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"Sri Alagar temple, Thevaram, Periyakulam taluk, Mathurai district, is a temple as defined in the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1926, and is also an ezcepted temple."

4. The annexur to this order containing the reasons for the above decision was not filed by the Board in these proceedings and it is not known whether the Board after enquiry came to the conclusion on the evidence placed before it that the conditions of the definition of a "temple", as contained in the Act, were satisfied or not. From a later order of the Board, it is gathered, however, that at the time of the passing of the above order, both sides agreed to have the temple declared to be an excepted temple and that the deed of foundation supported that view. It is not clear from the evidence now adduced who the other side to the petition, Ex. R-1, was. In the cause title of the petition itself there is no name of. any respondent and it appears from the preamble to the order that Sri N. Sivaraj, advocate for the appellant alone, appeared at the time of the final hearing of the petition. As there is no legal evidence such as the annexure containing the grounds of the decision, it is difficult to know what exactly were the reasons that influenced the decision of the Board and who the other party to the proceedings was. The statement in Ex. P-2, later order of the Board, cannot be treated as secondary evidence of the contents of the annexure to the order in Ex. R-1. Further, if the other party was the Board, how far the consent of the Board and that of the petitioner would be a substitute for an enquiry contemplated by the petition. Exhibit R-3 is a matter which will be considered later. No steps, however, were taken by any person to have the correctness of the order questioned in an appropriate proceeding. 5. In the year 1940, the Board suo motu initiated proceedings under Section 62 of the Act for the settlement of a scheme for Sri Alagar temple Thevaram. The reasons given in the notice issued on 9-5-1940 (vide Ex. P-2) for starting the scheme proceedings by the Board were : (i) steps have not been taken for the construction of the temple, (ii) each trustee leases the temple lands without the knowledge of the other, which results in litigation, (iii) accounts are not maintained (the word 'not' is omitted in Ex. P-2 at p. 23), and (iv) trustees have not taken possession of certain properties endowed for the temple. After this notice, the matter came up for consideration before the Board and an objection was taken that the Board had no jurisdiction to frame a scheme as the temple had not come into existence. This question was taken as a preliminary point for consideration by the Board consisting of Mr. Mannadi Nair and Mr. Kameswara Rao. Mr. Mannadi Nair was of opinion that as no temple had come into existence and as the existence of a temple was the first requisite for the exercise of the jurisdiction of the Board under the Act, including the framing of a scheme under Sections 62 and 63 the proceedings were without jurisdiction. He thought that the prior order of the Board declaring the temple an excepted one must have proceeded under a mistake and that merely by reason of that order he could not assume the existence of a temple for the purpose of framing a scheme, when in fact none existed. Mr. Kameswara Bao, however, differed from this view. His opinion was that, as the prior decision was not challenged in a Court of law as provided by the Act, the Board had no right to go beyond the view contained therein which proceeded on the basis that there is a "temple" which is an "excepted temple" and that therefore the Board had jurisdiction. He, however, overlooked the fundamental fact that the very notice stated as the first ground for framing a scheme that steps had not been taken for the construction of the temple which clearly establishes that notwithstanding the order, there was in fact no temple in existence. The matter thereafter came up for consideration before a full Board as a result of the difference of opinion between the two Commissioners. Mr. Ramachandra Chettiar, Commisaioner no. 1 expressed as his opinion that the notional existence of a temple was sufficient to justify the action of the Board, notwithstanding that the building was not completed, the idol was not installed, and pranaprathishta and kumbabhishekam were not performed and expressed further that though it has not been possible for the public to go and worship the deity at the place, because there has not been a formal ceremonial consecration, it was still a temple which attracted the provisions of the Act. The Commissioner No. 3, Mr. Krishna Rao, thought that the prior order of the Board was final as it was not a case where the Board lacked inherent jurisdiction but was a case where the Board exercised jurisdiction irregularly. As a result of this opinion of the full Board, it was decided that the Board had jurisdiction to start an enquiry under Sections 62 and 63 of the Act. This order was dated 2-5-1945. On this the two trustees filed in the District Court a petition under Section 84 (2) of the Act to set aside the said order of the Board on the ground, that the Board had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings under Sections 62 and 63 of the Act, as there was no temple in existence at any time and as at the time of the passing of the prior order, first petitioner's advocate was not authorised to consent to any such order and that while fighting the jurisdiction of the Board, the advocate could not possibly and legally have consented to the passing of such an order. It was also alleged in the petition that one of the joint trustees was not a party and that the order of the Board was without jurisdiction. The Board in the counter filed on their behalf pleaded that the prior order under Section 84 of the Act was final and barred the present application and that the petition did not lie under Section 84 (2). The Board did not, however, specifically deny in their counter the categorical assertion of the petitioners that there was no temple in existence as no idol was installed and consecrated.

