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"Temple means a place, by whatever designation known, used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by the Hindu community or any section thereof as a place of religious worship."

Confining the attention to this definition, the essence of the matter is the existence of a place of public religious worship. In the case of a temple, it becomes a place of public religious worship when the idol was installed and consecrated and the pranaprathishta or vivi-fication ceremony was performed. Until then, it is elementary knowledge that the image does not become an object of worship. The deity does not begin to reside in the idol (the visible image) until the consecration or the appropriate ceremony is completed. After the image is completed by the artist, it is brought in procession from the artist's place to the hall of ablation and thenceforward the ceremonies of consecration commence. This applies to prathishta sthalams, i. e., to the temples in which the deity is established newly by observing a certain set of rules as opposed to swayambhu sthalams, temples in which the idol or the deity is swayam vyektha or self-revealed, i. e., the image is not established by the act of men. A description of the ceremonies in the case of prathishta sthalams is to be found in Saraswathi's Hindu Law of Endowments (p. 109) and in P. R. Ganapathi Aiyar's Eeligious Endowments (p. 224). Unless and until these ceremonies are gone through, the place where the idol is installed, and in the idol itself, does not become a fit object of religious worship. We are not in this case concerned with other places of religious worship where it may be by custom or usage some stone image or wooden image becomes an object o worship. We are concerned only with the coming into existence of the temple as contemplated by the founder, the installation of the idol of Alagarawami and its conaecration and performance of kumbabhishekam after the completion of the building. In the present case, therefore, there is no place of public religious worship. This aspect of the definition was clearly emphasized by the decision in Board of Commrs. for Hindu Eeligious Endowments, Madras v. Rugmini, 55 Mad.

20. But Mr. Muthiah Mudaliar, for the appellants, contends that since, admittedly, there is no temple building in existence and no deity installed or consecrated, the institution cannot be a temple as defined in Section 9 (12) of the Act or the trust a "religious endowment" as defined in Section 9 (11). For this purpose, reliance is placed on Vythilinga Pandara Sannadhi v. Sadasiva Ayyar, 55 M. L. J. 605 at pp. 612, 613 : (A. I. R. (15) 1928 Mad. 1272) and the appeal therefrom reported in Board of Commrs. for H. R. E., Madras v. Rugmini, 65 Mad. 636 : (A. I. R. (19) 1932 Mad. 470). In the earlier case, Kumaraswami Sastri J. has held that, where there is no temple in existence as a place of worship when the Act came into force, the old temple having fallen into ruins or having been demolished long ago Section 84 of the Act does not give the Board any power to call upon the trustees to account for. the endowed properties or to direct them to rebuild the temple or to apply the income in a particular manner by invoking the doctrine of cypres for the purpose of dealing with the income. It was therefore declared the Act did not apply to the properties which originally were dedicated or endowed for a temple which had been demolished or destroyed long prior to the coming into existence of the Act. Beasley C. J. and Cornish J. in appeal from the above decision, agreed with the view of the trial Judge and held that the Board had no jurisdiction where the temple was clearly non-existent, not temporarily but permanently, and there was no apparent intention of bringing it into existence again. But where it had been temporarily abandoned as a place of worship either on account of its being washed away by flood or submerged or burnt down, in such a case there is no permanent annihilation of the institution and as such the Act would apply to the properties of such a temple. This is clear from the definition of the word "temple" in Section 9 (12) to which reference has already been made. In order that the Act should be made applicable, the institution in question should be used firstly, as a place of public religious worship and secondly, dedicated to, or for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship. The definition connotes two distinct matters. There should be firstly a place of public religious worship and secondly dedication or user by the Hindu community or any section thereof. It is unnecessary that a building should be in existence: for, it is a matter of common knowledge that in many places in South India there are idols being worshipped without a roofing to cover the idol. One is aware of idols in forests or under trees without any roofing. In the present case, there is no user of the place for the purpose of religious worship because it is admitted that though an idol is in existence, it has not been installed or consecrated. The creator of the trust, as is seen from the trust deed, EX. r-2, contemplated the existence of the temple with the deity installed though the building had not been completed, because in more than one place in the document it is clearly mentioned that the dedication is to the deity, in the temple to be built thereafter. Therefore it may be that the contention of the learned advocate for the appellants that the order of the Board dated 27-9-1938 is a wrong order on the merits cannot be rejected.

