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(n) That even if the court directed payment of arrears of rent, a statutory tenancy which had come into being by operation of law could not be converted back into contractual tenancy and the lessor was entitled to forfeit the lease and the court could not relieve the lessee from such forfeiture.
(o) That the lessors had reversionary interest and the same was never lost. That the rights conferred on the lessee company could not be exercised by the official liquidator as the liquidator would only come into the picture when an order of winding up was made. Thus, the reversionary interest which remained with the lessor could not be snatched away by the official liquidator.

27. It is beyond the pale of controversy that the purpose of enacting the Rent Act was to afford protection to a tenant against dispossession by landlord under the general law. One such restriction has been imposed by the provisions of Section 12 of the Rent Act. As can be seen from the provisions of Section 12 of the said Act, it is more a provision which disables a landlord from seeking possession than enables the tenant to seek protection. The result of the enactment of Section 12 of the Rent Act is that the right which the landlord otherwise had with the ordinary law being applicable to landlord and tenant, came to be restricted and conferred status of irremovability on the tenant against the landlord claiming possession of the property after determination of his tenancy. This situation has been commonly referred to as statutory tenancy as against the contractual tenancy which existed till that point of time. The tenant's possession would be, in a case where the contract of tenancy or lease has not come to an end, by virtue of the terms of the contract. In other words, if the tenant is entitled to possession by virtue of provision of any other statute apart from the Rent Act, such right is not affected by the provisions of the Rent Act and even if there might be a situation where some conditions stipulated in a provision of the Rent Act come to be satisfied, the tenant would yet be entitled to resist the claim of landlord for possession of the premises, if otherwise entitled to de hors the provisions of the Rent Act. A tenant needs no protection against eviction by the landlord so long as he has necessary protection under the terms of the contract entered into with the landlord. A tenant's right to hold over after the termination of the contractual tenancy is different from the right to protection during the contractual tenancy and the two rights must be kept distinct from each other. In the case of the former right provisions of the Rent Act come into play, while in the case of the latter right, ordinary law governing the rights of the tenant and landlord would become applicable.

28. It is settled law that the period of a subsisting lease cannot be curtailed in the absence of a forfeiture clause in the lease deed. The contractual tenancy would, thus, subsist as governed by provisions of the T. P. Act and there cannot be any eviction from such tenancy.

29. At a given point of time a view prevailed that the statutory tenancy was a personal right to remain in occupation after the contractual tenancy had been determined and there was no right to property but the position today is clear and well-settled. Tenancy is primarily a contract between landlord and tenant. During subsistence of a contractual tenancy the tenant has an estate or property in the subject matter of the tenancy and such an estate or property is heritable. Therefore, upon determination of such tenancy the estate does not necessarily disappear and the status of irremovability granted in favour of the tenant by the statute makes it clear that unless the decree or an order of eviction is made against the tenant he remains tenant as he was before the determination of the contract. Thus, the incidents of such tenancy, i.e., statutory tenancy and contractual tenancy are the same unless there is any provision in the Act conveying a contrary intention.

31. During the course of hearing great emphasis was laid on the provisions of Section 15 of the Rent Act, to contend that once statutory tenancy has come into being it would not be possible to assign or transfer the tenancy in any manner whatsoever except as stipulated in the proviso under Section 15(1) of the Rent Act. This contention was specifically raised in the case of Kalyanji Gangadhar Bhagat v. Virji Bharmal [1995] 3 SCC 725, wherein it was contended that the proviso must relate to contractual lease only. The apex court rejected this contention and held that the proviso was relatable to the premises held under statutory lease also and not merely to contractual leases. The court after reproducing an extract from earlier decision stated that (page 729) :