636 : (A. I. R. (19) 1932 Mad. 470), where, at p. 638, Beasley C. J. observed as follows :

"The definition of a temple in the Act requires it to be a place which is used; and this temple, not only was not used and is not being used, but it cannot be used until it is rebuilt. It has in fact been in ruins for many years. I, therefore, think, that the learned trial Judge was perfectly right in holding that the Board had no jurisdiction with regard to its properties."

The learned Chief Justice pointed out, lower down in the judgment, that the Board had no jurisdiction where the temple clearly is non-existent. It is therefore difficult to hold that when there is no temple as defined in the Act, the Board could have any jurisdiction in the matter. When the Act contains a definition of the word "temple" and when it says, in defining the words used in the Act, that unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, the word would have a particular meaning, it is not permissible to adopt the dictionary mean of the word. It is not suggested--and there is no reason to assume--that in the subject or context there is any repugnancy to justify the adoption of the dictionary meaning of the word in preference to the meaning given to it by the Legislature by the definition of the word in the Act. Adopting therefore the definition of the word as given in the Act, there is nothing in the evidence on record or in any of the orders of the Board which justify the inference that there is any temple or a place of public religious worship, as defined by the Act. The very foundation of the jurisdiction of the Board to apply the Act is the existence of the temple. If it did not exist, the Act ceases to apply. By this, it should not be understood that Venkataswami failed to establish a valid religious charity. According to Hindu religion, the deity always exists and soon after the property is dedicated by an appropriate method, it vests in the deity. By the dedication the property ceases to belong to the owner and vests in the deity, but until the idol is establised and consecrated and the pranaprathishta is performed, the deity does not begin to reside in the idol so as to make a proper object of religious worship. The jurisdiction of the Board over the endowments or the property dedicated commences only when appropriate ceremonies are performed, the idol is established and the place is made fit for public religious worship. Until then, it has no jurisdiction under the Act to exercise any powers over that property under the Hindu Religious Endowments Act. The trust created by the founder can well be enforced by other appropriate proceedings, but we are concerned in this case only with the jurisdiction of the Board to frame a scheme of administration in the exercise of the powers vested in it under Sections 62 and 63 of the Act. The powers can be exercised only if there is a temple in existence in the sense in which it is defined in the Act. I therefore agree with the view of the learned District Judge and Mr. Mannadi Nair that there is no temple in existence.

34. A dispute as to whether an institution is a "temple" as defined in the Act may arise in the course of the numerous proceedings which the Board might claim to initiate in respect of temples, in the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Board by the several sections of the Act. Such a dispute may arise in the course of any of the proceedings contemplated by Sections 18, 38,42, 45, 51 to 57, 69, 60, 65, 69, 70, 73, 75-A, 76 and 80. A decision of the dispute as to whether an institution is a temple as defined in the Act might be essential before further action is taken under the above sections by the Board or the Assistant Commissioner, as the case may be. Section 84 (1) is designedly framed in wider terms. When the Board decides a dispute as to whether an institution is a "temple" as defined in the Act, whatever be the nature or stage of the proceeding in which such dispute arises or decision is given, the Board acts under Section 84 (1) of the Act. Section 84 (1) does not insist that the dispute should be brought before the Board by means of an independent application or original petition or that the dispute contemplated by the section should be the only matter arising for the decision of the Board. If this view is correct, the remedy under Section 84 (2) was open to the trustees to set aside the decision of the Board, given in the course of the proceedings for settling a scheme, that there was here a "temple" as defined by the Act.

