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Showing contexts for: prompt dower deferred in Maqbul-Un-Nissa Begam vs Abdul Karim Khan And Muhammad Raza Khan ... on 4 April, 1908Matching Fragments
(iii) A certificate granted under this Act and having the debt specified therein, or *
(iv) A certificate granted under Act XXVII of 1800 * * * or
(v) A certificate granted under the Regulation of the Bombay Code No. VIII of 1827.
4. Sub-section 2 defines "debt" as including any debt, except rent, revenue or profits payable in respect of land used for agricultural purposes. Debt is therefore used in a very wide sense. The plaintiff has not produced probate, or letters of administration or a certificate as required by the Act. It is contended on her behalf that, inasmuch as the dower in respect of which she sues was deferred dower, it never was payable to Kadri Begam, and therefore her husband was not her debtor within the meaning of Section 4. Reliance is placed upon two decisions of the Calcutta High Court as supporting this contention. The first is the case of Nemdhari Roy v. Mussummat Bissessari Kumari (1898) 2 C.W.N. 594 in which it was held that the Succession Certificate Act referred only to debts for the recovery of which the deceased could sue, and that for debts falling due after death an heir may sue without a certificate. O'Kinealy, J., and Rampini, J., in their judgment observed: "In law we know two kinds of debts; debts which have accrued due and debts not accruing (sic) due, but which will be due. Now the Succession Certificate Act refers only to such debts as the deceased could sue upon. The debt in this case has fallen due since the death of the deceased." The learned Judges do not give any reasons for so restricting the meaning of the word debt. We do not find any language in the Succession Certificate Act to bear out the statement that the Act refers only to debts for the recovery of which the deceased could have sued. The language of the Act is quite general and defines a debt within the meaning of Section 4 as including "any debt except rent, revenue or profits * *." Dower, whether prompt or deferred, is a debt due by the husband to the wife, but in the case of deferred dower is debitum in praesenti solvendum in futuro.
6. Now the wife's right to dower, whether prompt or deferred, accrues as soon as her marriage is validly contracted. She can alienate it, pledge it, or make a free gift of it, either to her husband, or to her relations or to third parties, Mr. Ameer Ali in his "Personal Law of the Muhammadans" (2nd Edition, page 392)says: "Dower is a debt, like all other liabilities of the husband, and has preference over legacies bequeathed by the testator and the rights of heirs. A partition of the estate cannot take place until the dower debt has been satisfied. When the wife is alive she can recover the debt herself from the estate of her deceased husband. If she be dead her representatives stand in her place and are entitled to recover the same." Dower in fact, whether it be prompt or deferred, is a debt due from the husband to the wife. If the dower be prompt, it is presently payable. If it be deferred it is payable in the case of death or divorce--a debt payable in future, but none the less a debt of the husband. It is a debt which accrued due on the completion of the marriage contract, but a debt payment of which is deferred." "The law," said Brett, M. R., "has always recognized as a debt two kinds of debt, a debt payable at the time, and a debt payable in the future." Webb v. Stenton (1883) L.R. 11 Q.B.D., 518; at p. 524, Deferred dower is a debt payable in the future. We think therefore that the Court Cannot pass any decree in favour of the plaintiff without the production of a succession certificate. But we also think that the plaintiff should have an opportunity, if so advised, of producing such certificate. Accordingly we shall defer passing a decree in this appeal for a period of two months so as to give an opportunity to the plaintiff of obtaining the necessary certificate. We accordingly adjourn the bearing of this appeal for two months.