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14. The decisions the correctness of which has been doubted are largely based upon a decision of the Judicial Committee reported in 'MAHARAJAH OF BOBBILI v. NARASARAJU', 43 Ind App 238. The decree under execution in that case was obtained in the Court of the District Judge of Vizagapatam in April 1904. In September 1904, it was sent to the Court of the Munsif of Parvatipur for execution against property within the jurisdiction of that Court. It remained unexecuted in that Court till August 1910. On December 13th, 1907, the decree-holder applied to the District Judge of Vizagapatam for the execution of the decree. No conclusive action was taken on this application. The decree-holder again filed an execution petition before the District Judge on April 27th, 1910. The question arose whether limitation was saved by the execution petition of December 13th, 1907. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee gave their reasons for holding that it did not in these words:

16. In following this decision in 'KAMAKHYA NARAIN SINGH v. KALIPADO DUTT', AIR (26) 1939 Pat 289, Wort, J. referred to Section 38 of the Code and Order XXI, Rule 10, the latter of which provisions in his opinion makes it clear that the transferee Court has exclusive jurisdiction to execute the decree. He took the same view of the effect of 'MAHARAJAH OP BOBBILI'S CASE', 43 Ind App 238 P C, as was taken by Das, J. It does not appear if his attention was drawn to the decisions of other Courts in which that decision has been understood in the manner I have set out above ('MAHADUM BEG v. MUHAMMAD MEERA SAHIB', AIR (15) 1928 Mad 493 (2); 'KANTI NARAIN v. MADAN GOPAL', AIR (22) 1935 Lah 465; 'MAKKHAN LAL v. BHAGWANA KUER', 1936 All L J 277 and 'MUTHU RAMA REDDI v. MOTILAL DAGA', ILR (1938) Mad 326.) Regarding 'SARODA PROSAUD MULLICK'S CASE', 14 Moo Ind App 529 PC, his Lordship observed that it merely applied the principle laid down in Section 46 of the Code of 1908. With respect I would submit that at that time there was no provision in the Code for the issue of precepts, and what the decreeing Court had done was to send the decree to three different Courts for 'execution'. Manohar Lall, J. delivered a concurring judgment relying on the decision in 'JNANENDRA NATH GHOSH'S CASE', 2 Pat 247, and treating 'MAHARAJAH OF BOBBILI'S CASE' as applying to the facts of the case before him.

17. The point again arose in 'BISHUNDEO NARAIN 'MISSIR'S CASE', 19 Pat 354. Meredith J. (as he then was), with whom Wort, J. agreed accepted without discussion the decision in 'MAHARAJAH OP BOBBILI'S CASE', 43 Ind App 238 P C, as authority that without the certificate of non-satisfaction the transferor Court cannot entertain a petition for execution of the decree. The observation was made 'obiter', and it was held on another ground that limitation was saved.

18. In 'RAMESHWAR LAL'S CASE', 23 Pat 729, B.P. Sinha, J. (as he then was) made a reference to a Division Bench, doubting the correctness of the decision in 'KAMAKHYA NARAIN SINGH'S CASE', AIR (26) 1939 Pat 289. The facts were that the decree passed by a Court at Bhagalpur was transferred to Madhipura for execution. Before the sending of certificate of non-satisfaction to the Bhagalpur Court the decree-holder applied to it for execution against the person of the judgment-debtor. In a subsequent execution case in Madhipura the question arose if the execution petition in Bhagalpur was available to save limitation. The Division Bench answered the question in the negative. Chatterji. J. who delivered the judgment of the Co t pointed out in the course of it that 'MAHARAJAH OF BOBBILI'S CASE 43 Ind App 238 P C, proceeded mainly on the ground that the District Judge of Vizagapatam had no jurisdiction to sell the property which had been attached by the Munsif of Parvatipur and that other High Courts in India had placed an interpretation on that decision different from the view taken by this Court hitherto. Relying, however, on Order XXI, Rule 10 and; the observation of the Privy Council in 'MAHARAJAH OP BOBBILI'S CASE', that the Munsif of Parvatipur was "the Court whose duty it then was to execute the decree so far as it could be executed by the Court" he was not prepared to hold that the previous decisions of the Patna High Court were incorrect. I have already made my comments on the provisions of Order XXI, Rule 10. As regards the observation of the Privy Council I would suggest with respect that it supports the contrary view. Their Lordships of the Privy Council do not say that after the transfer of the decree it was only the Munsif of Parvatipur who could execute it. They carefully qualify their observation by adding "so far as it could be executed by that Court". That is to say, the authority of the Munsif to execute that decree operated to the extent of his ordinary jurisdiction to execute a decree. To that extent it was not open to the decreeing Court to entertain a petition for execution. It does not follow from this that the decreeing Court had not the power to execute the decree: outside the limits of the ordinary jurisdiction of the Munsif of Parvatipur. In this view I am supported by the observation of the Privy Council ill 'JANG BAHADUR'S CASE', 55 Ind App 227 P C. "Under Clause (c) of Section 39, sub-s. 1 of the Code of 1908, a decree, directing the sale of immovable property situate outside the local limits of the jurisdiction of the Court which passed it, may be transferred for purposes of execution to the Court within whose jurisdiction the property is situated. On such transfer the former Court does not altogether lose seisin of the decree. But the Court of transfer obtains jurisdiction to deal with that particular execution proceeding, and retains such jurisdiction until such execution is withdrawn or stayed or until it certifies to the Court which passed the decree either that the decree has been executed or if it fails to execute the decree, the circumstances attending such failure ( Section 41)."

The point emphasised by their Lordships is that the transferee Court obtained jurisdiction to deal with 'that particular execution proceeding', while the 'transferor' Court 'does not altogether lose seisin of the decree'. The words underlined (here single quoted) bring out, I think, the limits of the jurisdiction of the two Courts.

33. This decision is not, in any way, inconsistent with the earlier decision in 'MAHARAJAH OF BOBBILI'S CASE', 43 Ind App 238 (P C), if we only remember the facts of the case. In 'MAHARAJAH OF BOBBILI'S CASE', the decree-holder applied to the District Judge of Vizagapatam for the execution of the decree against property within the jurisdiction of the Munsif of Parvatipur. In that circumstance, it was held that the District Judge of Vizagapatam was not the proper Court within the meaning of Article 182 of the Limitation Act. The decision was not a decision on the question of law referred to above, but rather on the second question whether a particular Court was the proper Court within the meaning of Article 182, which question depended on the facts of the case.