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The contention put forward on behalf of the respondents is that they are in no way responsible for the delay in clearing the goods as the goods had been detained under the Import Trade Control Regulations. It is no doubt true that before clearance is given by the Import Trade Control authorities and the Customs Department the goods cannot be cleared by the respondents. Neither can the Port Trust deliver the goods without the consent of the Import Trade Control authorities. Taking into account the hardship caused to the importer because of the delay certain conces- sions in demurrage rates are permitted. The Port Trust has prescribed the reduced demurrage levy which is 1/6th of the normal rate from the date of expiry of the free days upto the 60th day, 1/3rd of the normal rate after the expiry of the 60th day, upto the 90th day, half the normal rate after the expiry of the 90th day upto the 120th day, 2/3rd of the normal rate after the expiry of the 120th day upto the 150th day and at the full rate after the expiry of the 150th day. As the scale of rates are framed by virtue of the statutory powers conferred on the Board under section 43 and as the rates have been approved by the Central Government under section 43B the rates have the force of law and cannot be questioned. Taking into account the hardship to the import- ers certain concession has been given but the legality of the rates which are being levied according to law cannot be questioned. This view was taken by this Court in a recent decision reported in Trustees the Port of Madras v. M/s. Aminchand Pyarelal & Ors. (1) Where it had t6 consider the validity of the scale of rates fixed by the Madras Port Trust. In a suit by the Port Trust against the importer and the Union of India and the Customs authorities to recov- er the balance of demurrage amounting to about rupees three lakhs the question arose whether the scale of charges in the Port Trust Regulations under the heading "Demurrage" was void and ultra vires for the reason that it was unrea- sonable and not within the authority of the Port Trust. The relevant provisions of the Bombay Port Trust Act with which we are concerned are in pari materia with the provisions of the Madras Act which fell for consideration by the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court held that the scale of rates and statement of conditions flamed by the Madras Port Trust under sections 42, 43 and 43A are not by-laws (1) [1976] 1 S.C.R. 721.] and the sections confer authority on the Board to frame a scale of rates at which and a statement or conditions under which any of the services specified therein shall be per- formed. It observed "The Board's power to frame a scale of rates and statement of conditions is not a regulatory power to order that something must be done or something may not be done. The rates and conditions govern the basis on which the Board performs the services mentioned in sections 42, 43 and 43-A. Those who desire to avail of the services of the Board are liable to pay for those services at prescribed rates and to perform the conditions framed in that behalf by the Board." The Court rejected the view of the High Court that demurrage being a charge for wilful failure to remove the goods within the free period can' be levied only if the failure to remove the-goods is due to the fault or negli- gence of the importer or his agent. It also did not agree with the view taken by the High Court that the authority given to the Board to frame the scale of rates can be exer- cised only for the purpose of levying charges where the importer was not prevented by any lawful authority from clearing the goods from the transit area and he had default- ed or was negligent in clearing the goods. Justice Chandra- chud, who spoke for the Court, observed in his judgment at page 736 supra that the statute had not placed any limita- tion on the power of the Board to fix rates and as the Board had the power to frame a scale of rates at which and the statement of conditions under which any of the services specified in the section shall be performed and as the Board has fixed the scale of rates it was difficult to see in what manner or respect the Board has exceeded its power under section 42. The Court proceeded to observe in rejecting the view of the High Court that the Board cannot fix rates of demurrage when the failure to remove was not due to some fault or negligence of the importer, that there is no such fetter on the Board's powers to fix the rates. This deci- sion of the Supreme Court is on all fours with the facts of the present case and concludes the question. Mr. Nariman, counsel for the appellants cited three deci- sions of the English Courts in support of his contention that even on the basis of a contract the right of the Port Trust to recover demurrage cannot be denied unless the person claiming the demurrage is responsible for the delay. In Aktieselskabet Reidar v. Arcos, Limited (1), Lord Justice Atkin in answering the question whether if the chatterer has failed to complete the loading of the ship within the lay days, and the ship during the demurrage days becomes, without the default of the shipowner, unable to carry as much cargo as she would have carried if loaded within the lay days, but receives from the charterer a full cargo for her diminished capacity, the loss falls upon the charterer in addition to the demurrage, expressed his opin- ion that the decision should be for the shipowner. It was held that "The result of the authorities appears to be that in a contract fixing a number of lay days and providing for days at demurrage thereafter, the charterer enters into a binding obligation to load a complete cargo within the lay days subject to any default by the shipowner or to the operation (1) [1927] 1 K.B. 352.