executive and unless it is patent that there is hostile discrimination against a class the processual basis of price fixation has to be accepted in the generality of cases as valid.