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31. It is already stated in the earlier part of this judgment that it is common ground between the parties that the Hazur order had been passed by His Highness in the exercise of his prerogative and sovereign powers. Thus, so far as the internal sovereignty was concerned, the Ruler of the State was the absolute monarch. His will was the law in respect to all matters upon which it was proclaimed. He was bound by no will except his own. He could make and administer laws. He was the fountain-head of justice. He could have justifiably described himself in the words attributed to Louis XIV of France:- "The State, it is I". All the political power was centred in him. Despite the Government of Baroda Act, he was still in strictness a sovereign of his State in the legal sense of that term. Any law made by him was binding and there was no power in his State which could annul or otherwise affect such law, except with his previous sanction. The powers of the Ruler of an Indian State were considered in two recent decisions of the Supreme Court. In Ameer-Un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum , on February 8, 1938, one Mahboob Begum had filed a suit in the Court established under the law of the State, praying for a declaration that she was the legally married wife of the deceased Nawab Wali-Ud-Dowlah. When the suit was pending, the Nizam issued a 'Firman' on February 19, 1939, directing the withdrawal of the suit from the said Court and appointing a Special Commission to investigate the matter of the dispute of Mahboob Begum and to submit a report to him (Nizam) through the Executive Council. The Commission made a report in" favour of Mahboob Begum and on March 20, 1946, the Executive Council recommended that the findings of the Commission should he accepted and this recommendation was approved by the Nizam by a 'Firman' dated June 26, 1947, which directed that the decision of the Commission which was in favour of Mahboob Begum should be implemented. On February 24, 1949, the Nizam issued another 'Firman' by which he dismissed the claim of Mahboob Begum. But this 'Firman' had been issued ex parte, and 011 a representation by Mahboob Begum, the Nizam issued a further 'Firman' which revoked the earlier 'Firman' of February 24, 1949, and the whole case was referred for opinion and report to one Sir George Spence.

32. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the meaning and the effect to be given to the abovementioned three 'Firmans' of the Nizam. They held (p. 359):

...that prior to the integration of Hyderabad State with the Indian Union and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, the Nizam of Hyderabad enjoyed uncontrolled sovereign powers. He was the supreme legislature, the supreme judiciary and the supreme head of the executive, and there were no constitutional limitations upon his authority to act in any of these capacities. The 'Firmans' were expressions of the sovereign will of the Nizam and they were binding in the same way as any other law; -nay, they would override all other laws which were in conflict with them. So long as a particular 'Firman' held the field, that alone would govern or regulate the rights of the parties concerned, though it could be annulled or modified by a later 'Firman' at any time that the Nizam willed.

33. Then their Lordships considered the question whether the 'Firmans' were in the nature of legislative enactments or judicial orders. They observed (p. 359) :

The Nizam was not only the supreme legislature, he was the fountain of justice as well. When (by his first Firman of February 19, 1939) he constituted a new Court (the Commission), he could, according to ordinary notions, be deemed to have exercised his legislative authority. When he affirmed (by his second Firman of June 26, 1947) or reversed (by his third Firman of February 24, 1949) a judicial decision, that may appropriately be described as a judicial act. A rigid line of demarcation, however, between the one and the other would from the very nature of things be not justified or even possible.

If the law-making powers of the State belonged only to the Legislature and the judiciary and if the law of the State, therefore, could express itself either in the form of legislative enactment or in the form of judicial decisions, it would be indeed difficult to ascertain which 'Firman' would be legislative and which judicial in character, when the 'Firman' issuing authority were one and the same being both the Supreme Legislature and the Supreme Judiciary. It was for this reason that their Lordships of the Supreme Court considered the effect of the 'Firmans' not only on the footing that they amounted to judicial decisions but also on the footing that they were in the nature of legislative enactments determining private rights somewhat on the analogy of private Acts of Parliament. In another place of their judgment their Lordships observed that the Firmans issued by the Nizam could be likened to judicial pronouncements only in the sense that they affected the rights and parties to a civil dispute.