45. It is common knowledge that there are in this Presidency many institutions of a mixed character, whose exact place among religious and charitable foundations is likely to be a matter of doubt or dispute. There are some samadhis or tombs and sepulchres of holy men, where an image of Siva is usually installed and worship, regular or occasional, is offered. Some of them have come to be considered as public temples by reason of the sanctity of the persons interred. There are private mausoleums where idols are installed and pooja offered, but which are not temples or temples as defined in the Act, because the public either do not care or are not allowed to worship at such places; Draiviasundaram v. Subramania, I.L.R. (1945) Mad. 854: (A.i.r. (32) 1946 Mad. 217), Velusami Goundan v. Dandapani, (1946) I M. l. J. 354 : (A. I. R. (33) 1946 Mad. 485). There having been cases where memorials erected originally in honour of heroes or martyrs have developed into places of public worship and have been declared to be public temples ; Board of Commissioners for H. R. E. Madras v. Narasimham, (1989) 1 M. L. J, 134 : (A.I.R. (26) 1939 Mad. 134). There are institutions like Bhajana matams where pictures or idols of God of the Hindu pantheon are kept, the public congregate daily or on stated occasions, sing the praise of God and receive prasadams. There are institutions loosely called mutts which, however, are private buildings in which house holders, belonging to particular sects or following particular tenets, live with their families. A so-called mutt may merely be the residence of a sanyasi or paradesi. There are also endowed mutts which are public institutions established for propagating particular systems of religious philosophy, presided over by an ascetic head. There are obaultries resorted to by the public, where images of Gods are installed and daily worship offered. There are also endowments of immovable property and cash for institutions of the foregoing types. There are foundations, of which it is difficult to say whether they are temples or mutts at all and whether they are temples or mutts as defined in the Act. If with reference to institutions of this kind, a dispute arises as to whether they are temples or mutts as defined in the Act, the Board is empowered, and indeed the duty is cast on the Board by Section 84 to enquire into and decide this dispute. If on enquiry the Board decides that the institution in question is not a temple or a mutt, its decision will be final, subject to the result of an application and an appeal under Section 84 (2) and (3) of the Act. Its decision cannot be considered to be one rendered by a Tribunal without jurisdiction merely because it turned out as a result of the enquiry that there was no mutt or temple. The same result would follow a decision of the Board that there was an institution answering the description of a temple or mutt as defined in the Act. Though the Act applies only to temples and mutts which are public institutions and though the jurisdiction of the Board does not extend to private temples or mutts which are not of the type defined in Section 9, Clauses (7) and (12) of the Act, still, the Board is, in my opinion, empowered by Section 84 to decide on the true character of these institutions as a preliminary to its exercising the other powers conferred by the Act in respect of "temples" and "mutts." In my opinion, the whole scheme of the Act and the language of Section 84 (1) bring this case within the category of cases referred to by Lord Esher M.R. in Reg. v. Income-tax Commissioner s,(1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313: (57 L.J.Q.B. 513) and in this case, the Legislature has entrusted the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. It is an erroneous application of the formula to say that in such a case the tribunal cannot give itself jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist because the Legislature gave it jurisdiction to determine all the facts including existence o the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of its jurisdiction depends. If this reasoning is correct, it cannot be said that EX. r-1 was an order passed without jurisdiction. The appellants, however, have relied strongly upon a decision of this Court in Board of Commissioners for H. R. E., Madras v. Rugmini, 55 Mad. 636 : (A.I.R.(19) 1932 Mad. 470) in support of their contention and my learned brother Satyanarayana Rao J. has also placed considerable reliance on this decision to support his conclusion. In that case, Kumaraswami Sastri J. sitting on the original side of this Court, passed a decree declaring that the Act did not apply to the properties endowed for a temple which had disappeared long before the Act came into force and granting an injunction restraining the Board from exercising any of the powers conferred by the Act in respect of that endowment; Vythilinga Pandaru Sannadhi v. Sadasiva Aiyar, 55 M.L.J. 605: (A.i.r. (15) 1928 Mad. 1272). This decree was affirmed by Beasley C. J. and Cornish J. in Board of Commissioners for H.R.E., Madras v. Rugmini, 55 Mad. 636: (A. I. R. (19) 1932 Mad. 470). The learned Chief Justice referred to the fact that the temple in question had been in ruins for many years, that there was no prospect of its reappearance and that it was not used and could not be used as a place of public worship as contemplated by Section 9(12) of the Act. He also held that the Board had no jurisdiction over the endowments of a temple where the temple itself was clearly not in existence, not temporarily but permanently and there was no apparent intention of bringing it into existence. He added, however, a qualification of this proposition in these terms :