21. The question then arises whether, without setting aside the order, it is open to the appellants to contend that the Board now has no right to take proceedings to frame a scheme. In order to justify such a contention the argument is advanced that the order of the Board evidenced by Ex. R-1 is ab initio void and without jurisdiction, because the Board acted absolutely without any jurisdiction in holding that where there was no public worship, a temple as defined in Section 9 (12) exists. Eeliance was placed for this contention on Thiruvengadam v. H. R. E. Board, Madras, I. L. R. (1946) Mad. 268 : (A. I. R. (32) 1945 Mad. 273). The facts of that case were as follows : There was a separate charity connected with the Sri Nachiar Temple at Srivilliputhur. Treating it as a specific endowment attached to the temple, the Board levied an annual contribution under Section 69 whereupon, the trustee filed a petition under Section 84 (2) of the Act before the District Judge for a decision whether the endowment came within the purview of the Act. The District Judge, on the acquiescence of the Board that Section 84 applied to such a case, held that the charity did constitute a specific endowment. In spite of this decision the trustee filed a suit in the Sub-Court for a declaration that the charity is a private charity and should not be regarded as a specific endowment. On the Subordinate Judge dismissing ther suit holding that the previous order of the District Judge under Section 84 (2) was a bar to the suit, an appeal was filed to the High Court. Leach C. J. and Yahya Ali J. held that, sincer the District Judge had no power, to pass an order on an application under Section 84 (2) because the dispute was not one of the nature referred to in the first sub-section, the suit was maintainable and therefore held that the order of the Subordinate Judge dismissing the auit was not correct. Because Section 84 refers only to a mutt or temple as defined in the Act, the learned Judges were of opinion that it had no application to the question as to whether the endowment is a specific endowment to the temple or a private charity, even though the trustees themselves had invoked the powers under Section 84 for a decision under that section. It is contended that this decision is in favour of the appellants for the reason that the principle underlying it is to the effect that, where the original decision was one without jurisdiction, even if the parties invited the Court to pass it and acquiesced in such a decision, a subsequent suit is still maintainable. If the circumstances of the present case are exactly similar to those in Thiruvengadam v. H. R. E. Board, Madras, I.L.R. (1946) Mad. 268 : (A. I. R. (32) 1945 Mad. 273), I am bound by that decision. But in my view the facts of the present case are different. That the original donor intended the existence of a temple is clear; and therefore the question before the Board was whether a temple as defined in Section 9 (12) existed or not. The Board had to decide whether such a temple or institution was used as a place of public religious worship and dedicated to, or for the benefit of or used as of right by, the Hindu community or any section thereof, as a place of religious worship. It may be that the Board wrongly decided that the place was used as a place of public religious worship. But that would not be sufficient to justify the view that the Board had no initial jurisdiction. The utmost that could be said is that the action of the Board amounted to a wrong exercise .of the jurisdiction vested in it, on the merits of the case and hence such a wrong decision ought to have been set aside by appropriate proceedings under Section 84 (2) of the Act, in default of which the order would become final. The question whether a suit can be filed for that purpose has now been set at rest by the amendment of Section 84 itself probably as a result of the deci-

45. It is common knowledge that there are in this Presidency many institutions of a mixed character, whose exact place among religious and charitable foundations is likely to be a matter of doubt or dispute. There are some samadhis or tombs and sepulchres of holy men, where an image of Siva is usually installed and worship, regular or occasional, is offered. Some of them have come to be considered as public temples by reason of the sanctity of the persons interred. There are private mausoleums where idols are installed and pooja offered, but which are not temples or temples as defined in the Act, because the public either do not care or are not allowed to worship at such places; Draiviasundaram v. Subramania, I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 854: (A.i.r. (32) 1946 Mad. 217), Velusami Goundan v. Dandapani, (1946) I M. l. J. 354 : (A. I. R. (33) 1946 Mad. 485). There having