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6. Referring to the admitted fact that the school management has passed the impugned order of compulsory retirement NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10327/2007 ORDER DATED: 31/07/2024 undefined without seeking prior approval from the D.E.O. Mr. J. A. Trivedi, L.A. appearing for applicant has submitted that this is the case of clear breach of Section 36 of the Act. Though the action of compulsory retirement is not included in Section - 36 (1) of the Act, it is contended by Mr. Trivedi that the action of compulsory retirement is covered under the cases of "otherwise terminated" because the net effect of the order of compulsory retirement is identical to that of the action of termination as in both the cases the relationship of master and servant is served. In support of this contention he has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Shri Mahuva Kelevani Sahayak Samaj and others Vs. Rashiklal K. Joshi & Anor reported in 1996 (2) GLH 269, Mr. Prajapati, L.A. appearing for the management has submitted that looking to the clear-cut language of Section 36 (1) and having regard to the fact that the action of compulsory retirement is totally different from the action of termination, it cannot be said that the cases of compulsory retirement are covered under the cases of "otherwise terminated". On behalf of the D.E.Ο., it is pointed out that the management had never made a proposal to the D.E.O. seeking approval prior to passing of the impugned order. It is, therefore, an admitted fact that the management has not sought the approval from the D.E.O. seeking approval to their action of retiring the delinquent compulsorily from services. Upon hearing the parties and perusal of the language of Section - 36 so also the judgment referred by L.A. for applicant hereinabove, I am of the view that the action of "compulsory retirement"

NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10327/2007 ORDER DATED: 31/07/2024 undefined cannot be considered as the action of "otherwise terminated", as mentioned in Section 36 (1) of the Act. The act of termination and the act of compulsory retirement are two different and distinct actions with two different results flowing there from. In the matters of termination, the concerned employee is not entitled to the accrued benefits of qualifying service rendered by him whereas in the case of "compulsory retirement" there is no forfeiture of accrued benefit of qualifying service rendered by the concerned employee. In the latter case the concerned employee becomes entitled to receive pension and post- retrial benefits whereas in the case of termination, he is not entitled to such benefits. Merely because the effect of both the actions viz. "otherwise terminated" and "compulsory retirement" is the same i.e. severance of master and servant relationship but in the case of termination, the employee is not entitled to the retrial benefits whereas in the case of compulsory retirement is not included in Section 36 (1) of the Act, it is contended by Mr. Trivedi that the action of compulsory retirement is covered under the cases of "otherwise terminated" because the net effect of the order of compulsory retirement is identical to that of the action of termination as in both the cases the relationship of master and servant is severed. In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Shri Mahuva Kelevani Sahayak Samaj and others Vs. Rasiklal K. Joshi and Anor reported in 1996(2) GLH 269, Mr. Prajapati L.A. appearing for the management has submitted that looking to the clear-cut NEUTRAL CITATION C/SCA/10327/2007 ORDER DATED: 31/07/2024 undefined language of Section - 36 (1) and having regard to the fact that the action of compulsory retirement is totally different from the action of termination, it cannot be said that the cases of compulsory retirement are covered under the cases of "otherwise termination". On behalf of the D.E.O., it is pointed out that the management had never made a proposal to the D.E.O. seeking approval prior to passing of the impugned order. It is, therefore, an admitted fact that the management has not sought the approval from the D.E.O. seeking approval to their action of retiring the delinquent compulsorily from services. Upon hearing the parties and perusal of the language of Section - 36 so also the judgment referred by L. A. for applicant hereinabove, I am of the view that the action of "compulsory retirement"