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(emphasis supplied)

38. In my view therefore, both the prayers made by Plaintiff for specific performance of the Agreement dated 11 January 1988 as well as seeking declaration that the Agreement was subsisting or binding are clearly barred by provisions of Articles 54 and 58 of the Limitation Act. The first Appellate Court has undertaken the process of first determining whether the termination notice was legal and valid and thereafter holding that the Suit is within limitation. In absence of any prayer regarding validity of termination (which aspect has been dealt with separately), the first Appellate Court arrived at a finding that the termination notice itself was invalid. After holding that the termination notice was illegal, the first Appellate Court has held the Suit to be within limitation by referring to provisions of Article 113 of the Limitation Act. In my view, the entire process of Megha Page No. 27 of 51_ 16 April 2024 sa_350_2022 & 353_2022_fc.docx reverse engineering employed by the first Appellate Court by deciding the issue of limitation by linking it with the issue of validity of termination notice is grossly incorrect. The Plaint did not contain a prayer regarding validity of termination notice. This is the reason why neither Trial Court nor Appellate Court framed an issue as to whether the termination notice was invalid. In any case, the validity or otherwise of the termination notice has no connection with the issue of limitation. Even if the Plaint was to contain a prayer for declaring the termination notice to be invalid, still the period of limitation would apply to adjudicate that prayer. It is impermissible for the Court to first decide merits of termination and then hold the prayer for specific performance to be within limitation. The approach adopted by the first Appellate Court suffers from serious flaw.