been cases where memorials erected originally in honour of heroes or martyrs have developed into places of public worship and have been declared to be public temples ; Board of Commissioners for H. R. E. Madras v. Narasimham, (1989) 1 M. L. J, 134 : (A.I.R. (26) 1939 Mad. 134). There are institutions like Bhajana matams where pictures or idols of God of the Hindu pantheon are kept, the public congregate daily or on stated occasions, sing the praise of God and receive prasadams. There are institutions loosely called mutts which, however, are private buildings in which house holders, belonging to particular sects or following particular tenets, live with their families. A so-called mutt may merely be the residence of a sanyasi or paradesi. There are also endowed mutts which are public institutions established for propagating particular systems of religious philosophy, presided over by an ascetic head. There are obaultries resorted to by the public, where images of Gods are installed and daily worship offered. There are also endowments of immovable property and cash for institutions of the foregoing types. There are foundations, of which it is difficult to say whether they are temples or mutts at all and whether they are temples or mutts as defined in the Act. If with reference to institutions of this kind, a dispute arises as to whether they are temples or mutts as defined in the Act, the Board is empowered, and indeed the duty is cast on the Board by Section 84 to enquire into and decide this dispute. If on enquiry the Board decides that the institution in question is not a temple or a mutt, its decision will be final, subject to the result of an application and an appeal under Section 84 (2) and (3) of the Act. Its decision cannot be considered to be one rendered by a Tribunal without jurisdiction merely because it turned out as a result of the enquiry that there was no mutt or temple. The same result would follow a decision of the Board that there was an institution answering the description of a temple or mutt as defined in the Act. Though the Act applies only to temples and mutts which are public institutions and though the jurisdiction of the Board does not extend to private temples or mutts which are not of the type defined in Section 9, Clauses (7) and (12) of the Act, still, the Board is, in my opinion, empowered by Section 84 to decide on the true character of these institutions as a preliminary to its exercising the other powers conferred by the Act in respect of "temples" and "mutts." In my opinion, the whole scheme of the Act and the language of Section 84 (1) bring this case within the category of cases referred to by Lord Esher M.R. in Reg. v. Income-tax Commissioner s,(1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313: (57 L.J.Q.B. 513) and in this case, the Legislature has entrusted the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. It is an erroneous application of the formula to say that in such a case the tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist because the Legislature gave it jurisdiction to determine all the facts including existence o the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdiction depends. If this reasoning is correct, it cannot be said that EX. r-1 was an order passed without jurisdiction. The appellants, however, have relied strongly upon a decision of this Court in Board of Commissioners for H. R. E., Madras v. Rugmini, 55 Mad. 636 : (A.I.R.(19) 1932 Mad. 470) in support of their contention and my learned brother Satyanarayana Rao J. has also placed considerable reliance on this decision to support his conclusion. In that case, Kumaraswami Sastri J. sitting on the original side of this Court, passed a decree declaring that the Act did not apply to the properties endowed for a temple which had disappeared long before the Act came into force and granting an injunction restraining the Board from exercising any of the powers conferred by the Act in respect of that endowment; Vythilinga Pandaru Sannadhi v. Sadasiva Aiyar, 55 M.L.J. 605: (A.i.r. (15) 1928 Mad. 1272). This decree was affirmed by Beasley C. J. and Cornish J. in Board of Commissioners for H.R.E., Madras v. Rugmini, 55 Mad. 636: (A. I. R. (19) 1932 Mad. 470). The learned Chief Justice referred to the fact that the temple in question had been in ruins for many years, that there was no prospect of its reappearance and that it was not used and could not be used as a place of public worship as contemplated by Section 9(12) of the Act. He also held that the Board had no jurisdiction over the endowments of a temple where the temple itself was clearly not in existence, not temporarily but permanently and there was no apparent intention of bringing it into existence. He added, however, a qualification of this proposition in these terms :